In a recent guest post, Richard Wolfram discussed his objections to recent First and Third Circuit decisions on summary judgment in antitrust collusion cases. See Supreme Court Dodges Question of Antitrust Summary Judgment Standard, Higher Bar to Reach Jury Splitting Circuits, Will Valspar Be Up Next? Mr. Wolfram wrote:
As Evergreen [First Circuit case] explained in its petition, and as applies equally in Valspar [Third Circuit case], to require that the plaintiff show by a preponderance of evidence on summary judgment that a jury would find in its favor effectively pre-empts the role of the jury, infringes on the Seventh Amendment right of the plaintiff, and is illogical, in effect raising the bar by requiring that the plaintiff satisfy the preponderance standard at both the summary judgment phase and at trial. Inquiring minds may wonder — will Valspar be the vehicle where the Court finally addresses these issues?
The plaintiff in Valspar just filed a Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the Third Circuit. Echoing the comments made by Mr. Wolfram, appellant’s petition states:
En banc review is necessary because the panel’s decision eviscerates the protections of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by making an unprecedented summary judgment standard for plaintiffs trying to prove a price-fixing conspiracy by circumstantial evidence in the Third Circuit. A majority of the panel incorrectly created a new “more likely than not” standard to evaluate circumstantial evidence at summary judgment.
Valspar’s petition is here: Valspar en banc petition.
Stay tuned. Thanks for reading
In a new article I published in Law360 last week, I discussed the following four reasons why the scope of colluding algorithms, even if they are technologically possible, could be limited:
- Algorithmic asymmetry
- Robust compliance
- Observable collusive outcomes
- Risk of class actions
The paper is titled “Four Reasons We May Not See Colluding Robots Anytime Soon” and is available here. If you do not have a subscription to Law360 but would like to have a copy, please feel free to email me at firstname.lastname@example.org
As always, I appreciate your thoughts and comments. You can reach me at the email above or connect with me on LinkedIn [here].
Thanks for reading.
Below is a Guest Post by Richard Wolfram, counsel for Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. Evergreen filed suit alleging polystyrene converters and their trade association engaged in a concerted refusal to deal with the company in violation of the Sherman Act. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially dismissed the action. Evergreen appealed and the First Circuit vacated and remanded. 720 F. 3d 33 (1st Cir. 2013). The district court then entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 116 F. Supp. 3d 1. (D. Mass. 2015). Evergreen again appealed and the First Circuit upheld the dismissal of the action. Evergreen Partnering Group v. Pactiv Corp, et. al., 832 F. 3d 1 (1stCir. 2017). After the First Circuit denied without comment Evergreen’s petition for rehearing, Evergreen filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Respondents filed an Opposition brief at the request of the Court and Evergreen filed a Reply. (No. 16-1148.)
On October 2, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Evergreen’s petition for certiorari in its concerted refusal to deal case from the First Circuit. Evergreen contended that the court of appeals, in dismissing the case, misinterpreted and misapplied the summary judgment standard in antitrust, and that the standard itself is the source of significant confusion and inconsistent reasoning among the federal circuits and thus calls for clarification by the Court. Evergreen’s petition was supported by an amicus brief submitted by 12 professors of antitrust law and economics.
The Court, as is customary, gave no explanation for denying Evergreen’s petition. The Court lost an important and timely opportunity to clarify an issue that has created tremendous confusion and inconsistency among the circuits — the proper tools for applying the summary judgment standard in antitrust. Although the Court understandably focuses on issues of law and not fact for petitions that it accepts, one has to wonder what set of facts — with the lower court here improperly weighing evidence and making credibility determinations and applying the much-criticized equal inferences rule — would serve as a better vehicle for resolving this question. This issue is not going away, and anyone who practices antitrust knows that. Click here and here for articles about the decision.
Confirming this comment, and on the same day, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals publicly issued a decision affirming summary judgment dismissal of a Sherman Act Section 1 oligopoly conspiracy case despite findings of 31 uniform price increases by defendants over 11 years, well over any increase in costs and despite declining demand and excess capacity. Valspar Corp. v. Dupont, (3d Cir., 10/2/17). Arguably pre-empting the role of the trier of fact, just as Evergreen alleged the First Circuit did in its case, the Third Circuit panel required that the plaintiff provide inferences that the alleged conspiracy was “more likely than not” rather than applying the general summary judgment standard, as repeated by the Supreme Court in Kodak, that the plaintiff show simply that a jury could reasonably find in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s burden at trial is to prove its case by a preponderance of evidence (51%), whereas its burden on summary judgment is simply to show that a jury could reasonably find in its favor — which the Supreme Court itself has explained is less than the preponderance standard. As Evergreen explained in its petition, and as applies equally in Valspar, to require that the plaintiff show by a preponderance of evidence on summary judgment that a jury would find in its favor effectively pre-empts the role of the jury, infringes on the Seventh Amendment right of the plaintiff, and is illogical, in effect raising the bar by requiring that the plaintiff satisfy the preponderance standard at both the summary judgment phase and at trial. Inquiring minds may wonder — will Valspar be the vehicle where the Court finally addresses these issues? For more information on Valspar, see write-up by the American Antitrust Institute, which filed an amicus in support of the plaintiff (here).
Richard Wolfram email@example.com
The Antitrust Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International Affairs, Roger Alford delivered a speech on October 3, 2017 in San Paolo, Brazil. (here). There were no groundbreaking announcements in the speech, but since it was the first delivered since Makan Delrahim took over as head of the Antitrust Division, I thought it might be of interest.
There were two aspects of the talk worth noting. First, Mr. Alford highlighted the Division’s longstanding focus on holding individuals accountable:
As my colleagues at the Antitrust Division have explained before, “[h]olding companies accountable and assessing large fines, alone, are not the only means, or even the most effective way, to accomplish our goal of deterring and ending cartels. Individuals commit the crimes for which corporate offenders pay. Every corporate crime involves individual wrongdoing.” For that reason, we at the Antitrust Division have a long history of holding individuals accountable for antitrust crimes, and we have consistently touted prison time for individuals as the single most effective deterrent to criminal collusion.
The other item that caught my eye in the speech was the Mr. Alford’s reference to two Antitrust Division recent prosecutions:
- In June of this year, Yuval Marshak was sentenced to 30 months in prison for participating in a scheme to defraud the U.S. Department of Defense.
- In 2016, we tried and obtained the conviction of John Bennett for fraud against the United States as a result of a kickback scheme in the procurement of environmental clean-up services. He was ultimately sentenced to five years in prison.
These examples of “fraud prosecutions” are interesting because there is sometimes an internal debate in the Antitrust Division about whether only Sherman Act, (i.e. price fixing or bid rigging) charges should be brought or whether the Division has a broader mandate to prosecute what is sometimes called “corruption of the bidding process.” A “corruption of the bidding process” example would be bribing a procurement official to tailor bid specifications to favor one company. In a hybrid case, there may be both a bribe of a procurement official and collusion among the favored bidders.
At times, investigation and prosecution of collusion on public contracts such as defense, roads, and schools has been a priority for the Division. Public contracts are typically where collusion and bribery turn up–and jail sentences tend to be long. The Division has limited resources, however, so when international cartels dominate, there may be few resources left to devote to public contracts.
The interesting thing about public contract investigations, is that the Division has some ability to be proactive in generating new investigations (as opposed to being reactive to leads/leniencies that come into the Division.) When resources are available, the Division will often beat the bushes talking to federal agents and procurement officials looking for tips on possible worthwhile investigations. It will be worth watching to see if there is any noticeable shift in emphasis under the new Antitrust Division leadership.
Thanks for reading.
I thought this might be of interest to readers and/or to pass on to clients. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) just published a case study of their investigation of a real estate against cartel in the UK (here). Below are the lessons learned section of the study:
What are the lessons?
Be careful when talking business with your competitors – make sure you don’t agree not to compete with each other.
Be especially wary of any conversations about pricing, or about a shared approach to pricing. Each business must set and decide its prices independently.
Competition law applies to small businesses as well as large ones. The estate agents in this case were small local or regional businesses.
The consequences of breaking competition law can be severe; fines can be as much as 10% of a business’ global turnover and a director can be banned from being a director of a company, or being involved in the promotion, formation or management of one, for up to 15 years. In the most serious cases, individuals can go to prison for up to 5 years. [In the United States the maximum prison sentence is 10 years.]
Competition law applies to all industries and the CMA will take action against those breaking the law.
The Somerset estate agents’ cartel is the second recent enforcement case the CMA has taken in the property sector. The CMA remains committed to tackling illegal anti-competitive conduct in the sector.
You can subscribe to the CMS for email updates (here).
Thanks for reading.
Yesterday I had the pleasure of having lunch with my old boss, John Hughes. Also with us were former office mates in the Philadelphia Field Office, Brad Geyer, Rich Rosenberg, and Wendy Norman. I thought I’d post the picture because John is one of the most respected and beloved figures in the antitrust world and people often ask me, “How is John doing?” John is doing great!
John began his career in the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Philadelphia Field Office and immediately began to work on what would become the Great Electrical Conspiracy cases–a watershed event in antitrust history. He later became Chief of the Philadelphia Field Office where I worked for 34 years. Everyone that worked for John agreed–he was the greatest boss, mentor and friend that anyone could ever ask for. When John retired in 1994, he became a trial advisor on a number of Antitrust Division cases so he got to know and help staffs throughout the Division. It is pretty common for a trial staff not to want someone looking over their shoulder as an “advisor,” but everyone asked for John. He is equally respected by the defense and plaintiff bar and the judiciary.
So, I just want to let everyone know John and his wife Helen are doing great. They keep busy with a very large family of children, grandchildren and great grandchildren. John gives his best to everyone who helped make his career in antitrust so fondly memorable.
By: Ai Deng, PhD, Principal, Bates White Economic Consulting
Hope everyone had a wonderful Labor Day weekend. During my time off CartelCapers, I have been working on several research projects. In this post, I’d like to give the interested readers an update on two of them.
When Machines Learn to Collude: Lessons from a Recent Research Study on Artificial Intelligence
From Professors Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s Virtual Competition published a year ago, to speeches by the Federal Trade Commission Commissioner Terrell McSweeny and Acting Chair Maureen K. Ohlhausen, to an entire issue of a recent CPI Antitrust Chronicles, and a conference hosted by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in June this year, there has been an active and ongoing discussion in the antitrust community about computer algorithms. In a short commentary (downloadable here), I briefly summarize the current views and concerns in the antitrust and artificial intelligence (AAI) literature pertaining to algorithmic collusion and then discuss the insights and lessons we could learn from a recent AI research study. As I argue in this article, not all assumptions in the current antitrust scholarship on this topic have empirical support at this point.
Sub-regressions, F test, and Class Certification
Did the anticompetitive conduct impact all or nearly all class members? This question is central to a court’s class certification decision. And to answer the question, a methodology—known as sub-regressions (also labelled less informatively as simply the “F test” in the recent Drywall litigation)—is being increasingly employed, particularly by defendants’ expert witnesses. A key step of a sub-regression type analysis is to partition the data into various sub-groups and then to examine data poolability.
Forthcoming in the Journal of Competition Law & Economics, my article titled “To Pool or Not to Pool: A Closer Look at the Use of Sub-Regressions in Antitrust Class Certification” focuses on three areas of interest pertaining to sub-regressions:
- The related law and economics literature related to this methodology
- Courts’ recent class certification decisions in cases where parties introduced sub-regression analysis
- Several methodological challenges, many of which have not been previously acknowledged, as well as potential ways to address them. Speciﬁcally, what test should one use? How does one choose the subsets or partitions of data to test? Are individual estimates of damages always the most reliable approach when we believe the impact varies across customers or across some other dimensions?
This paper is currently being processed at the Journal. If you would like a copy, please feel free to reach out to me.
Thanks for reading.
Ai Deng, PhD
Principal, Bates White Economic Consulting
Lecturer, Advanced Academic Program, Johns Hopkins University
direct: 2022161802 | fax: 2024087838
1300 Eye Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20005
Kemp & Associates, Inc. and its vice-president and part owner Daniel J. Mannix, were indicted on August 17, 2016 in the District of Utah on a single-count conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by engaging in a customer allocation agreement. The agreement at issue was a set of guidelines which governed the joint activity between defendants and co-conspirators. On March 31, 2017, the defendants filed a Motion for Order that the case be Subject to the Rule of Reason and to Dismiss the Indictment as time barred on Statute of Limitations grounds. On August 29, 2017, the district court affirmed an earlier ruling that the indictment would be tried under the Rule of Reason, but then made that ruling moot by dismissing the case on statute of limitations grounds. The court ruled that the conspiracy ended three years outside the statute of limitations. In a nutshell, the court found the conspiracy ended when the last customer was allocated, while the government argued, unsuccessfully, that the conspiracy continued while the defendants reaped the supra competitive profits from allocating the customers. The government’s “payment theory” usually prevails, but not in this case.
When I have time, I’d like to comment on the court’s ruling but for now I simply provide the ruling (US v. Kemp & Associates, Inc and Daniel J. Mannix) for your perusal.
Thanks for reading.
P.S. Want to write a guest post? The pay stinks but contributors welcome.
In Part II I discuss how I think the criminal element of the Sherman Act should be fixed.
The Heir Locators Criminal Indictment May Make This Issue Topical
I want to explain why this topic has come to mind. The Antitrust Division’s heir locators investigation/prosecution garners little attention in the world of massive international cartel investigations, but an indictment in this investigation could have major implications for criminal antitrust prosecutions. In a recent development, the trial judge ruled that the criminal case should be tried under the Rule of Reason. It is possible this development will set off a chain of events that leads to the Supreme Court revisiting what is necessary for a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act.
Heir locator firms locate potential heirs to an estate from public records and agree to help with their claim in return for a contingency fee. The amount of the contingency fee depends on factors such as the complexity of the claim, potential recovery etc. Since the potential heirs are located from public records, they may be contacted by more than one heir locator firm. According to the indictment, the defendants agreed to allocate customers on a “first to contact basis.” The firm to which the customers were allocated would pay the firm that “backed off” a percentage of the contingency recovered. The Division has obtained two guilty pleas in the investigation but defendants Kemp & Associates and its co-owner Daniel J. Mannix were indicted in August 2016 and have pled not guilty.
The indictment appears to be a straight forward customer allocation scheme—a per seviolation. The defendants:
agreed, during those conversations and other communications, that when both co-conspirator companies contacted the same unsigned heir to an estate, the co-conspirator company that first contacted that heir would be allocated certain remaining heirs to that estate who had yet to sign a contract with an Heir Location Services provider;
agreed that the co-conspirator company to which heirs were allocated would pay to the other co-conspirator company a portion of the contingency fees ultimately collected from those allocated heirs;
If anything is a per se violation, customer allocation should earn the title. It eliminates price competition and it can be an easier agreement to monitor/enforce than price fixing. If you lose a customer you were supposed to get, you know it. But, the defendants moved that the case should be tried under the rule of reason. The briefs in the case were filed under seal so it is impossible at this point to understand the defendants’ argument and the government’s response. Nonetheless, on June 21, 2017 U.S. District Judge David Sam heard oral argument and then granted the defendants’ motion that the case is subject to the rule of reason. He reserved judgment on the motion to dismiss “for further disposition pending the government’s further evaluation of the case.”
I predict that the Antitrust Division will not try a criminal case under the Rule of Reason. The government will either seek an interlocutory appeal to reverse the district court’s ruling, or drop the case. The Division is in a tough position because three defendants have already pled guilty. The Division will not lightly walk away from a prosecution where others have already taken a plea. On the other hand, the Antitrust Division will not want a precedent that allows the defendant to raise the reasonableness of the conduct. Defendants have argued in previous criminal cases that the restraint should be judged under a rule of reason, but the Division has had ample authority to beat that argument back. But, what if the defendants go for the whole enchilada, and seek not just a rule of reason trial, but a complete dismissal of the charges? It certainly would be helpful to the defendants to have a criminal case tried under the rule of reason, but it would be a home run, or antitrust Hall of Fame material to get the indictment dismissed in its entirety as unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
A Rule of Reason Criminal Case?
One reason the defendants may have moved for a rule of reason trial is that the Supreme Court has already said that this would be permissible. In United States v. U.S. Gypsum,the Supreme Court held that in a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act that was subject to rule of reason analysis, “action undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws.” That would seem to settle the question, but the Supreme Court has been rightly flexible with stare decisis in overruling numerous other “conventional wisdom” tenets in the antitrust area. Think vertical restraints, maximum resale price maintenance and resale price maintenance as examples. Would the Supreme Court decide that a rule of reason criminal case (or a per se case) is unconstitutional. Would an after-the-fact rule of reason determination (after a quick look?) (or full blown inquiry?) meet the “notice” standard required for a criminal statute? But, what about the Gypsum required showing of intent of anticompetitive conduct? Does that save the statute? But what does that even mean? Anticompetitive under the “consumer welfare model?” Measured by the Chicago School? Post Chicago School? School of Rock?
I have a proposal to amend the elements of a Sherman Act criminal conviction that eliminates these questions/issues and is warranted in light of the 10-year maximum jail sentence. (And not to forget, a corporation has paid a $500 million criminal fine.)
If the Restraint is Fraudulent—It’s Criminal
Every head of the Antitrust Division in recent memory has made statements such as, “price fixing, market allocation and bid rigging steal from, and commit fraud upon, American business and customers.” Similarly, an Antitrust Division official has testified, “the [criminal] cases that we are charging and prosecuting are unmistakable fraud.” Simply put, the litmus test for criminality should be whether the restraint of trade also involves fraud (i.e. a per se violation). The substantial hammer of justice –lengthy prison sentences, Red Notices, extradition, should be reserved for when a jury finds the defendant engaged in a restraint of trade that involved fraud.
Today, criminal antitrust indictments contain an element of fraud, because of [wise] prosecutorial discretion, not because of the dictates of the statute. But, antitrust jurisprudence could have taken the path down a fraud requirement instead of veering off to a per se rule (a conclusive presumption that takes the issue of reasonableness out of the juries’ hand), and found that the criminality in the Sherman Act is confined to those agreements that have an element of fraud. Early cases interpreting what was an unreasonable restraint of trade were heading in that direction.
What we now call per se offenses were originally called fraud. This was recognized as early as 1875 in Craft v. McConoughy, a case involving a secret scheme to fix prices among four Illinois warehouses. The court stated, “To the public the four houses were held out as competing firms for business. Secretly they had conspired together.” The scheme enabled the parties “by secret and fraudulent means, to control the price of grain.” In the seminal antitrust case of United States v. Addyston Pipe, the court found secret agreements to refrain from bidding to be a form of fraud: “It is well settled that an agreement between intending bidders at a public auction or a public letting not to bid against each other, and thus prevent competition, is a fraud.” In McMullen v. Hoffman, the Court refused to enforce a contract when one conspirator sued for his portion of the profits from a successful collusive bidding scheme. The Court explained that the agreement “tend[ed] to induce the belief that there really is competition . . . although the truth is that there is no such competition.” The Court held that “the illegal character of the agreement is founded not alone upon the fact that it tends to lessen competition, but also upon the fact of the commission of a fraud by the parties in combining their interests and concealing the same.” The Court distinguished a secret agreement from a known joint venture, where “[t]he public may obtain at least the benefit of the joint responsibility. . . . The public agents know then all that there is in the transaction, and can more justly estimate the motives of the bidders, and weigh the merits of the bid.” Over a century later, in response to a question as to whether antitrust crimes are crimes of moral turpitude, Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer responded that “price-fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation agreements among companies that hold themselves out to the public as competitors are inherently deceptive and defraud consumers who expect the benefit of competition.”
Drawing on the wisdom of early Supreme Court decisions and the recent pronouncements of the Antitrust Division, the demarcation between a restraint of trade that can subject the violator to civil penalties and one that subjects the violator to criminal penalties is whether there was an element of fraud. The Sherman Act should reflect this, either by amendment in Congress, or by Supreme Court further interpretation of what the government is required to prove to subject the defendant to criminal penalties. In a criminal case the government’s burden should include proving that the agreement was a restraint of trade where the agreement was actively concealed or where the defendant held him/itself out to the public as a competitor when in fact an agreement not to compete or limit competition had been reached without the knowledge of the customer. In a previous article, I have labeled this standard Per Se Plus.
How would the heir locators indictment fare under such a standard? It is hard to know for sure but the indictment suggests that customers shopped around or there would have been no need for an agreement at all. And when customers got quotes from more than one company, the customer would reasonably assume there was competition. And the fraud would be, as the Supreme Court said long ago, “in [the defendants] combining their interests and concealing the same.”
Would requiring the government to prove an element of fraud to obtain a criminal conviction make obtaining convictions more difficult? The answer must be yes, but as a former Antitrust Division prosecutor, to convince a jury to convict you must argue that the crime wasn’t an “unreasonable restraint of trade” whatever the heck that is—but it was fraud by the lying cheating defendants. There are benefits to the Antitrust Division that would flow from having to prove fraud, but that’s for another post. Here, I’ll end with this. The crime should fit the punishment; and with punishment of up to ten years in prison for an individual and hundreds of millions of dollars for a corporation, the Sherman Act needs to be amended to include an element of fraud for a criminal conviction because it is currently unconstitutional.
Thanks for reading.
 When the per se rule was announced in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S 150 (1940). a jail sentence was virtually a non-existent possibility. The maximum sentence imposed on any of the convicted individual defendants in Socony Vacuum was a fine of $1000. See Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 107 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
 Richard Blake agreed to plead guilty in January 2016 as part of a proposed plea agreement between the Antitrust Division and Blake. His company was not charged, most likely because it had received leniency. California-based Brandenburger & Davis and its president Bradley Davis agreed to plead guilty in December 2015.
 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444. fn 21.
 The Supreme Court stated in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). “Stare decisis is not as significant in this case, however, because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act,” which the Court has treated as a common-law statute. The Court has been receptive to reviewing the per se rule in light of “new circumstances and new wisdom.” The severe loss of personal liberty and other consequences now at stake in a Sherman Act criminal case is a new circumstance that warrants an evolution in the application of the per se rule to criminal antitrust cases so that the test for liability will better match the evolution of the law on consequences
 Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Clinton Administration: Trends in Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before the Corporate Counsel Inst. (Nov. 30, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0471.htm.
 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Transcript of Testimony Before the United States Sentencing Commission Concerning Proposed 2005 Amendments to Section 2R1.1 at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public testimony/209071.pdf.
 79 Ill. 346 (1875).
 Id. at 348.
 Id. at 349.
 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
 Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
 174 U.S. 639 (1899)
 Id. at 646.
 Id. at 649.
 Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Patrick Leahy Attaching Responses of William Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Questions for the Record Arising from the Nov. 14, 2013 Hearing of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary Regarding Cartel Prosecution: Stopping Price Fixers and Protecting Consumers at 3 (Jan. 24, 2014) (emphasis added), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111413QFRs-Baer.pdf.
 Robert E. Connolly, Per Se “Plus:” A Proposal to Revise the Per se Rule in Criminal Antitrust Cases, Antitrust, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2015, p. 105.