A physician pleaded guilty today to conspiracy to commit health care fraud for his role in an approximately $19 million Medicare fraud scheme involving three Detroit area providers.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Blanco of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Daniel L. Lemisch of the Eastern District of Michigan, Special Agent in Charge David P. Gelios of the FBI’s Detroit Division, Special Agent in Charge Lamont Pugh III of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General’s (HHS-OIG) Chicago Regional Office and Special Agent in Charge Manny Muriel of Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) made the announcement.
Abdul Haq, 72, of Ypsilanti, Michigan, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud before U.S. District Judge Denise Page Hood of the Eastern District of Michigan. Sentencing has been scheduled for May 29, 2018 before Judge Hood.
As part of his guilty plea, Haq admitted that he conspired with the owner of the Tri-County Network, Mashiyat Rashid, and his co-defendants and others to prescribe medically unnecessary controlled substances, including Oxycodone, Hydrocodone and Opana, to Medicare beneficiaries, many of whom were addicted to narcotics. He further admitted that in furtherance of the conspiracy, Rashid and others also directed physicians, including Haq and others, to require Medicare beneficiaries to undergo medically unnecessary facet joint injections if the beneficiary wished to obtain prescriptions for controlled substances.
In furtherance of the conspiracy, Haq and others referred Medicare beneficiaries to specific third party home health agencies, laboratories and diagnostic providers even though those referrals were medically unnecessary, he admitted. Haq also served as the straw owner of various pain clinics owned and/or controlled by Rashid, and submitted false and fraudulent enrollment materials to Medicare that failed to disclose the ownership interest of Rashid, as it was illegal for Rashid – a non-physician – to own medical clinics under Michigan law. In total, Haq admitted that he submitted or caused the submission of approximately $19,322,846.60 in false and fraudulent claims to Medicare.
Haq was charged along with Mashiyat Rashid, 37, of West Bloomfield, Michigan; Yasser Mozeb, 35, of Madison Heights, Michigan; Spilios Pappas, 61, of Monclova, Ohio; Joseph Betro, 57, of Novi, Michigan; Tariq Omar, 61, of West Bloomfield, Michigan; and Mohammed Zahoor, 51 of Novi, Michigan, in an indictment unsealed on July 6. Rashid, Mozeb, Pappas, Betro, Omar and Zahoor are awaiting trial.
An indictment is merely an allegation and all defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
This case was investigated by the FBI, HHS-OIG and IRS-CI. Trial Attorney Jacob Foster of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section is prosecuting the case.
The Fraud Section leads the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, which is part of a joint initiative between the Department of Justice and HHS to focus their efforts to prevent and deter fraud and enforce current anti-fraud laws around the country. The Medicare Fraud Strike Force operates in nine locations nationwide. Since its inception in March 2007, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force has charged over 3,500 defendants who collectively have falsely billed the Medicare program for over $12.5 billion.
Alden, New York-based contractors, Zoladz Construction Company Inc. (ZCCI), Arsenal Contracting LLC (Arsenal), and Alliance Contracting LLC (Alliance), along with two owners, John Zoladz of Darien, New York, and David Lyons of Grand Island, New York, have agreed to pay the United States more than $3 million to settle allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by improperly obtaining federal set-aside contracts designated for service-disabled veteran-owned (SDVO) small businesses, the Justice Department announced today.
“Contracts are set aside for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses so to afford veterans with service-connected disabilities the opportunity to participate in federal contracting and gain valuable experience to help them compete for future economic opportunities,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A. Readler of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Every time an ineligible contractor knowingly pursues and obtains such set-aside contracts, they are cheating American taxpayers at the expense of service-disabled veterans.”
To qualify as a SDVO small business, a service-disabled veteran must own and control the company. The United States alleged that Zoladz recruited a service-disabled veteran to serve as a figurehead for Arsenal, which purported to be a legitimate SDVO small business but which was, in fact, managed and controlled by Zoladz and Lyons, neither of whom is a service-disabled veteran. The United States alleged that Arsenal was a sham company that had scant employees of its own and instead relied on Alliance and ZCCI employees to function. After receiving numerous SDVO small business contracts, Arsenal is alleged to have subcontracted nearly all of the work under the contracts to Alliance, which was owned by Zoladz and Lyons, and ZCCI, which was owned by Zoladz. Neither Alliance nor ZCCI were eligible to participate in SDVO small business contracting programs. Zoladz and Lyons are alleged to have carried out their scheme by, among other things, making or causing false statements to be made to the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) regarding Arsenal’s eligibility to participate in the SDVO small business contracting program and the company’s compliance with SDVO small business requirements.
“Detecting and discontinuing fraud, waste, and abuse committed by those who do business with the government remains a core function performed in this Office,” said Acting U.S. Attorney James P. Kennedy, Jr. for the Western District of New York. “That function, however, takes on additional significance when the target of the fraud is a program designed for the benefit of the heroes among us—our disabled veterans. Although this investigation did not uncover sufficient evidence to establish criminal liability by these entities and individuals, the multi-million dollar civil judgment ensures that those involved pay a heavy price for their decision to divert to themselves resources intended for the benefit of those who have made supreme sacrifices on behalf of all.”
“This settlement demonstrates the commitment of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Inspector General, the Department of Justice, and other law enforcement agencies to aggressively pursue individuals and companies that misrepresent themselves as service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses and deny legitimate disabled veterans the opportunity to obtain VA set-aside contracts,” said Inspector General, Michael J. Missal of U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Inspector General (OIG). “The VA OIG will continue to work diligently to protect the integrity of this important program, which is designed to aid disabled veterans. I also want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners in this effort.”
“The contracting companies and principals allowed greed to corrupt a federal process intended to benefit service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses,” said Special Agent in Charge Adam S. Cohen of FBI Buffalo Field Office. “The FBI and our partners will continue to identify and investigate companies and individuals who target these types of programs for personal gain.”
The settlement resolves a lawsuit filed under the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private individuals to sue on behalf of the government for false claims and to share in any recovery. The civil lawsuit was filed in the Western District of New York and is captioned United States ex rel. Western New York Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc. v. Arsenal Contracting, LLC, et al., Case No. 11-CV-0821(S) (W.D.N.Y.). As part of today’s resolution, the whistleblower will receive $450,000.
“This case is yet another example of the tremendous results achieved through the joint efforts of the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department of Justice, and partner agencies to uncover and forcefully respond to fraud in Federal Government contracting programs, such as the Service Disabled Veteran-Owned Program in this case,” said Christopher M. Pilkerton, General Counsel of the SBA. “Identifying and aggressively pursuing instances of civil fraud by participants in these procurement programs is one of SBA’s top priorities.”
“Providing false statements to gain access to federal contracts set aside for service-disabled veterans denies the government opportunities to meet its abiding commitment to our nation’s veterans,” said Acting SBA Inspector General Hannibal “Mike” Ware. “The SBA’s Office of the Inspector General is committed to bringing those that lie to gain access to SBA’s preferential contracting programs to justice. I want to thank the Department of Justice for its leadership and dedication to serving justice.”
“There is an obvious need and reason for service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses in the government contracting process,” said Director Frank Robey of the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), Major Procurement Fraud Unit. “Special Agents from Army CID will continue to work closely with our law enforcement partners to make every contribution possible to bring persons to justice who violate that process.”
This matter was investigated by the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of New York, the FBI, the VA’s Office of Inspector General, the SBA’s Office of Inspector General, and Army CID.
The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.
Note: If the Grassley/Leahy Anti-Retaliation Act is passed, that protection would be part of the whistleblower statute. Ms. Justice and I are advocating that an antitrust whistleblower statute should go farther and provide a reward for actionable cartel-busting information.
The SEC whistleblower statute is a very successful model to be followed for a potential antitrust whistleblower statute. There should be differences in some areas (discussed below), but the SEC program has shown to be an effective tool in preserving the integrity of the nations’ securities market while conserving the investigative resources of the SEC. But, it took a severe financial crisis to overcome the objections to an SEC whistleblower statute. Many of the stakeholders, such as the Chamber of Commerce that opposed allowing a whistleblower award as part of the Dodd-Frank Act are likely to oppose an antitrust whistleblower statute. But in November 2016, then SEC chair Mary Jo White said: “The whistleblower program has had a transformative impact on enforcement and that impact will only increase in the coming years.”
The success of the SEC whistleblower statute, at least from an enforcement perspective, is one reason why we think the time has come for a similar antitrust whistleblower statute. It works. The SEC, which pays the whistleblower 10-30% of the sanctions collected in successful actions, has rewarded 46 whistleblowers with approximately $158 million for information that has led to successful enforcement actions.
The SEC statute, like the antitrust statute we propose, is different than a typical False Claims Act-type whistleblower claim where the relator (whistleblower) brings an action in the name of the United States alleging the government has been the victim of fraud. The SEC statute basically provides an informant with a reward (bounty) for coming forward with actionable information where the SEC obtains monetary sanctions. The SEC, however, is precluded from making monetary awards “to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award.”
While the SEC statute provides a model, there are areas where adjustments for the nature of cartel violations may be made in an antitrust whistleblower statute. The full SEC legislation can be found here, but below are a couple of key provisions and our suggestions about how they might be modified.
Payment of Award
The SEC whistleblower program allows for a reward, “In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related action.”
The Antitrust Division does not have administrative actions. An antitrust whistleblower would be eligible for an award, in our view, only based on original information that led to criminal Sherman Act convictions and the imposition of fines based on a conviction.
Amount of Award
The SEC provides for a whistleblower award only where the penalties exceed $1 million. In such cases the reward is an aggregate amount [if more than one whistleblower] equal to—
‘‘(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions; and
‘‘(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions.
In our view, this may not be an appropriate award schedule for an antitrust whistleblower. At a minimum, the $1 million threshold should be eliminated. A whistleblower statute may be particularly effective in construction-type contracts where the loss to the victim is acute. For example, a rigged electrical contract at a local hospital that would have been $750,000 with competitive bidding but has a low fixed bid of $1 million is as worthy of a whistleblower award as an international cartel where each consumer suffers a relatively small loss, but cumulatively the loss will easily exceed $1 million.
Also, the 10 to 30 percent award range may be excessive in a large cartel case. The impetus behind our proposed legislation is not so much to make a whistleblower a mega-lottery winner, but to provide a way to help the whistleblower pay for what could be substantial attorney fees, and to compensate the whistleblower for what may be a long period of unemployment or underemployment, regardless of anti-retaliation protection. Therefore, we would eliminate the minimum award of 10%, leave the maximum of 30% and perhaps require that in making the award the Antitrust Division consider a) the attorney fees incurred; and b) the likely or actual loss of income over a period of time, as well as the value of the information provided, the level of cooperation and the amount of the recovery.
No Recovery for One Convicted of the Violation
No SEC whistleblower award can be made to ‘‘to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this section.”
An antitrust whistleblower statute should certainly retain this provision. It is our sense that the most likely potential antitrust whistleblowers will be lower-level employees who know about a conspiracy and take some action in furtherance of it—thus creating criminal liability for themselves. This will give the Antitrust Division much control over who can become a whistleblower. The Division retains the discretion whether to give non-prosecution protection, a necessary first step before an insider can become a whistleblower. If the potential whistleblower has a level of culpability such that the Antitrust Division is not comfortable accepting as a whistleblower, the simple answer is to not grant non-prosecution protection. Another possible scenario is that the Antitrust Division grant non-prosecution protection to a highly culpable individual (making them eligible for an award because no conviction) but write into the cooperation agreement that the cooperator waive the right to a potential “bounty.”
There may be, and hopefully will be, some whistleblowers who do not need non-prosecution protection (customers, administrative staff or others who learn of a cartel but have no role in it). But, in practice, the Antitrust Division would have significant control over the whistleblower program because it is likely that many potential whistleblowers would have to take as a first step, negotiating non-prosecution agreements.
Office of the Whistleblower
A key aspect behind the success of the SEC whistleblower provision is that the SEC actively promotes the program. The SEC established an Office of the Whistleblower. This is an excerpt from the office’s home page:
Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individuals involved, whistleblowers can help the Commission identify possible fraud and other violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible.
The level to which the Antitrust Division promotes a new whistleblower statute will determine its level of success. When the Division first began the revised leniency program, it rolled it out like a new iPhone. The Division went to great lengths to advertise the program and make the program successful in practice by working with companies to help them qualify if at all possible. The flexibility and discretion built in to an SEC style whistleblower statute will give the Antitrust Division the ability to accentuate the features the whistleblower provisions that work best for law enforcement while mitigating any possible downside (such as very culpable people getting awards).
We’ve only touched on the most significant feature of the SEC whistleblower program that may be mimicked in an antitrust whistleblower statute. There would be more “sausage making” into creating actual legislation. Other features of the SEC program worth noting are the reporting requirements to Congress and the Inspector General review and report on the program. If an antitrust whistleblower statute is nearly as effective as the SEC statute, law enforcement and consumers will be the winners. But, if an antitrust whistleblower statute is a bad idea, it can be a short-lived bad idea. In light of the success of the SEC program, it is prudent to give it a chance.
The idea of an antitrust whistleblower is not new, but it has never gained much traction in the past. There have been significant objections, or at least disinterest—particularly from the Department of Justice. The mood seemed to be “Our cup runneth over with Amnesty applications so let’s not screw this thing up.” But, perhaps times have changed. Our analysis is that the objections to a whistleblower statute were either superficial, or when having merit, still not enough to outweigh the benefits of a whistleblower statute.
Before considering some of the possible downside to an antitrust whistleblower statute, a little explanation of what we have in mind may be helpful. We propose an SEC-style whistleblower statue where an informant can be awarded a level of compensation (bounty) when information of illegality leads to charges and recovery by the SEC. This is different than a False Claims Act qui tam case where a Relator brings a case in the name of the government alleging the government has been defrauded. In fact, an antitrust whistleblower statute is needed because a qui tam case is not generally available in price-fixing matters since it is the private sector, not the government that has been harmed.
Concerns About an Antitrust Whistleblower statute
It’s worth noting that the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act has been passed twice unanimously by the Senate in the last two Congresses and is up for vote again on the Senate floor. It will no doubt pass—most likely again unanimously. There is agreement that a person who reports criminal antitrust activity should not face retaliation in the workplace. (Despite the consensus, the House has failed to take up this bill the last two times it has passed the Senate). There is controversy, however, about whether a whistleblower should be eligible for some type of bounty if the information leads to successful cartel prosecution and the imposition of fines.
In 2011, the General Accounting Office Published a report on Criminal Cartel Enforcement that reported stakeholders’ views on a possible antitrust whistleblower statute (here). This is a summary of the GAO findings:
There was no consensus among key stakeholders GAO interviewed–antitrust plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys, among others–regarding the addition of a whistleblower reward, but they widely supported adding antiretaliatory protection. Nine of 21 key stakeholders stated that adding a whistleblower reward in the form of a bounty could result in greater cartel detection and deterrence, but 11 of 21 noted that such rewards could hinder DOJ’s enforcement program. Currently, whistleblowers who report criminal antitrust violations lack a civil remedy if they experience retaliation, such as being fired, so they may be hesitant to report criminal wrongdoing, and past reported cases suggest retaliation occurs in this type of situation. All 16 key stakeholders who had a position on the issue generally supported the addition of a civil whistleblower protection though senior DOJ Antitrust Division officials stated that they neither support nor oppose the idea.
The GAO report is several years old and it may be that positions have been reevaluated. For example, I think the Antitrust Division today would support the anti-retaliation measures in whistleblower statute. But below is an analysis of some of the objections raised to making a bounty available to an antitrust whistleblower.
The Antitrust Division’s principal concern was that jurors may not believe a witness who stands to benefit financially from successful enforcement action against those he implicated. GAO Report p. 39. But, a whistleblower is highly unlikely to ever be a principle witness at a trial. An antitrust crime typically involves many culpable actors. A whistleblower would generally “get the ball rolling” and provide evidence that will turn other witnesses, and allow subpoenas and search warrants from target companies. Further, a single whistleblower who might receive a financial reward seems no less credible than witnesses from an amnesty company where everyone—including the highest-ranking culpable executives—will have escaped criminal prosecution. Also, criminal antitrust trials are relatively rare—almost all cases are resolved by pleas. Finally, it is not logical to worry about the credibility of a witness you would otherwise not even know about absent a whistleblower statute.
A Whistleblower Reward Could Result in Claims That Do Not Lead to Criminal Prosecution:
There was some fear expressed in the GAO report that would-be whistleblowers would fabricate information in order to conjure up a cartel in the hopes of collecting a reward. GAO Report p. 40. Anything is possible, but the Antitrust Division folks are pretty savvy and have standards for opening grand jury investigations. Moreover, the possibility of fabricated charges exists today with a company applying for leniency in the hopes of knee-capping competitors who would have to deal with a criminal cartel investigation. The reality is a “false accusation” simply wouldn’t be corroborated by anyone else and could land the accuser in jail for making a false statement.
In a similar vane, concern was expressed that a whistleblower statute may result in a deluge of complaints to the Antitrust Division that would take additional resources to sift through. This seems like a good problem to have. When Ms. Justice and I were at the Division, we received a fair number of complaints that amounted to no more than oligopoly pricing. It did not take too much time to ask: “What else ya got?”
After the 2009 special enforcement initiative, called Operation Mirage, CBP compiled statistical data proved that the undervaluation of imported goods from China had risen to the level of significant risk in some product categories. Supported by the Administration’s direction to level the trade playing field, addressing undervaluation will continue to be part of CBP’s comprehensive trade enforcement strategy.
While working for CBP, an in-house counsel remarked that you would know you are on the right enforcement track when case law supports your theory of risk.
An example of this observation recently surfaced. In a press release dated October 3, Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that, as alleged in a False Claims Act complaint, a company called Notations, acting as a wholesaler, repeatedly ignored warning signs that its business partner, which imported garments from China, was engaged in a scheme to underpay customs duties on the imported garments it sold to Notations. Pursuant to the settlement, Notations admitted and accepted responsibility for failing to act in response to indications of fraudulent conduct. The company agreed to pay $1 million in damages, and implement measures designed to prevent future fraud in its business and supply chain operations.
The importer of women’s apparel manufactured in China presented false and fraudulent invoices to CBP, showing prices that were discounted by 75 percent, or more, to avoid customs duties. The wholesaler, Notations, which was the importer’s biggest customer, admitted that it aided this scheme by repeatedly ignoring warning signs that the importer’s irregular business practices were highly suggestive of fraud.
Notations has also agreed to implement a written compliance policy that will include measures to educate its employees on identifying red flags for fraud in import transactions, to monitor the conduct of its business partners who act as importers, and to report all potentially fraudulent conduct to CBP.
To be noted in this example, the court was successful in pursuing a case against a company that was not the importer of record, and that is in a foreign location.
This should be a warning to all companies. It is recommended that your written compliance plan include steps to monitor the players in your supply chain. If your suppliers are buying overseas, your procurement team needs to remember that caveat emptor can save them a world of trouble.
Kimberly Justice and I wrote an article published in Global Competition Review arguing that it is time for an “Antitrust Whistleblower Statute.” [The article is behind a pay firewall (here).] Kimberly and I will be expanding on this idea in Cartel Capers blog posts over the next two weeks. Below is the first installment. We explain why cartels are a great pond to be fishing in for informants, but a little “whistleblower” bait is needed.
Over the last several years, Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy have introduced antitrust whistleblower legislation that has passed in the Senate but died in the House. Their proposed legislation would grant job protection to antitrust whistleblowers. The legislation that Ms. Justice and I are proposing would go further; besides retaliation protection, we would offer potential financial reward to a whistleblower who initiated a successful cartel prosecution.
The time is right for antitrust whistleblower legislation. In 1993, the Antitrust Division revised its Corporate Leniency policy, setting the stage for similar, successful, legislation/polices to be enacted around the world. Amnesty/Leniency rewards an entire company and its cooperating executives with non-prosecution for coming forward and reporting cartel behavior. But leniency applications are slowing down—at least that is the perception of many observers—as the cost of obtaining leniency in terms of corporate time and attorney fees, in an expanding universe of jurisdictions, has would-be applicants reassessing the cost/benefit analysis. A whistleblower statute would not replace, nor in our opinion undercut, leniency policies, but would add a new tool to uncover cartels that exist, and deter new cartels from forming.
There are two features of cartels that are key to understanding why an antitrust whistleblower statute would be a potent and needed weapon in the fight against cartels:
1) There are many potential whistleblowers in virtually every price-fixing/bid rigging conspiracy. The culpability level of the many players ranges from Masters (top-level) to Sherpas (working group guy). Offering a potential whistleblower reward to a single cartel member still leaves a target rich enforcement of culpable executives to focus on; but
2) It is costly for a potential whistleblower to come forward. Any member of a cartel, even the least culpable, faces the possibility of significant jail time. In order for a low-level cartel participant to come forward, he needs to engage a qualified attorney and negotiate a non-prosecution agreement with the Antitrust Division. This is an expensive, potentially life changing decision. Long-term unemployment may well follow. Hefty attorney fees surely will. Even the most desirable whistleblower—one with no culpability at all, such as a secretary, or customer– will not ensnare herself in a cartel investigation without some means to cover significant attorney costs and reap some compensation for doing “the right [but very costly] thing.”
Ms. Justice and I worked on two investigations which highlight these points. The first was an international cartel investigation involving both US and foreign companies. Within each company there were many executives—some retired—that had enough knowledge of the cartel that had they come forward, an investigation would have been opened. If a single whistleblower had come forward, there still would have been many culpable individuals and companies left to prosecute.
Another prosecution involved a typical bid rigging scheme on a government contract. This type of scheme is usually initiated by the owner/senior member of the company (who would not be eligible for whistleblower status). But, it is also typical that an estimator who knows the boss has schemed with a competitor(s) is told to bump up the prices to reflect the agreement. The estimator is liable as a participant in the cartel, but would make an excellent whistleblower.
Given almost any cartel, international or local, a lower level employee could come forward and likely receive a non-prosecution/cooperation deal under the Antitrust Division’s current Individual Leniency Policy. But the Individual Leniency Policy is almost never used because a rational person would likely prefer to lay low and hope the crime never gets uncovered than come forward, likely lose his job and have to pay an attorney to negotiate with the Antitrust Division for immunity. Being an Antitrust Division witness is a marriage that lasts longer than many real marriages. Criminal antitrust investigations take years, and if it is an international matter, a whistleblower will be called on to be interviewed by many jurisdictions around the globe. Without some incentive of a reward, an individual would almost certainly not “volunteer” to assist in a cartel investigation. Even a non-culpable witness/whistleblower such as a customer in whom a salesperson confided or a corporate administrative assistant who saw/heard incriminating information is not likely to come forward to the Antitrust Division on his/her own.
There are many potential antitrust whistleblowers. But the disincentives to come forward voluntarily are significant. Some “bait” is needed to entice a whistleblower: protection from job retaliation and a financial incentive that would cover the significant costs of cooperation and perhaps even provide an “informants’’ bounty.” The False Claims Act, the SEC and other whistleblower statutes are successful because individuals with knowledge can engage an attorney to guide them through the process in exchange for a possible award of attorney fees and a contingency fee. The whistleblower’s attorney can develop the potential whistleblower’s claim, negotiate with the government, and represent the potential whistleblower throughout the process, all without an upfront cost to the potential whistleblower. A former employee, for example, maybe one who has been fired or downsized—would have a way to report illegal conduct without assuming a tremendous legal bill—and even have a financial incentive to do so.
In the next blog post we will discuss some of the objections that have been raised to an antitrust whistleblower statute and why we think none of these concerns are serious enough to kill the whistleblower idea. But, first, we’ll wrap this segment up by noting a couple of the benefits of a whistleblower statute which may be obvious:
A whistleblower can start a criminal cartel investigation with an insider’s view of the agreement and who is party to it. A single whistleblower does not preclude the Antitrust Division from also offering leniency, as it is unlikely one witnesses can provide indictable evidence. But, whistleblower evidence/assistance should lead to an efficient investigation that preserves the most culpable cartel members for prosecution.
Like leniency, as the whistleblower tool gets used and generates publicity, it will be effective in deterring cartels from even forming. This effect is not capable of measurement, but it is logical that if a single member of a cartel (particularly lower-level Sherpas who may not be crazy about carrying out the Master’s scheme) has a means to report the cartel and be rewarded for actionable information, cartel members will have another reason to think twice before engaging in criminal antitrust behavior.
More to come. Thanks for reading.
 Where the government is a victim of a fraud—and bid rigging is a fraud—a whistleblower case can currently be brought under the False Claims Act. There are occasional instances of bid rigging whistleblower case. But, it would be better to have these types of cases covered by a particular antitrust whistleblower statute and better publicized with an Antitrust Division Office Whistleblower Office.
MediSys Health Network Inc., which owns and operates Jamaica Hospital Medical Center and Flushing Hospital and Medical Center, two hospitals in Queens, New York, has agreed to pay $4 million to settle allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by engaging in improper financial relationships with referring physicians, the Justice Department announced today.
The settlement resolves allegations that the defendants submitted false claims to the Medicare program for services rendered to patients referred by physicians with whom the defendants had improper financial relationships. These relationships took the form of compensation and office lease arrangements that did not comply with the requirements of the Stark Law, which restricts the financial relationships that hospitals may have with doctors who refer patients to them.
“This recovery should help to deter other health care providers from entering into improper financial relationships with physicians that can taint the physicians’ medical judgment, to the detriment of patients and taxpayers,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A. Readler of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.
The lawsuit was filed by Dr. Satish Deshpande under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act. Under the Act, private citizens can bring suit on behalf of the United States and share in any recovery. Dr. Deshpande will receive $600,000 as his share of the recovery.
“Health care providers who enter into improper financial relations with referring physicians compromise the referral process and encourage over-utilization of services, to the potential detriment of both patients and taxpayers,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Bridget M. Rohde for the Eastern District of New York. “We will hold health care providers accountable for their violations of federal law.”
“When hospital operators provide financial incentives to doctors for patient referrals, individuals rightfully wonder whose best interests are being served,” said Special Agent in Charge Scott J. Lampert for U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “We will continue to investigate such entities who fraudulently bill government health programs.”
The case, United States ex rel. Deshpande, et al. v. The Jamaica Hospital Medical Center, et al., Case No. 13-cv-4030 (E.D.N.Y.), was handled by Senior Trial Counsel David T. Cohen of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Assistant U.S. Attorney Kenneth M. Abell of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York and Associate Counsel David Fuchs from HHS-OIG. The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma – Dr. Gordon P. Laird has agreed to pay $580,000 to settle civil claims stemming from allegations that he violated the False Claims Act by submitting false claims to the Medicare program, announced Mark A. Yancey, United States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma.
Laird is a physician licensed in the State of Oklahoma. He is a former owner and employee of the companies Blackwell Feet Plus, LLC, and Feet Plus, LLC, which later did business as Prevention Plus.
The United States alleges Lairdcaused false claims to be submitted to the Medicare Program for services he did not provide or supervise. First, the United States alleges that in 2011, he allowed Prevention Plus to use his National Provider Identifier numbers (NPIs) to bill Medicare for evaluation and management physical therapy services that he did not provide or supervise. Second, the United States alleges that in December 2011, he separated from Prevention Plus, did not provide any additional services for Prevention Plus, and deactivated his NPIs associated with Prevention Plus. However, Laird reactivated his NPIs associated with Prevention Plus around March 2012 so Prevention Plus could use them to bill Medicare for services in January and February 2012 that he did not perform or supervise.
To resolve these allegations, Laird agreed to pay $580,000. In reaching this settlement, he did not admit liability, and the government did not make any concessions about the legitimacy of the claims. The agreement allows the parties to avoid the delay, expense, inconvenience, and uncertainty involved in litigating the case.
This case was investigated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Assistant United States Attorneys Scott Maule and Ronald R. Gallegos prosecuted the case.
Acting United States Attorney Steve Butler of the Southern District of Alabama announced today that Dr. Rassan M. Tarabein, 58, a neurologist residing in Fairhope, Alabama, pled guilty before Chief United States District Judge Kristi K. DuBose to one count of health care fraud and one count of unlawful distribution of a schedule II controlled substance. As part of his plea agreement, Dr. Tarabein will no longer be able to practice medicine and prescribe controlled substances in the United States. Chief Judge DuBose has scheduled sentencing for March 2, 2018. Dr. Tarabein faces up to ten years in prison for health care fraud and up to twenty years in prison for unlawfully distributing a controlled substance.
On June 28, 2017, a federal grand jury for the Southern District of Alabama returned a 22–count superseding indictment against Dr. Tarabein, charging him with health care fraud, making false statements relating to health care matters, lying to a federal agent, unlawfully distributing schedule II controlled substances, and money laundering. He was arrested two days later.
Dr. Tarabein previously operated the Eastern Shore Neurology and Pain Center, a private clinic in Daphne, Alabama where he offered services relating to neurology and pain management, such as spinal injections. In his plea agreement, Dr. Tarabein admitted that from around 2004 to May 2017, he ran an insurance scam in which he induced patients to visit his clinic so that he could bill health care benefit programs for medically unnecessary tests and procedures. The purpose of Dr. Tarabein’s admitted scheme was to maximize personal financial gain by fraudulently seeking payments from health care benefit programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, Humana, UnitedHealthcare, and other private insurers. As part of his guilty plea, Dr. Tarabein admitted to violating the traditional standards of care in his medical practice by, for example, failing to provide informed consent to patients about procedures, discriminating against Alabama Medicaid patients in services rendered, fraudulently documenting patient records, submitting false claims to insurance companies, and issuing prescriptions for schedule II controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose.
Dr. Tarabein has pending state criminal charges in Montgomery County, Alabama. On June 16, 2017, a state grand jury returned a 2–count indictment against Dr. Tarabein, charging him with Medicaid fraud and theft of property in the first degree, each a felony offense. On September 20, 2017, Dr. Tarabein is expected to plead guilty in state court to Medicaid fraud.
Acting United States Attorney Butler stated, “Today’s guilty plea reinforces our office’s dedication to protecting the public from corrupt physicians. Doctors who exploit patients through medically unnecessary services to line their own pockets have no place in our health care system. I commend the investigators who unraveled Dr. Tarabein’s scam for their commitment to uproot health care fraud.”
Attorney General Steve Marshall stated, “I am pleased that my Medicaid Fraud Control Unit had the opportunity to team with our federal law enforcement colleagues to investigate and bring to justice this defendant who not only violated his oath to his patients, but stole taxpayer money set aside to provide care for our most vulnerable citizens. I am grateful to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Alabama for its speedy resolution of the federal charges, as this defendant is held to account for his actions.”
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent in Charge Robert E. Lasky stated, “The FBI stands ready to work alongside our state, local, and federal partners to eliminate prescription drug abuse. When doctors place money before the well-being of their patients, this task becomes nearly impossible. This guilty plea is a testament to all the hard work and cooperation between the agencies that conducted this investigation.”
“The abuse of prescription drugs is a serious problem in our communities. All too often, this abuse leads to addiction, shattered lives, and even death. For the health and safety of our citizens, DEA and our law enforcement partners will continue to target those who illegally distribute these potentially dangerous drugs. We hope that the conviction of Dr. Tarabein serves as a reminder to anyone who might illegally divert pharmaceuticals that they will be held accountable for the harm they cause,” said Stephen G. Azzam, Special Agent in Charge of DEA’s New Orleans Field Division.
“Today’s plea should serve as a wake-up call to those who intend to bill the government for medically unnecessary services and thereby enriching their own bottom line,” said Special Agent in Charge Derrick L. Jackson of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG). “The nation is facing a very serious prescription drug crisis and the OIG, along with our state and federal law enforcement partners, take allegations such as these very seriously.”
The FBI, DEA, OIG, and Alabama Medicaid Fraud Control Unit are investigating the federal case. Assistant United States Attorneys Sinan Kalayoglu and Gregory A. Bordenkircher are prosecuting the federal case in coordination with the Office of the Alabama Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. Assistant Attorney General Bruce M. Lieberman is prosecuting the state case.
CHRISTUS St. Vincent Regional Medical Center (St. Vincent) and its partner, CHRISTUS Health (CHRISTUS), have agreed to resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by making illegal donations to county governments, which were used to fund the state share of Medicaid payments to the hospital, the Department of Justice announced today. Under the settlement agreement, St. Vincent and CHRISTUS have agreed to pay $12.24 million, plus interest. St. Vincent is located in Santa Fe, New Mexico. CHRISTUS is based in Irving, Texas.
“Congress expressly intended that states and counties use their own money when seeking federal matching funds,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A. Readler of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Using local funds provides an incentive for the counties and states to, among other things, hold down costs rather than rely on non bona-fide donations by private providers.”
New Mexico’s Sole Community Provider (SCP) program, which was discontinued in 2014, provided supplemental Medicaid funds to hospitals in mostly rural communities. The federal government reimbursed the state of New Mexico for approximately 75 percent of its health care expenditures under the SCP program. Under federal law, New Mexico’s 25 percent “matching” share of SCP program payments had to consist of state or county funds, and not impermissible “donations” from private hospitals. This restriction on the use of private hospital funds to satisfy state Medicaid obligations was enacted by Congress to curb possible abuses and ensure that states have sufficient incentive to curb rising Medicaid costs.
Between 2001 and 2009, St. Vincent and CHRISTUS allegedly made non-bona fide donations and thus caused the presentment of false claims by the state of New Mexico to the federal government under the Medicaid program.
“Protecting the integrity of the Medicaid program is crucial because millions of Americans, including hundreds of thousands of New Mexicans, depend on the program for medical care and related services,” said Acting U.S. Attorney James D. Tierney for the District of New Mexico. “This case illustrates our commitment to ensuring that government funds are legally obtained and used for their intended purposes. We will use all available civil remedies to recover the ill-gotten gains obtained by those who defraud government health care programs.”
The settlement resolves allegations originally brought in a lawsuit filed by a former Los Alamos County, New Mexico Indigent Healthcare Administrator under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, which allow private parties to bring suit on behalf of the government and to share in any recovery. The whistleblower will receive $2.249 million as her share of the recovery in this case.
The case was handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Mexico with assistance from the Justice Department’s Civil Division and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General.
The lawsuit is captioned U.S. ex rel. Stepan v. Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center Corp. et al., Civil Action No. 11-cv-572 (D.N.M.). The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only; there has been no determination of liability.