CCC’s: The Bid Rigging Whistleblower –Part 2

Should the Antitrust Division Have a Whistleblower Czar?

Well, no.  Without legislation to create a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute, the Czar might have little to do.  But, the Antitrust Division should make some effort, short of Czardom, to encourage bid rigging whistleblowers.  As I noted in Part I (here), there is already a mechanism for a whistleblower to claim a reward for prosecuting collusion among contractors/vendors on government contracts.  The bid rigging whistleblower can file a False Claims Act (qui tam) case on behalf of the government alleging that the government was ripped off by illegal collusion among the bidders.  If the government recovers damages, the person who brought the suit (the Relator) can receive a percentage (10-25%) of the recovery.

As I mentioned in Part I, the Antitrust Division has brought both criminal and civil suits as a result of filed whistleblower cases. This is a pretty well-kept secret because as far as I know, the Division has never encouraged anyone to come forward as a bid rigging whistleblower or done anything to publicize the fact that whistleblowers of collusion on government contracts can and have recovered a portion of the government’s damages.  The government should make some effort to attract bid rigging whistleblowers.  Doing so would benefit the Antitrust Division in obvious and non-obvious ways.  Below are a few ideas I think are worth discussing.

  1. Welcoming Bid Rigging False Claims Act cases
  • Special Counsel for False Claims Act Cases

Over the years there has been a proliferation of counselors to the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division.  One counsel, with a criminal and civil background, could be designated as the Special Counsel for False Claims Act cases.  This would at least be a message to the bar that the Antitrust Division does have an interest in promoting whistleblowing on collusion on federal government contracts.  This special counsel could also oversee whatever efforts the Antitrust Division does take to encourage bid rigging whistleblowing.

  • Create a False Claims Act web page

The Antitrust Division has a page on its website for the Leniency Program.  The Antitrust Division promotes the heck out of leniency.  This page is an excellent source of information about everything one would need to know about the Corporate and Individual Leniency Programs.   There is also a Report Violations page on the Antitrust Division’s website. A False Claims Act page would signal the Division’s interest in possible False Claims cases as well as provide information a potential whistleblower might need to begin.

  • Better Coordination with Civil Division and United States Attorney’s Offices

 When a False Claim Act case is filed, notice of the case and the evidence supporting it must be filed with the Attorney General of the United States.  From there, the case will be assigned according to the subject matter of the alleged fraud: (i.e. health care, defense, antitrust).  Perhaps this is already being done, but the Antitrust Division might be more aggressive in claiming its seat at the table for bid rigging on government contracts.  A whistleblower will not file a Sherman Act case if she has information about collusion on a government contract—because there is no provision for antitrust whistleblowers.  The case will be filed as a Conspiracy to Defraud the United States with the bid rigging constituting the fraud.  A review of cases False Claims Act Cases on the Department of Justice website indicates that there have been a variety of False Claims Act matters that involved bid rigging yet were handled by local United States Attorney’s offices and the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, instead of the Antitrust Division.[1]

It would be good public policy to have all potential government bid rigging cases be referred to the Antitrust Division. Pardon the institutional pride (I worked there for 34 years), but nobody can spot, investigate and prosecute a viable criminal antitrust violation (i.e. bid rigging) better than an experienced Antitrust Division Attorney.  What may look like a bid rig too small for government intervention, may be spotted as the tip of the iceberg by an Antitrust Division prosecutor.  Likewise, a case that may appear weak to someone else, may look quite viable to a Division prosecutor that has experience investigating cartels—and tools like the leniency program.  A special counselor for False Claims Act cases would raise the profile within the Antitrust Division, the Department of Justice (and the outside bar) and may spur additional viable False Claim Act cases being referred to the Antitrust Division for a decision on whether the government should intervene and take over the prosecution.

     2.      The Benefits to the Antitrust Division of a Higher Profile for False Claims                                      Act Cases

The Antitrust Division could benefit in both obvious and non-obvious ways from a higher profile on False Claim Act cases.

  • The Obvious

Filing a False Claims Act case is a risky proposition for any potential whistleblower.  The blowback from being a whistleblower will likely be severe and the chances for success, especially if the government does not intervene, are far from certain.  Modest changes like these suggestions are not going to lead to an avalanche of new cases.  (Thus, the need for an SEC like criminal antitrust whistleblower statute as I argue in this article (here)).  But, it is certainly worth a try.  Nothing suggested above, and others may have additional/better suggestions, costs the government a nickel and the return on the investment may be substantial, even if just one additional cartel is uncovered.  Also, while a different subject, many believe that the value of leniency has been decreasing and the number of viable leniency applications is down. While this may be coincidence, not causation, the Antitrust Division’s statistics for cases and jail sentences and fines are way down.  It may be an opportune time to launch a new, if modest, initiative.

  • Good Cases

One benefit of publicizing the potential benefits of being a bid rigging whistleblower is that even if only one new case emerges, these are great cases for staff to work on.  Here I speak from personal experience and my views may not be universally held, but I’m pretty sure they are held by most trial attorneys in the Antitrust Division. Government bid rigging cases are great cases to work on.  They are much lower profile than say a Forex or Libor or other international cartel matters.  These “big” cases have their own allure, but the front office, the Criminal Division, SEC, CFTC, foreign agencies, Batman and Robin and others all have a hand in these investigations.  While it is exhilarating to work on a matter that makes the front page of the Wall Street Journal, a staff member is a small cog in the big wheel. On a government contract matter, generally speaking, the staff has more responsibility and more ownership of the matter, including possible trial experience on manageable cases. It’s a great way to learn how to investigate, take chances and take ownership.  These cases also involve working with agents across the federal spectrum.  These relationships can last a career and produce results over a long period of time.

  • Deterrent Effect

Finally, one of the most important reasons for robust antitrust prosecutions is deterrence. If the Antitrust Division starts whistleblowers and prosecuting bid rigging cases, it should have a deterrent effect on all the bid riggers out there that are not currently being detected. Whistleblower awards on bid rigging matters should be well-publicized. There is great satisfaction in seeing taxpayer money restored (with appropriate penalties) if a successful case is brought.  In a cartel case like capacitors the price of an input is raised but the impact on the final cost to consumers is small.  The cumulative harm is great (and should be prosecuted), but it is very diffused.  With bid rigging on government contracts the harm is focused and the recovery can be significant with both criminal and civil penalties.  Also, many government bid rigging investigations can lead to finding more bid rigging and what often looks like a small matter can proliferate into a major investigation.  Road construction, school milk, Defense Department contracts are just a few of the government contract cases that led to uncovering “way of life” collusion in certain industries.

Part III

 Special Issues with A Big Rigging Whistleblower

 Thanks for reading. Please come back for Part III.

Bob Connolly

CCC’s: DOJ Announces “Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties” Policy

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On May 9, 2018 Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein delivered remarks to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute. He announced a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.  The full prepared remarks are here.  Below is an excerpt:

Today, we are announcing a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.

The aim is to enhance relationships with our law enforcement partners in the United States and abroad, while avoiding unfair duplicative penalties.

It is important for us to be aggressive in pursuing wrongdoers. But we should discourage disproportionate enforcement of laws by multiple authorities. In football, the term “piling on” refers to a player jumping on a pile of other players after the opponent is already tackled.

Our new policy discourages “piling on” by instructing Department components to appropriately coordinate with one another and with other enforcement agencies in imposing multiple penalties on a company in relation to investigations of the same misconduct.

In highly regulated industries, a company may be accountable to multiple regulatory bodies. That creates a risk of repeated punishments that may exceed what is necessary to rectify the harm and deter future violations.

Sometimes government authorities coordinate well.  They are force multipliers in their respective efforts to punish and deter fraud. They achieve efficiencies and limit unnecessary regulatory burdens.

Other times, joint or parallel investigations by multiple agencies sound less like singing in harmony, and more like competing attempts to sing a solo.

Modern business operations regularly span jurisdictions and borders. Whistleblowers routinely report allegations to multiple enforcement authorities, which may investigate the claims jointly or through their own separate and independent proceedings.

By working with other agencies, including the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OFAC, and others, our Department is better able to detect sophisticated financial fraud schemes and deploy adequate penalties and remedies to ensure market integrity.

But we have heard concerns about “piling on” from our own Department personnel. Our prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys prize the Department’s reputation for fairness.

They understand the importance of protecting our brand. They asked for support in coordinating internally and with other agencies to achieve reasonable and proportionate outcomes in major corporate investigations.

And I know many federal, state, local and foreign authorities that work with us are interested in joining our efforts to show leadership in this area.

“Piling on” can deprive a company of the benefits of certainty and finality ordinarily available through a full and final settlement. We need to consider the impact on innocent employees, customers, and investors who seek to resolve problems and move on. We need to think about whether devoting resources to additional enforcement against an old scheme is more valuable than fighting a new one.

Our new policy provides no private right of action and is not enforceable in court, but it will be incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, and it will guide the Department’s decisions.

This is another step towards greater transparency and consistency in corporate enforcement. To reduce white collar crime, we need to encourage companies to report suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement and to resolve liability expeditiously.

There are four key features of the new policy.

First, the policy affirms that the federal government’s criminal enforcement authority should not be used against a company for purposes unrelated to the investigation and prosecution of a possible crime. We should not employ the threat of criminal prosecution solely to persuade a company to pay a larger settlement in a civil case.

That is not a policy change. It is a reminder of and commitment to principles of fairness and the rule of law.

Second, the policy addresses situations in which Department attorneys in different components and offices may be seeking to resolve a corporate case based on the same misconduct.

The new policy directs Department components to coordinate with one another, and achieve an overall equitable result. The coordination may include crediting and apportionment of financial penalties, fines, and forfeitures, and other means of avoiding disproportionate punishment.

Third, the policy encourages Department attorneys, when possible, to coordinate with other federal, state, local, and foreign enforcement authorities seeking to resolve a case with a company for the same misconduct.

Finally, the new policy sets forth some factors that Department attorneys may evaluate in determining whether multiple penalties serve the interests of justice in a particular case.

Sometimes, penalties that may appear duplicative really are essential to achieve justice and protect the public. In those cases, we will not hesitate to pursue complete remedies, and to assist our law enforcement partners in doing the same.

Factors identified in the policy that may guide this determination include the egregiousness of the wrongdoing; statutory mandates regarding penalties; the risk of delay in finalizing a resolution; and the adequacy and timeliness of a company’s disclosures and cooperation with the Department.

Cooperating with a different agency or a foreign government is not a substitute for cooperating with the Department of Justice. And we will not look kindly on companies that come to the Department of Justice only after making inadequate disclosures to secure lenient penalties with other agencies or foreign governments. In those instances, the Department will act without hesitation to fully vindicate the interests of the United States.

The Department’s ability to coordinate outcomes in joint and parallel proceedings is also constrained by more practical concerns.  The timing of other agency actions, limits on information sharing across borders, and diplomatic relations between countries are some of the challenges we confront that do not always lend themselves to easy solutions.

The idea of coordination is not new. The Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and many of our U.S. Attorney’s Offices routinely coordinate with the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, and other financial regulators, as well as a wide variety of foreign partners. The FCPA Unit announced its first coordinated resolution with the country of Singapore this past December.

The Antitrust Division has cooperated with 21 international agencies through 58 different merger investigations during the past four years.

Here is a link to the policy on Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties.

As the Deputy Attorney General stated, coordination is not new.  The Antitrust Division routinely coordinates with other federal and state agencies on most investigations.  And some coordination always occurs on international investigations.  In the recent financial crimes investigations such as Libor and FOREX the amount of coordination was extensive among federal agencies such as the Antitrust Division, Criminal Division, FBI, SEC, CFTC, state AG office, as well as with many foreign jurisdictions.  It is rumored that meetings were held in the Great Hall at the Department of Justice since no conference room could hold the throngs of participating enforcers.

Coordination by the Antitrust Division with enforcers from other federal, state and international enforcers is not new, but there is a continual debate about whether such coordination prevents “piling on.”  Of course, what a defense attorney may call piling on, the prosecutors may deem to be a hard but fair hit.  There is no referee or instant replay.  The question of piling on or double counting is a subject of continuing debate in antitrust circles.  It’s a tough question as foreign jurisdictions are injured by international cartels and they have stakeholders that want a significant penalty.  Sorting out proportional penalties among sovereign nations is a particularly tough ongoing challenge. This new policy document is not going to end that debate but a written policy document (while creating no new rights) could enhance defendants’ power of persuasion with the Department of Justice if they have some credible numbers to back up a “piling on” argument.

Thanks for reading.

PS.  Several publications have reported that Richard Powers will become the next Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division.  The Antitrust Division has made no announcement yet.  One of the many qualifications Mr. Powers will bring to the position, if he is named as the Criminal Deputy, is his experience in multi-agency, international prosecutions. He worked on both Libor and Forex while a member of the Antitrust Division’s New York Field Office.

CCC’s: It’s A Crime There Isn’t a Criminal Antitrust Whistleblower Statute

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Kimberly Justice and I are continuing to write about what we believe is a very important issue in cartel fighting–the passing of criminal antitrust whistleblower legislation.  Below are the opening paragraphs of our latest article on the subject.  The full article, kindly posted by Wolters Kluwer in their Antitrust Law Daily, can be found here.

“The SEC’s wildly successful whistleblower program has returned hundreds of millions of dollars to investors as a result of actionable whistleblower information over the past six years.  The IRS paid one whistleblower more than $100 million for information that helped the government uncover a massive tax evasion scheme and led to a $780 million settlement.  The CFTC predicts that the results of its whistleblower program this year will be “huge.”  The Antitrust Division has paid $0 to whistleblowers and received $0 from cartels exposed by whistleblowers.  Or, as Charlie Brown would say, the Antitrust Division “got a rock.”

There is no cartel whistleblower program and this should change now.  Price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies are felonies costing American consumers millions of dollars in the form of artificially high prices.  These fraudulent schemes are particularly suited to exposure by whistleblowers because senior corporate executives frequently use lower level employees (and potential whistleblowers) to carry out the illegal scheme.  The time is right for serious antitrust whistleblower legislation.”

 

Full article here

Thanks for reading.  If you have any reaction/comment you’d like to share please use the comment section or through LinkedIn (here).

Former Siemens Executive Pleads Guilty To Role in $100 Million Foreign Bribery Scheme

Thursday, March 15, 2018

The former Technical Manager of the Major Projects division of Siemens Business Services GmbH & Co. OGH (SBS), a wholly owned subsidiary of Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG), pleaded guilty today to conspiring to pay tens of millions of dollars in bribes to Argentine government officials to secure, implement and enforce a $1 billion contract to create national identity cards.

Acting Assistant Attorney General John P. Cronan of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman of the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director in Charge Andrew W. Vale of the FBI’s Washington, D.C. Field Office made the announcement.

Eberhard Reichert, 78, of Munich, Germany, was employed by Siemens AG from 1964 until 2001.  Beginning in approximately 1990, Reichert was the Technical Manager of the Major Projects division of SBS.  Reichert pleaded guilty today in the Southern District of New York to one count of conspiring to violate the anti-bribery, internal controls and books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and to commit wire fraud.  Reichert was arraigned last December on a three-count indictment filed in December 2011 charging him and seven other individuals.  He will be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote of the Southern District of New York, who accepted his plea today.

“Far too often, companies pay bribes as part of their business plan, upsetting what should be a level playing field and harming companies that play by the rules,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Cronan.  “In this case, one of the largest public companies in the world paid staggeringly large bribes to officials at the uppermost levels of the government of Argentina to secure a billion-dollar contract.  Eberhard Reichert’s conviction demonstrates the Criminal Division’s commitment to bringing both companies and corrupt individuals to justice, wherever they may reside and regardless of how long they may attempt to avoid arrest.”

“Eberhard Reichert tried to sidestep laws designed to root corruption out of the government contracting process,” said U.S. Attorney Berman.  “As he admitted in Manhattan federal court today, Reichert helped to conceal tens of millions of dollars in bribes that were paid to unfairly secure a lucrative contract from the Argentine government.  Today’s plea should be a warning to others that our office is committed to bringing corrupt criminals to justice, no matter how long they run from the law.”

In 1998, the government of Argentina awarded to a subsidiary of Siemens AG a contract worth approximately $1 billion to create state-of-the-art national identity cards (the Documento Nacional de Identidad or DNI project).  The Argentine government terminated the DNI project in 2001.  In connection with his guilty plea, Reichert admitted that he engaged in a decade-long scheme to pay tens of millions of dollars in bribes to Argentine government officials in connection with the DNI project, which was worth more than $1 billion to Siemens.  Reichert admitted that he and his co-conspirators concealed the illicit payments through various means, including using shell companies associated with intermediaries to disguise and launder the funds.

Reichert also admitted that he used a $27 million contract between a Siemens entity and a company called MFast Consulting AG that purported to be for consulting services to conceal bribes to Argentine officials.

In 2008, Siemens AG, a German entity, pleaded guilty to violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA; Siemens Argentina pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the books and records provisions of the FCPA; and Siemens Bangladesh Limited and Siemens S.A. – Venezuela each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA.  As part of the plea agreements, the Siemens companies paid a total of $450 million in criminal fines.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also brought a civil case against Siemens AG alleging that it violated the anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.  In resolving the SEC case, Siemens AG paid $350 million in disgorgement of wrongful profits.  The Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office also resolved similar charges with Siemens AG that resulted in a fine of $800 million.  In August 2009, following these corporate resolutions with U.S. and German authorities, Siemens AG withdrew its claim to the more than $200 million arbitration award.

The FBI’s International Corruption Squad in Washington, D.C. is investigating the case.  The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Michael Culhane Harper of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Niketh Velamoor of the Southern District of New York.  The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, the SEC, Croatian authorities and the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office also provided significant assistance.

The Criminal Division’s Fraud Section is responsible for investigating and prosecuting all FCPA matters.  Additional information about the Justice Department’s FCPA enforcement efforts can be found at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.

Former CEO of Arthrocare Corporation Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Role in $750 Million Securities Fraud Scheme

Friday, November 3, 2017

The former chief executive officer of ArthroCare Corporation, a publicly traded medical device company based in Austin, Texas, was sentenced today to 240 months in prison for his role in orchestrating a fraud scheme that resulted in shareholder losses of over $750 million.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Blanco of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Richard L. Durbin Jr. of the Western District of Texas and Special Agent in Charge Christopher Combs of the FBI’s San Antonio Field office made the announcement.

Michael Baker, 58, of Austin, Texas, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks of the Western District of Texas, who also ordered Baker five years of supervised release following his prison sentence and to pay a fine in the amount of $1 million and to forfeit $13.7 million.  At the sentencing hearing, the Court found that investors lost more than $750 million as a result of the fraud scheme.  On Aug. 18, after a two-week re-trial, Baker was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud, seven counts of wire fraud, two counts of securities fraud and two counts of making false statements.

Evidence at trial showed that, beginning in 2005 and continuing until 2009, Baker, along with his co-conspirators, masterminded and executed a scheme to artificially inflate sales and revenue through a series of end-of-quarter transactions involving several of ArthroCare’s distributors.  Baker, along with his co-conspirators, determined the type and amount of product to be shipped to distributors based on ArthroCare’s need to meet Wall Street analyst forecasts, rather than distributors’ actual orders.  Baker and others then caused ArthroCare to “park” millions of dollars’ worth of ArthroCare’s medical devices at its distributors at the end of each relevant quarter.  ArthroCare reported these shipments as sales in its quarterly and annual filings at the time of the shipment, enabling the company to meet or exceed internal and external earnings forecasts.

The trial evidence further showed that ArthroCare’s distributors agreed to accept shipment of millions of dollars of products in exchange for special conditions, including substantial, upfront cash commissions, extended payment terms and the ability to return products, allowing ArthroCare to falsely inflate revenue by tens of millions of dollars.  In the case of ArthroCare’s largest distributor, DiscoCare, Baker caused ArthroCare to acquire DiscoCare specifically to conceal from the investing public the nature and financial significance of ArthroCare’s relationship with DiscoCare.  In addition to falsely inflating ArthroCare’s revenue, Baker lied when he was deposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in November 2009 about ArthroCare’s relationship with DiscoCare, the evidence showed.

Baker’s earlier conviction was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, resulting in the retrial.  The sentence imposed on Baker today of 20 years imprisonment is identical to the sentence he received after his first trial.

Co-conspirators David Applegate and John Raffle, both former senior vice presidents of ArthroCare, pleaded guilty to multiple felonies in 2013 in connection with their participation in the scheme.  Co-conspirator Michael Gluk, former chief financial officer of ArthroCare, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud on June 14, in connection with his participation in the scheme.

On Aug. 29, 2014, Raffle was sentenced to 80 months in prison.  On Aug. 29, 2014, Applegate was sentenced to 60 months in prison.  Gluk’s sentencing is scheduled for Jan. 5, 2018.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s San Antonio Field Office.  The case is being prosecuted by Securities and Financial Fraud Unit Chief Benjamin D. Singer, Assistant Chief Henry P. Van Dyck and Trial Attorney Caitlin Cottingham of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.

CCC’s: Top Comments on Antitrust Whistleblower Posts

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I’ve received several comments on the idea of an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute.  Some of the top comments are:

  1.    Didn’t you retire?  No.
  2.    Well, you should have.  I sometimes think the same thing, but what could be more fun than being an antitrust lawyer?
  3.    Your website design stinks and for a nominal fee I can fix it and help you lose weight.  I’m not worried about the website design.  But, please email me with the weight loss help.  
  4.    There were concerns that, particularly with international cartels, a whistleblower award could be excessive.  We agree that some allowance should be made to address this possibility.  John Connor offered this helpful comment:  “What is an appropriate standard for the size of the award? Using a percentage the employer’s fine is likely to be excessive. What about 5 or 10 years’ of the whistle-blower’s compensation?”   
  5.  There were some questions as to whether cartel whistleblower bounty provisions exist in other countries.  That is a good question.  We are researching that and will follow up.   
  6. Several people noted that an antitrust whistleblower idea is not a new idea and has never received support in the past from the Antitrust Division or Congress.  This is true, and we may get nowhere with our proposal this time.  But, as we’ve noted, the leniency “cash cow” is slowing down and the SEC whistleblower provision has been a huge success (by most people’s estimation).   Sometimes persistence pays off and the time may have come has come for a successful antitrust whistleblower push.  And, I may humbly suggest that Kimberly Justice and I may have some insights based on our many years with the Antitrust Division that have not been considered before.  We’ll see.

P.S.

The Grassley-Leahy Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2017, was just passed unanimously in the Senate.  The legislation would make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who reports a violation of antitrust laws or a crime connected to antitrust laws.  This is the third time this legislation has passed the Senate unanimously, but it has never even been taken up by the House.

Stay tuned….

Thanks for reading.

CCC’s: It Is Time for an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute–Part 3

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This is Part Three of a four-part series of posts by myself and colleague Kimberly Justice on “It Is Time for an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute.”  Parts 1 and 2 can be found here and here.

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Note:   If the Grassley/Leahy Anti-Retaliation Act is passed, that protection would be part of the whistleblower statute. Ms. Justice and I are advocating that an antitrust whistleblower statute should go farther and provide a reward for actionable cartel-busting information.

The SEC whistleblower statute is a very successful model to be followed for a potential antitrust whistleblower statute. There should be differences in some areas (discussed below), but the SEC program has shown to be an effective tool in preserving the integrity of the nations’ securities market while conserving the investigative resources of the SEC.  But, it took a severe financial crisis to overcome the objections to an SEC whistleblower statute.  Many of the stakeholders, such as the Chamber of Commerce that opposed allowing a whistleblower award as part of the Dodd-Frank Act are likely to oppose an antitrust whistleblower statute.  But in November 2016, then SEC chair Mary Jo White said: “The whistleblower program has had a transformative impact on enforcement and that impact will only increase in the coming years.”

The success of the SEC whistleblower statute, at least from an enforcement perspective, is one reason why we think the time has come for a similar antitrust whistleblower statute.  It works.  The SEC, which pays the whistleblower 10-30% of the sanctions collected in successful actions, has rewarded 46 whistleblowers with approximately $158 million for information that has led to successful enforcement actions.

The SEC statute, like the antitrust statute we propose, is different than a typical False Claims Act-type whistleblower claim where the relator (whistleblower) brings an action in the name of the United States alleging the government has been the victim of fraud.  The SEC statute basically provides an informant with a reward (bounty) for coming forward with actionable information where the SEC obtains monetary sanctions.  The SEC, however, is precluded from making monetary awards “to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award.”

While the SEC statute provides a model, there are areas where adjustments for the nature of cartel violations may be made in an antitrust whistleblower statute.  The full SEC legislation can be found here, but below are a couple of key provisions and our suggestions about how they might be modified.

Payment of Award

The SEC whistleblower program allows for a reward, “In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related action.” 

The Antitrust Division does not have administrative actions.  An antitrust whistleblower would be eligible for an award, in our view, only based on original information that led to criminal Sherman Act convictions and the imposition of fines based on a conviction.

 Amount of Award

The SEC provides for a whistleblower award only where the penalties exceed $1 million.  In such cases the reward is an aggregate amount [if more than one whistleblower] equal to—

‘‘(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions; and

‘‘(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions.

In our view, this may not be an appropriate award schedule for an antitrust whistleblower.  At a minimum, the $1 million threshold should be eliminated. A whistleblower statute may be particularly effective in construction-type contracts where the loss to the victim is acute.  For example, a rigged electrical contract at a local hospital that would have been $750,000 with competitive bidding but has a low fixed bid of $1 million is as worthy of a whistleblower award as an international cartel where each consumer suffers a relatively small loss, but cumulatively the loss will easily exceed $1 million.

Also, the 10 to 30 percent award range may be excessive in a large cartel case.  The impetus behind our proposed legislation is not so much to make a whistleblower a mega-lottery winner, but to provide a way to help the whistleblower pay for what could be substantial attorney fees, and to compensate the whistleblower for what may be a long period of unemployment or underemployment, regardless of anti-retaliation protection. Therefore, we would eliminate the minimum award of 10%, leave the maximum of 30% and perhaps require that in making the award the Antitrust Division consider a) the attorney fees incurred; and b) the likely or actual loss of income over a period of time, as well as the value of the information provided, the level of cooperation and the amount of the recovery.

No Recovery for One Convicted of the Violation

No SEC whistleblower award can be made to ‘‘to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this section.”

             An antitrust whistleblower statute should certainly retain this provision.  It is our sense that the most likely potential antitrust whistleblowers will be lower-level employees who know about a conspiracy and take some action in furtherance of it—thus creating criminal liability for themselves.  This will give the Antitrust Division much control over who can become a whistleblower.  The Division retains the discretion whether to give non-prosecution protection, a necessary first step before an insider can become a whistleblower.  If the potential whistleblower has a level of culpability such that the Antitrust Division is not comfortable accepting as a whistleblower, the simple answer is to not grant non-prosecution protection.  Another possible scenario is that the Antitrust Division grant non-prosecution protection to a highly culpable individual (making them eligible for an award because no conviction) but write into the cooperation agreement that the cooperator waive the right to a potential “bounty.”

There may be, and hopefully will be, some whistleblowers who do not need non-prosecution protection (customers, administrative staff or others who learn of a cartel but have no role in it).  But, in practice, the Antitrust Division would have significant control over the whistleblower program because it is likely that many potential whistleblowers would have to take as a first step, negotiating non-prosecution agreements.

 Office of the Whistleblower

            A key aspect behind the success of the SEC whistleblower provision is that the SEC actively promotes the program.  The SEC established an Office of the Whistleblower.  This is an excerpt from the office’s home page:

Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individuals involved, whistleblowers can help the Commission identify possible fraud and other violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible.

The level to which the Antitrust Division promotes a new whistleblower statute will determine its level of success.  When the Division first began the revised leniency program, it rolled it out like a new iPhone.  The Division went to great lengths to advertise the program and make the program successful in practice by working with companies to help them qualify if at all possible.  The flexibility and discretion built in to an SEC style whistleblower statute will give the Antitrust Division the ability to accentuate the features the whistleblower provisions that work best for law enforcement while mitigating any possible downside (such as very culpable people getting awards).

Miscellaneous

We’ve only touched on the most significant feature of the SEC whistleblower program that may be mimicked in an antitrust whistleblower statute.  There would be more “sausage making” into creating actual legislation.  Other features of the SEC program worth noting are the reporting requirements to Congress and the Inspector General review and report on the program.  If an antitrust whistleblower statute is nearly as effective as the SEC statute, law enforcement and consumers will be the winners.  But, if an antitrust whistleblower statute is a bad idea, it can be a short-lived bad idea.  In light of the success of the SEC program, it is prudent to give it a chance.

Thanks for reading

[email protected]

Kimberly A. Justice, [email protected]

CCC’s: It Is Time For An Antitrust Whistleblower Statute–Part 2

Objections to an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute

The idea of an antitrust whistleblower is not new, but it has never gained much traction in the past.  There have been significant objections, or at least disinterest—particularly from the Department of Justice.  The mood seemed to be “Our cup runneth over with Amnesty applications so let’s not screw this thing up.”  But, perhaps times have changed.  Our analysis is that the objections to a whistleblower statute were either superficial, or when having merit, still not enough to outweigh the benefits of a whistleblower statute.

Before considering some of the possible downside to an antitrust whistleblower statute, a little explanation of what we have in mind may be helpful.  We propose an SEC-style whistleblower statue where an informant can be awarded a level of compensation (bounty) when information of illegality leads to charges and recovery by the SEC. This is different than a False Claims Act qui tam case where a Relator brings a case in the name of the government alleging the government has been defrauded.  In fact, an antitrust whistleblower statute is needed because a qui tam case is not generally available in price-fixing matters since it is the private sector, not the government that has been harmed.

Concerns About an Antitrust Whistleblower statute

 It’s worth noting that the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act has been passed twice unanimously by the Senate in the last two Congresses and is up for vote again on the Senate floor.  It will no doubt pass—most likely again unanimously.  There is agreement that a person who reports criminal antitrust activity should not face retaliation in the workplace. (Despite the consensus, the House has failed to take up this bill the last two times it has passed the Senate).  There is controversy, however, about whether a whistleblower should be eligible for some type of bounty if the information leads to successful cartel prosecution and the imposition of fines.

In 2011, the General Accounting Office Published a report on Criminal Cartel Enforcement that reported stakeholders’ views on a possible antitrust whistleblower statute (here).  This is a summary of the GAO findings:

There was no consensus among key stakeholders GAO interviewed–antitrust plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys, among others–regarding the addition of a whistleblower reward, but they widely supported adding antiretaliatory protection. Nine of 21 key stakeholders stated that adding a whistleblower reward in the form of a bounty could result in greater cartel detection and deterrence, but 11 of 21 noted that such rewards could hinder DOJ’s enforcement program. Currently, whistleblowers who report criminal antitrust violations lack a civil remedy if they experience retaliation, such as being fired, so they may be hesitant to report criminal wrongdoing, and past reported cases suggest retaliation occurs in this type of situation. All 16 key stakeholders who had a position on the issue generally supported the addition of a civil whistleblower protection though senior DOJ Antitrust Division officials stated that they neither support nor oppose the idea.

The GAO report is several years old and it may be that positions have been reevaluated.  For example, I think the Antitrust Division today would support the anti-retaliation measures in whistleblower statute.  But below is an analysis of some of the objections raised to making a bounty available to an antitrust whistleblower.

Whistleblower Credibility

 The Antitrust Division’s principal concern was that jurors may not believe a witness who stands to benefit financially from successful enforcement action against those he implicated.  GAO Report p. 39.  But, a whistleblower is highly unlikely to ever be a principle witness at a trial.  An antitrust crime typically involves many culpable actors.  A whistleblower would generally “get the ball rolling” and provide evidence that will turn other witnesses, and allow subpoenas and search warrants from target companies.  Further, a single whistleblower who might receive a financial reward seems no less credible than witnesses from an amnesty company where everyone—including the highest-ranking culpable executives—will have escaped criminal prosecution.  Also, criminal antitrust trials are relatively rare—almost all cases are resolved by pleas.  Finally, it is not logical to worry about the credibility of a witness you would otherwise not even know about absent a whistleblower statute.

A Whistleblower Reward Could Result in Claims That Do Not Lead to Criminal Prosecution: 

 There was some fear expressed in the GAO report that would-be whistleblowers would fabricate information in order to conjure up a cartel in the hopes of collecting a reward.  GAO Report p. 40.  Anything is possible, but the Antitrust Division folks are pretty savvy and have standards for opening grand jury investigations.  Moreover, the possibility of fabricated charges exists today with a company applying for leniency in the hopes of knee-capping competitors who would have to deal with a criminal cartel investigation.  The reality is a “false accusation” simply wouldn’t be corroborated by anyone else and could land the accuser in jail for making a false statement.

In a similar vane, concern was expressed that a whistleblower statute may result in a deluge of complaints to the Antitrust Division that would take additional resources to sift through.  This seems like a good problem to have.  When Ms. Justice and I were at the Division, we received a fair number of complaints that amounted to no more than oligopoly pricing.  It did not take too much time to ask: “What else ya got?”

* * * * * Click Here for the Rest of the Story * * * * *

CCC’s: It Is Time for an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute —Part I

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Kimberly Justice and I wrote an article published in Global Competition Review arguing that it is time for an “Antitrust Whistleblower Statute.”  [The article is behind a pay firewall (here).]  Kimberly and I will be expanding on this idea in Cartel Capers blog posts over the next two weeks.  Below is the first installment.  We explain why cartels are a great pond to be fishing in for informants, but a little “whistleblower” bait is needed.

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Over the last several years, Senators Chuck Grassley and Patrick Leahy have introduced antitrust whistleblower legislation that has passed in the Senate but died in the House.  Their proposed legislation would grant job protection to antitrust whistleblowers.  The legislation that Ms. Justice and I are proposing would go further; besides retaliation protection, we would offer potential financial reward to a whistleblower who initiated a successful cartel prosecution.

The time is right for antitrust whistleblower legislation. In 1993, the Antitrust Division revised its Corporate Leniency policy, setting the stage for similar, successful, legislation/polices to be enacted around the world.  Amnesty/Leniency rewards an entire company and its cooperating executives with non-prosecution for coming forward and reporting cartel behavior.  But leniency applications are slowing down—at least that is the perception of many observers—as the cost of obtaining leniency in terms of corporate time and attorney fees, in an expanding universe of jurisdictions, has would-be applicants reassessing the cost/benefit analysis.  A whistleblower statute would not replace, nor in our opinion undercut, leniency policies, but would add a new tool to uncover cartels that exist, and deter new cartels from forming.

There are two features of cartels that are key to understanding why an antitrust whistleblower statute would be a potent and needed weapon in the fight against cartels:

1)         There are many potential whistleblowers in virtually every price-fixing/bid rigging conspiracy.  The culpability level of the many players ranges from Masters (top-level) to Sherpas (working group guy).  Offering a potential whistleblower reward to a single cartel member still leaves a target rich enforcement of culpable executives to focus on; but

2)         It is costly for a potential whistleblower to come forward.  Any member of a cartel, even the least culpable, faces the possibility of significant jail time.  In order for a low-level cartel participant to come forward, he needs to engage a qualified attorney and negotiate a non-prosecution agreement with the Antitrust Division.  This is an expensive, potentially life changing decision.  Long-term unemployment may well follow.  Hefty attorney fees surely will.  Even the most desirable whistleblower—one with no culpability at all, such as a secretary, or customer– will not ensnare herself in a cartel investigation without some means to cover significant attorney costs and reap some compensation for doing “the right [but very costly] thing.”

Ms. Justice and I worked on two investigations which highlight these points.  The first was an international cartel investigation involving both US and foreign companies.  Within each company there were many executives—some retired—that had enough knowledge of the cartel that had they come forward, an investigation would have been opened.  If a single whistleblower had come forward, there still would have been many culpable individuals and companies left to prosecute.

Another prosecution involved a typical bid rigging scheme on a government contract.  This type of scheme is usually initiated by the owner/senior member of the company (who would not be eligible for whistleblower status).  But, it is also typical that an estimator who knows the boss has schemed with a competitor(s) is told to bump up the prices to reflect the agreement.  The estimator is liable as a participant in the cartel, but would make an excellent whistleblower.[1]

Given almost any cartel, international or local, a lower level employee could come forward and likely receive a non-prosecution/cooperation deal under the Antitrust Division’s current Individual Leniency Policy.  But the Individual Leniency Policy is almost never used because a rational person would likely prefer to lay low and hope the crime never gets uncovered than come forward, likely lose his job and have to pay an attorney to negotiate with the Antitrust Division for immunity.  Being an Antitrust Division witness is a marriage that lasts longer than many real marriages.  Criminal antitrust investigations take years, and if it is an international matter, a whistleblower will be called on to be interviewed by many jurisdictions around the globe.  Without some incentive of a reward, an individual would almost certainly not “volunteer” to assist in a cartel investigation.   Even a non-culpable witness/whistleblower such as a customer in whom a salesperson confided or a corporate administrative assistant who saw/heard incriminating information is not likely to come forward to the Antitrust Division on his/her own.

There are many potential antitrust whistleblowers.  But the disincentives to come forward voluntarily are significant.  Some “bait” is needed to entice a whistleblower:  protection from job retaliation and a financial incentive that would cover the significant costs of cooperation and perhaps even provide an “informants’’ bounty.”  The False Claims Act, the SEC and other whistleblower statutes are successful because individuals with knowledge can engage an attorney to guide them through the process in exchange for a possible award of attorney fees and a contingency fee.  The whistleblower’s attorney can develop the potential whistleblower’s claim, negotiate with the government, and represent the potential whistleblower throughout the process, all without an upfront cost to the potential whistleblower.  A former employee, for example, maybe one who has been fired or downsized—would have a way to report illegal conduct without assuming a tremendous legal bill—and even have a financial incentive to do so.

In the next blog post we will discuss some of the objections that have been raised to an antitrust whistleblower statute and why we think none of these concerns are serious enough to kill the whistleblower idea.  But, first, we’ll wrap this segment up by noting a couple of the benefits of a whistleblower statute which may be obvious:

  • A whistleblower can start a criminal cartel investigation with an insider’s view of the agreement and who is party to it. A single whistleblower does not preclude the Antitrust Division from also offering leniency, as it is unlikely one witnesses can provide indictable evidence.  But, whistleblower evidence/assistance should lead to an efficient investigation that preserves the most culpable cartel members for prosecution.
  • Like leniency, as the whistleblower tool gets used and generates publicity, it will be effective in deterring cartels from even forming. This effect is not capable of measurement, but it is logical that if a single member of a cartel (particularly lower-level Sherpas who may not be crazy about carrying out the Master’s scheme) has a means to report the cartel and be rewarded for actionable information, cartel members will have another reason to think twice before engaging in criminal antitrust behavior.

More to come.  Thanks for reading.

[email protected]

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[1]   Where the government is a victim of a fraud—and bid rigging is a fraud—a whistleblower case can currently be brought under the False Claims Act.  There are occasional instances of bid rigging whistleblower case.  But, it would be better to have these types of cases covered by a particular antitrust whistleblower statute and better publicized with an Antitrust Division Office Whistleblower Office.

SEC Announces Whistleblower Award of More Than $1.7 Million

Washington D.C., July 27, 2017

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced a whistleblower award of more than $1.7 million to a company insider who provided the agency with critical information to help stop a fraud that would have otherwise been difficult to detect.  Millions of dollars were returned to harmed investors as a result of the SEC’s ensuing investigation and enforcement action.

”When whistleblowers tip the SEC, it not only can bring wrongdoers to justice but also relief to investors,” said Jane Norberg, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower.  ”This whistleblower’s valuable information enabled us to stop further investor harm and ultimately return money to victims.”

Approximately $158 million has now been awarded to 46 whistleblowers who voluntarily provided the SEC with original and useful information that led to a successful enforcement action.

By law, the SEC protects the confidentiality of whistleblowers and does not disclose information that might directly or indirectly reveal a whistleblower’s identity.  Whistleblowers may be eligible for an award when they voluntarily provide the SEC with original, timely, and credible information that leads to a successful enforcement action.

Whistleblower awards can range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the money collected when the monetary sanctions exceed $1 million.  All payments are made out of an investor protection fund established by Congress that is financed entirely through monetary sanctions paid to the SEC by securities law violators. No money has been taken or withheld from harmed investors to pay whistleblower awards.

For more information about the whistleblower program and how to report a tip, visit www.sec.gov/whistleblower.