Tag Archives: Bill Baer

Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit Lawsuit Challenging Anheuser-Busch InBev’s Proposed Acquisition of Grupo Modelo

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Merger Would Result in U.S. Consumers Paying More for Beer, Less Innovation; Lawsuit Seeks to Maintain Competition in the Beer Industry Nationwide

WASHINGTON — The Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today challenging Anheuser-Busch InBev’s (ABI) proposed acquisition of total ownership and control of Grupo Modelo. The department said that the $20.1 billion transaction would substantially lessen competition in the market for beer in the United States as a whole and in 26 metropolitan areas across the United States, resulting in consumers paying more for beer and having fewer new products from which to choose.

Americans spent at least $80 billion on beer last year. According to the department, ABI’s Bud Light is the best selling beer in the United States and Modelo’s Corona Extra is the best-selling import. Because of the size of the beer market in the United States, even a small increase in the price of beer could result in billions of dollars of harm to American consumers, the department said.

The department’s lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeks to prevent the companies from merging and to preserve the existing head-to-head competition between the firms that the transaction would eliminate.

“The department is taking this action to stop a merger between major beer brewers because it would result in less competition and higher beer prices for American consumers,” said Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  “If ABI fully owned and controlled Modelo, ABI would be able to increase beer prices to American consumers. This lawsuit seeks to prevent ABI from eliminating Modelo as an important competitive force in the beer industry.”

ABI and Modelo–the largest and third largest beer firms, respectively–together control about 46 percent of annual sales in the United States. MillerCoors, the second largest beer firm, accounts for about 29 percent of nationwide sales. Beer is generally grouped into four distinct segments by industry participants–sub-premium, premium, premium plus and high-end. The sub-premium segment includes: Busch (owned by ABI); and Keystone (owned by MillerCoors). The premium segment includes: Bud Light; Coors Light; and MillerLite. The premium plus segment includes: Michelob (owned by ABI); and Modelo Especial (owned by Modelo). The high-end segment includes: imports such as Corona (owned by Modelo) and Heineken; and a variety of craft beers.

According to the department’s complaint, the U.S. beer market is already highly concentrated, and prices are increased by strategic interactions among the largest brewers, including ABI and MillerCoors. ABI generally acts as the price leader, implementing annual price increases in the sub-premium, premium and premium plus segments of the U.S. beer industry. MillerCoors and other brewers have typically joined the ABI price increases, while Modelo has not. By pricing aggressively, Modelo–through its importer, Crown Imports–puts pressure on ABI to maintain or lower prices, especially in certain parts of the country. As a result, Modelo has become a particularly important competitor in the U.S. market.

The complaint quotes internal company documents demonstrating both ABI’s determination to maintain its upward price leadership in the U.S. beer industry and Modelo’s present-day position as a significant competitive threat to ABI:

 

    • ABI has implemented a “conduct plan,” whereby ABI hopes to establish “the highest level of [price] followership” by its large rivals by being as “consistent,” “simple” and “transparent” as possible;

 

 

    • ABI believes that its conduct plan provides the highest possibility of “sustaining a price increase” and “ensuring competition does not believe they can take share through pricing”;

 

 

    • By contrast, Modelo’s pricing strategy in the United States is known as the “momentum plan” and aims to narrow the “price gap” between Modelo’s imports and domestic premium beers, such as ABI’s Bud Light, stealing market share from ABI by enticing consumers to “trade up” to Modelo beer; and

 

 

    • ABI executives acknowledge that Modelo has “put increasing pressure” on ABI competitively, and that Modelo’s strategy is at odds with ABI’s well-established practice of leading prices upward with the expectation that its competitors will follow.

 

The complaint also discusses ABI’s efforts to target Corona. ABI considered Corona to be a significant threat, and launched Bud Light Lime in 2008 to compete with Corona. ABI went as far as to mimic Corona’s distinctive clear bottle.  Ultimately, instead of trying to compete head-to-head with its own product, Bud Light Lime, ABI is thwarting competition by buying Modelo.

The department alleges that ABI’s acquisition of total ownership and control of Modelo would eliminate the existing competition between ABI and Modelo, further concentrating the beer industry, enhancing ABI’s market power and facilitating coordinated pricing between ABI and the remaining large players. Consumers would, as a result, see higher prices and less innovation.

The department’s complaint also alleges that ABI and Modelo efforts to remedy the anticompetitive aspects of their transaction are inadequate. The complaint states that ABI has agreed to sell Modelo’s existing 50 percent interest in Crown to its Crown joint venture partner, Constellation. ABI would also enter into an exclusive agreement to supply Constellation with Modelo beer to import into the United States, although ABI can terminate this supply agreement after 10 years and would retain the Modelo brands and its brewing and bottling facilities.

“The companies’ attempt to fix this anticompetitive deal through the sale of Modelo’s existing interest in Crown and a temporary supply agreement is not sufficient to prevent consumer harm from ABI’s acquisition of its competitor, Modelo,” said Baer.

The complaint states that the combined effect of the proposed acquisition of Modelo and the proposed fix is to eliminate from the marketplace a sophisticated brewing firm with a long history of success and replace it with an importer which will own no brands or brewing facilities and be totally dependent on ABI for its supply of Corona and other Modelo brands.  The documents in the case show that as Crown’s CEO wrote to his employees after the acquisition was announced: “our #1 competitor will now be our supplier…it is not currently or will not, going forward, be ‘business as usual.’” The department’s complaint said that not only will competition be harmed by the loss of Modelo as a competitor, but by removing an independent brewer–Modelo–from the market, strategically coordinated pricing will become easier in the future.

ABI is a Belgian corporation with its principal place of business in Leuven, Belgium.  In 2011, ABI had revenues of approximately $39 billion. ABI currently has a 43 percent voting interest and a 50.35 percent economic interest in Modelo. ABI has stated in its annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission that it does not have voting or other effective control of Modelo. Through the proposed acquisition, ABI would acquire control of, and the remaining economic interest in Modelo.

Modelo is a Mexican corporation with its principal place of business in Mexico City.  In 2011, Modelo had revenues of approximately $7 billion.

***Antitrust Monitor (Inaugural Issue): 2013 Forecast***

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Renewed Vigilance Regarding Civil Enforcement; Continued Consolidation, Integration and Acceptance of Structural Changes at Criminal Program; Higher Morale

Baer’s Confirmation is unlikely to change momentum, policies or priorities.

As the Obama Administration prepares for a second term, Bill Baer has been confirmed as Assistant Attorney General.  The Antitrust Division’s informal profile photo of Baer captures his genuine humility and good will that many Antitrust Division attorneys will immediately recognize from numerous interactions with him when he represented clients as a partner at Arnold & Porter.  Baer’s easygoing nature is no contrivance and he will build on this long track record of good relations with many of the attorneys and mid-level managers at the Antitrust Division.  In addition to the normal productivity enhancements associated with having confirmed leadership at the helm, Baer’s tenure at the FTC suggests that he will implement an effective management style and push more expansive enforcement goals.  We also believe that Baer’s confirmation will improve morale (discussed more fully below) and Baer will quickly calm the ripples caused by programmatic changes that resulted in field office closure and attrition of seasoned prosecutors in the criminal program.

Continued Civil Enforcement Vigilance 

In its first term, the Obama Administration took some modest steps toward its goal of revitalizing civil enforcement.  The Division repudiated the Bush administration’s monopolization guidelines and expressed a greater willingness to challenge unilateral conduct and exclusionary business arrangements, although it only brought one monopolization case.  That the Obama administration managed a slight increase in second requests is significant since it occurred in the midst of significantly dampened merger activity caused by the financial crisis.  Perhaps the most telling metric was discovered by the Stanford Law Review (SLR Online, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, July 18, 2012):

“[t]he Bush Administration conducted 0.04 investigations per Hart-Scott filing; Obama conducted 0.05 investigations per filing. The Bush Administration made 0.013 second requests for information per Hart-Scott filing; Obama’s made 0.020—a 50% increase on a per capita basis.

Combine this 50% increase with a few more high profile enforcement actions that included AT&T/T-Mobile, H&R Block/TaxAct, NASDAQ/NYSE, and BCBS/Physicians Health, and the Obama administration can make a plausible case that it has already reinvigorated enforcement. During his Senate confirmation hearings in July, Baer told lawmakers that he supported Congressional action to repeal the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision which imposed rule of reason analysis for resale price maintenance where per se analysis, albeit with loopholes, had sufficed in the past.

This was music to Democratic ears in the Senate that clearly prefer more aggressive enforcement.  Senator Herb Kohl, D-Wis had expressed concerns back in July regarding Google potentially using its market power in search engine technology to favor its products and services.  Baer did not answer Kohl’s question as to Google, but he did share his enforcement philosophy generally: “being vigilant whether its Microsoft or Alcoa Aluminum about firms that are successful, and we don’t want to penalize success but to make sure it’s not improperly translated into unfair advantage in other markets, is really a key part of what antitrust is all about.”  This comment suggests a revival of monopoly leveraging, always a favorite of Democrat administrations even if the courts have been less receptive.

Will Baer lead the Division on a path to reinvigoration?  He may have provided an answer last week when he came out of the box swinging against the merger between Bazaarvoice and Powerreviews Inc. (involving online customer reviews for retailers) and Oklahoma Chiropractors (which challenged joint contracting agreements with insurers).  Of these first two significant actions of Baer’s tenure, Bazaarvoice is the one that is suggestive of reinvigoration and expansion.  The customer reviews market is evolving at rocket speed, there are challenges for the government regarding market definition and it is unclear that the barriers to entry can be all that high, particularly when well-funded behemoths like Google and Facebook seem to have position for market entry.  Notably, the company was vocal in its frustration about the “six months” it spent in negotiations with the Antitrust Division, suggesting that it could have announced this challenge prior to Baer taking the helm.  The fact that Baer announced it after he assumed his duties suggests that he sees a strong case.   Certainly it would not have escaped Baer’s attention that a decision like this would allow many to interpret this is a bullish signal that Baer plans to reinvigorate, revitalize and expand the Antitrust Division’s mission regarding civil enforcement.

At the FTC, Chairman Leibowitz, a Democrat, has served as an FTC commissioner for eight years and as chairman for almost four years. As rumors circulate regarding his likely departure, President Obama must consider potential replacements. The president could appoint a new chairman from the sitting Democratic commissioners, or he could choose someone from outside the agency. The president recently nominated Joshua Wright, a Republican, to replace outgoing Republican commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, whose term expired in September. Commissioner Rosch has indicated that he will stay in his position until the Senate confirms Wright. Although no more than three of the FTC’s five commissioners, who each serve seven-year terms, can be of the same political party, President Obama’s reelection ensures a Democratic majority at the FTC. Three of the five FTC commissioners will continue to be Democrats, and the chairman, who appoints the directors of the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection, will also be a Democrat.  Accordingly, there is little reason to expect a new direction in antitrust enforcement priorities.

Continued Consolidation and Integration of Structural Changes at Criminal Program 

In the first Obama term, cartel enforcement was the Division’s top criminal priority to the exclusion of things like procurement fraud.  Almost certainly, these headwinds still exist, but time will tell whether Baer can be successful at reducing impediments to opening investigations that do not present themselves on first impression as Section 1 conduct.  Although people can argue over the causes, the Antitrust Division grand jury investigations plummeted from over 150 to fewer than 60 overall and new openings fell from 66 to 29.  Most of this came at the expense of Department’s procurement fraud program and overall anti-competitive deterrence in the area of government procurements has been grievously affected as a result.

On paper, cartel enforcement was little changed from the Bush years, although some of the Division’s numbers were marginally inflated by splitting criminal information’s in non-traditional ways and there is a widespread concern that the pipeline of “small” or “bread and butter” investigations is dry.  Airline Shipping and Auto Parts are behemoth investigations that generate a wealth of statistics, but there are 90 fewer industries that are the subject of grand jury investigations and it is impossible to measure deterrence that is not happening.

In procurement fraud, the Bush administration gave the Antitrust Division a long leash and authorized its use of resources in most allegations that affected the pre-award contract process.  As the Obama Administration strained its resources to support invigorated civil enforcement and it pushed investigative resources toward financial crimes, the administration implemented a series of policy changes that significantly reduced Antitrust Division criminal investigations.  First, it was made much more difficult for attorneys to open grand jury investigations involving matters that did not present themselves on first impression as suspected antitrust conspiracies.  Since very few antitrust criminal cases ever “present” as fully-fledged antitrust conspiracies (i.e.. evident participation by more than one competitor), investigation requests plummeted.  This effect was particularly pronounced in procurement because so few government contracts are awarded through an invitation for bid (”IFB”) process and more are awarded sole source, best value and through a request for proposal procedure where price is not the only factor.  These contracting schemes make it difficult, if not impossible as a matter of law, to use the Sherman Act to prosecute schemes affecting contracts that were not awarded through an IFB process.

Second, the Antitrust Division implemented a new, computerized tracking system that made it harder to keep open investigations that were not being actively investigated.  Because grand jury authority is held at the AAG level in contrast to the Criminal Division (delegated to the DAAG) and the United States Attorneys’ Offices (delegated to line assistants), getting grand jury investigations opened takes the Antitrust Division greater resources than other components.  Line attorneys refer to this process with dread as “the investigation to get grand jury investigative authority.”  Because the Antitrust Division has to invest greater resources into securing grants of grand jury authority and because this authority requires higher levels of approval, it is relatively unusual to reopen a grand jury investigation after closure.  In the past, keeping investigations “on the books” might allow a staff to focus on another industry or to offer help to another investigative staff on an investigation that had “gone hot.”  It also might allow another contract to be awarded or another coordinated price increase to be implemented that might significantly further the investigation.  For these and other reasons, putting open cases on the back burner became verboten and if investigations did not hit success early on they got closed.  The new case matter tracking system often pushes staffs to make tactical decisions that would be better made later after the emergence of new leads, information or evidence.  Ironically, in some respects, the Antitrust Division now pursues an operations policy that reminds line attorneys of some partner investigative agencies who years ago would have to close investigations and then struggle to reopen them if a staff determined that a three month delay was advisable.  Because case filings (i.e. stats) are the paramount metric, this provides disincentives to working any case that is at all considered “marginal” and the Division’s deterrence footprint has shrunk.

Third, by January 30, 2013, the Division will have closed four of its seven field offices, a move that has adversely impacted morale.  Although this was sold as a serious consolidation plan for which many employees would avail themselves and relocate to Washington D.C. or the remaining field offices (San Francisco, New York, and Chicago), this does not seem to be happening in any great numbers.  Using the Philadelphia and Cleveland Field Offices as examples, we count a total of three attorneys who will be staying with the Division.

Baer’s mission is not an easy one.  He joins the Antitrust Division just prior to the formal shut down of four offices and significant attrition; he joins an Antitrust Division that has fewer raw materials in the investigations pipeline.  Still we have caucused Antitrust Division attorneys who are staying with the agency and there is reason for optimism.  As word filters back that Antitrust Division attorneys who severed or retired were dealt with fairly and considerately, active concerns will dissipate and we believe Baer can drive a newly structured criminal program to fire on all cylinders by the end of this fiscal year.   There could be reinvigorated activity as a rumored new section formed in Washington D.C. (staffed by detailees and transferring attorneys) and offices in San Francisco, Chicago (currently slated for one additional expat prosecutor) and New York receive transferring prosecutors and lateral hires to stem attrition, and we expect to see vibrant competition by attorneys for investigations.  Most notably, the rumored new section in Washington D.C., that will be comprised of expats from some of the closed field offices, will see the National Criminal Enforcement Section (NCES) as its main competition and we expect fierce competition to develop creative strategies for generating new cases.