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CCC’s: DOJ Announces “Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties” Policy

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On May 9, 2018 Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein delivered remarks to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute. He announced a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.  The full prepared remarks are here.  Below is an excerpt:

Today, we are announcing a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.

The aim is to enhance relationships with our law enforcement partners in the United States and abroad, while avoiding unfair duplicative penalties.

It is important for us to be aggressive in pursuing wrongdoers. But we should discourage disproportionate enforcement of laws by multiple authorities. In football, the term “piling on” refers to a player jumping on a pile of other players after the opponent is already tackled.

Our new policy discourages “piling on” by instructing Department components to appropriately coordinate with one another and with other enforcement agencies in imposing multiple penalties on a company in relation to investigations of the same misconduct.

In highly regulated industries, a company may be accountable to multiple regulatory bodies. That creates a risk of repeated punishments that may exceed what is necessary to rectify the harm and deter future violations.

Sometimes government authorities coordinate well.  They are force multipliers in their respective efforts to punish and deter fraud. They achieve efficiencies and limit unnecessary regulatory burdens.

Other times, joint or parallel investigations by multiple agencies sound less like singing in harmony, and more like competing attempts to sing a solo.

Modern business operations regularly span jurisdictions and borders. Whistleblowers routinely report allegations to multiple enforcement authorities, which may investigate the claims jointly or through their own separate and independent proceedings.

By working with other agencies, including the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OFAC, and others, our Department is better able to detect sophisticated financial fraud schemes and deploy adequate penalties and remedies to ensure market integrity.

But we have heard concerns about “piling on” from our own Department personnel. Our prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys prize the Department’s reputation for fairness.

They understand the importance of protecting our brand. They asked for support in coordinating internally and with other agencies to achieve reasonable and proportionate outcomes in major corporate investigations.

And I know many federal, state, local and foreign authorities that work with us are interested in joining our efforts to show leadership in this area.

“Piling on” can deprive a company of the benefits of certainty and finality ordinarily available through a full and final settlement. We need to consider the impact on innocent employees, customers, and investors who seek to resolve problems and move on. We need to think about whether devoting resources to additional enforcement against an old scheme is more valuable than fighting a new one.

Our new policy provides no private right of action and is not enforceable in court, but it will be incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, and it will guide the Department’s decisions.

This is another step towards greater transparency and consistency in corporate enforcement. To reduce white collar crime, we need to encourage companies to report suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement and to resolve liability expeditiously.

There are four key features of the new policy.

First, the policy affirms that the federal government’s criminal enforcement authority should not be used against a company for purposes unrelated to the investigation and prosecution of a possible crime. We should not employ the threat of criminal prosecution solely to persuade a company to pay a larger settlement in a civil case.

That is not a policy change. It is a reminder of and commitment to principles of fairness and the rule of law.

Second, the policy addresses situations in which Department attorneys in different components and offices may be seeking to resolve a corporate case based on the same misconduct.

The new policy directs Department components to coordinate with one another, and achieve an overall equitable result. The coordination may include crediting and apportionment of financial penalties, fines, and forfeitures, and other means of avoiding disproportionate punishment.

Third, the policy encourages Department attorneys, when possible, to coordinate with other federal, state, local, and foreign enforcement authorities seeking to resolve a case with a company for the same misconduct.

Finally, the new policy sets forth some factors that Department attorneys may evaluate in determining whether multiple penalties serve the interests of justice in a particular case.

Sometimes, penalties that may appear duplicative really are essential to achieve justice and protect the public. In those cases, we will not hesitate to pursue complete remedies, and to assist our law enforcement partners in doing the same.

Factors identified in the policy that may guide this determination include the egregiousness of the wrongdoing; statutory mandates regarding penalties; the risk of delay in finalizing a resolution; and the adequacy and timeliness of a company’s disclosures and cooperation with the Department.

Cooperating with a different agency or a foreign government is not a substitute for cooperating with the Department of Justice. And we will not look kindly on companies that come to the Department of Justice only after making inadequate disclosures to secure lenient penalties with other agencies or foreign governments. In those instances, the Department will act without hesitation to fully vindicate the interests of the United States.

The Department’s ability to coordinate outcomes in joint and parallel proceedings is also constrained by more practical concerns.  The timing of other agency actions, limits on information sharing across borders, and diplomatic relations between countries are some of the challenges we confront that do not always lend themselves to easy solutions.

The idea of coordination is not new. The Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and many of our U.S. Attorney’s Offices routinely coordinate with the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, and other financial regulators, as well as a wide variety of foreign partners. The FCPA Unit announced its first coordinated resolution with the country of Singapore this past December.

The Antitrust Division has cooperated with 21 international agencies through 58 different merger investigations during the past four years.

Here is a link to the policy on Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties.

As the Deputy Attorney General stated, coordination is not new.  The Antitrust Division routinely coordinates with other federal and state agencies on most investigations.  And some coordination always occurs on international investigations.  In the recent financial crimes investigations such as Libor and FOREX the amount of coordination was extensive among federal agencies such as the Antitrust Division, Criminal Division, FBI, SEC, CFTC, state AG office, as well as with many foreign jurisdictions.  It is rumored that meetings were held in the Great Hall at the Department of Justice since no conference room could hold the throngs of participating enforcers.

Coordination by the Antitrust Division with enforcers from other federal, state and international enforcers is not new, but there is a continual debate about whether such coordination prevents “piling on.”  Of course, what a defense attorney may call piling on, the prosecutors may deem to be a hard but fair hit.  There is no referee or instant replay.  The question of piling on or double counting is a subject of continuing debate in antitrust circles.  It’s a tough question as foreign jurisdictions are injured by international cartels and they have stakeholders that want a significant penalty.  Sorting out proportional penalties among sovereign nations is a particularly tough ongoing challenge. This new policy document is not going to end that debate but a written policy document (while creating no new rights) could enhance defendants’ power of persuasion with the Department of Justice if they have some credible numbers to back up a “piling on” argument.

Thanks for reading.

PS.  Several publications have reported that Richard Powers will become the next Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division.  The Antitrust Division has made no announcement yet.  One of the many qualifications Mr. Powers will bring to the position, if he is named as the Criminal Deputy, is his experience in multi-agency, international prosecutions. He worked on both Libor and Forex while a member of the Antitrust Division’s New York Field Office.

Former Bank of America Executive Pleads Guilty for Role in Conspiracy and Fraud Involving Investment Contracts for Municipal Bonds Proceeds

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A former Bank of America executive pleaded guilty today for his participation in a conspiracy and scheme to defraud related to bidding for contracts for the investment of municipal bond proceeds and other municipal finance contracts, the Department of Justice announced.

Phillip D. Murphy, the former managing director of Bank of America’s municipal derivatives products desk from 1998 to 2002, pleaded guilty today before U.S. District Judge Max O. Cogburn Jr. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina to participating in a fraud conspiracy and wire fraud scheme with employees of  Rubin/Chambers, Dunhill Insurance Services Inc., also known as CDR Financial Products, a broker of municipal finance contracts, and others.  Murphy also pleaded guilty to conspiring with others to make false entries in the reports and statements originating from his desk, which were sent to bank management.

Murphy was indicted by a grand jury on July 19, 2012.  According to the indictment, Murphy  participated in a wire fraud scheme and separate fraud conspiracies that began as early as 1998 and continued until 2006.

“By manipulating what was intended to be a competitive bidding process, the conspirators defrauded municipalities, public entities and taxpayers across the country,” said Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program.  “Today’s guilty plea reaffirms the Antitrust Division’s continued efforts to hold accountable those who corrupt and subvert the competitive process in our financial markets.”

Public entities seek to invest money from a variety of sources, primarily the proceeds of municipal bonds that they issue, to raise money for, among other things, public projects.  Public entities typically hire a broker to conduct a competitive bidding process for the award of the investment agreements and often for other municipal finance contracts.

According to the charges, Murphy conspired with CDR and others to increase the number and profitability of investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts awarded to Bank of America.  Murphy won investment agreements through CDR’s manipulation of the bidding process in obtaining losing bids from other providers, which is explicitly prohibited by U.S. Treasury regulations.  As a result of the information, various providers won investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts at artificially determined prices.  In exchange for this information, Murphy submitted intentionally losing bids for certain investment agreements and other contracts when requested, and, on occasion, agreed to pay or arranged for kickbacks to be paid to CDR and other co-conspirator brokers.

Murphy and his co-conspirators misrepresented to municipal issuers that the bidding process was competitive and in compliance with U.S. Treasury regulations.  This caused the municipal issuers to award investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts to providers that otherwise would not have been awarded the contracts if the issuers had true and accurate information regarding the bidding process.  Such conduct placed the tax-exempt status of the underlying bonds in jeopardy.

“Mr. Murphy’s actions undermined the public’s trust when he conspired to manipulate a competitive bidding process,” said Richard Weber, Chief, IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).  “IRS-CI has experienced great success in unraveling significant and complex financial frauds as we work in close collaboration with our law enforcement partners.”

“Mr. Murphy ripped off hard working American taxpayers and cash-strapped municipalities all in pursuit of his own lucre,” said George Venizelos, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s New York Field Office.  “Let this serve as a reminder to others who are entrusted to act in the public’s best interest; your lack of candor won’t go without notice.”

Murphy pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy and one count of wire fraud.  The fraud conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.  The wire fraud charge carries a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine.  The false bank records conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.  The maximum fines for each of these offenses may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.

Including Murphy, a total of 17 individuals have been convicted or pleaded guilty.  Additionally, one company has pleaded guilty.

The prosecution is being handled by Steven Tugander, Richard Powers, Eric Hoffmann, Patricia Jannaco and Stephanie Raney of the Antitrust Division.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kurt Meyers, Michael Savage and Mark Odulio of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of North Carolina have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.  The guilty plea announced today resulted from a wide-ranging investigation conducted by the Antitrust Division’s New York office, the FBI and the IRS-CI.  The division coordinated its investigation with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Today’s guilty plea is part of efforts underway by President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) which was created in November 2009 to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  With more than 20 federal agencies, 94 U.S. attorney’s offices and state and local partners, it’s the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud.  Since its formation, the task force has made great strides in facilitating increased investigation and prosecution of financial crimes; enhancing coordination and cooperation among federal, state and local authorities; addressing discrimination in the lending and financial markets and conducting outreach to the public, victims, financial institutions and other organizations.  Over the past three fiscal years, the Justice Department has filed more than 10,000 financial fraud cases against nearly 15,000 defendants including more than 2,700 mortgage fraud defendants.   For more information on the task force, visit www.stopfraud.gov .

THREE FORMER RABOBANK TRADERS CHARGED WITH MANIPULATING YEN LIBOR

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WASHINGTON — Two former Coöperatieve Centrale  Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank) Japanese Yen derivatives traders and  the trader responsible for setting Rabobank’s Yen London InterBank Offered Rate  (LIBOR) were charged as part of the ongoing criminal investigation into the  manipulation of LIBOR.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the  Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent  Snyder of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Assistant Director in  Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the  announcement.

Earlier today, a U.S. Magistrate  Judge sitting in the Southern District of New York signed a criminal complaint  charging Paul Robson of the United Kingdom, Paul Thompson of Australia, and Tetsuya  Motomura of Japan with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud as well  as substantive counts of wire fraud.  All  are former employees of Rabobank, which on Oct. 29, 2013, entered into a  deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice as part of the  department’s LIBOR investigation and agreed to pay a $325 million penalty.  Each defendant faces up to 30 years in prison  for each count upon conviction.

“Today, less than three months  after Rabobank admitted its involvement in the manipulation of LIBOR, we have charged  three of its senior traders with participating in this global fraud scheme,”  said Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman.  “As alleged, these three  traders – working from Japan, Singapore and the U.K. – deliberately submitted  what they called ‘obscenely high’ or ‘silly low’ LIBOR rates in order to  benefit their own trading positions.  The illegal  manipulation of this cornerstone benchmark rate undermines the integrity  of the markets; it harms those who are relying on what they expect to be an  honest benchmark; and it has ripple effects that extend far beyond the trading  at issue here.  The Justice Department has now charged eight individuals  and reached resolutions with four multi-national banks as part of our ongoing  and industry-wide LIBOR probe and, alongside our law enforcement and regulatory  partners both here and abroad, we remain committed to continuing to root out  this misconduct.”

“The  conspirators charged today conspired to rig the interest rates used by  derivative products throughout the financial industry to benefit their own  trading books,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Snyder. “Today’s charges  demonstrate the department’s commitment to hold individuals accountable for  schemes that undermine the integrity of markets that rely on competition to  flourish.”

“Manipulation  of benchmark rates that are routinely referenced by financial products around  the world erodes the integrity of our financial markets,” said Assistant  Director in Charge Parlave.  “The charges  against these individuals represent another step in our ongoing efforts to find  and stop those who hide behind complex corporate and securities fraud schemes.  I commend the Special Agents, forensic  accountants and analysts as well as the prosecutors for the significant time  and resources they committed to investigating this case.”

According to the complaint,  LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based on submissions from leading  banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be  charged if borrowing from other banks.   LIBOR is published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade  association based in London.  At the time  relevant to the criminal complaint, LIBOR was calculated for 10 currencies at  15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one  year.  The published LIBOR “fix” for Yen  LIBOR at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon  submissions from a panel of 16 banks, including Rabobank.

LIBOR serves as the primary  benchmark for short-term interest rates globally and is used as a reference  rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans  and other consumer lending products.  The  Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009,  outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.

According to allegations in the complaint,  all three defendants traded in derivative products that referenced Yen  LIBOR.  Robson worked  as a senior trader at Rabobank’s Money Markets and Short Term Forwards desk in  London; Thompson was Rabobank’s head of Money Market and Derivatives Trading  Northeast Asia and worked in Singapore; and Motomura was a senior trader at  Rabobank’s Tokyo desk who supervised money market and derivative traders employed  at Rabobank’s Tokyo desk.  In addition to  trading derivative products that referenced Yen LIBOR, Robson also served as  Rabobank’s primary submitter of Yen LIBOR to the BBA.

Robson, Thompson and Motomura  each entered into derivatives contracts containing Yen LIBOR as a price  component.  The  profit and loss that flowed from those contracts was directly affected by the  relevant Yen LIBOR on certain dates.  If  the relevant Yen LIBOR moved in the direction favorable to the defendants’  positions, Rabobank and the defendants benefitted at the expense of the  counterparties.   When LIBOR moved in the opposite direction, the defendants and  Rabobank stood to lose money to their counterparties.

The complaint alleges that from about May 2006 to at least  January 2011, Robson, Thompson, Motomura and others agreed to make false and  fraudulent Yen LIBOR submissions for the benefit of their trading positions.  According to the allegations, sometimes  Robson submitted rates at a specific level requested by a co-defendant and  consistent with the co-defendant’s trading positions.  Other times, Robson made a higher or lower  Yen LIBOR submission consistent with the direction requested by a co-defendant  and consistent with the co-defendant’s trading positions.  On those occasions, Robson’s manipulated Yen  LIBOR submissions were to the detriment of, among others, Rabobank’s  counterparties to derivative contracts.

In addition to allegedly manipulating Rabobank’s Yen LIBOR  submissions, Robson, on occasion and on behalf of one or more co-defendants,  coordinated his Yen LIBOR submission with the trader responsible for making Yen  LIBOR submissions at another Yen LIBOR panel bank.  At times, Robson allegedly submitted Yen  LIBOR at a level requested by the other trader, and, at other times, that trader  submitted Yen LIBOR at a level requested by Robson.

As alleged  in the complaint, Thompson, Motomura and another Rabobank trader described in  the complaint as Trader-R made requests of Robson for Yen LIBOR submissions  through electronic chats and email exchanges.   For example, on May 19, 2006, after Thompson informed Robson that his  net exposure for his 3-month fixes was 125 billion Yen, he requested by email  that Robson “sneak your 3m libor down a cheeky 1 or 2 bp” because “it will make  a bit of diff for me.”  On or about May  19, 2006, Robson responded: “No prob mate I mark it low.”

On Sept. 21, 2007, Trader-R  asked Robson by email, “where do you think today’s libors are?  If you can I would like 1mth higher  today.”  Robson responded, “bookies  reckon .85,” to which Trader-R replied, “I have some fixings in 1mth so would  appreciate if you can put it higher mate.”   Robson answered, “no prob mate let me know your level.”  After Trader-R asked for “0.90% for 1mth,”  Robson confirmed, “sure no prob[ ] I’ll probably get a few phone calls but no  worries mate… there’s bigger crooks in the market than us guys!”

As another example, on Aug. 4,  2008, in a Bloomberg chat, Motomura asked Robson, “Please set today’s 6mth  LIBOR at 0.96 I have chunky fixing.”  To this, Robson responded, “no  worries mate.”
The complaint alleges that  Robson accommodated the requests of his co-defendants.  For example, on Sept. 21, 2007, after Robson  received a request from Trader-R for a high 1 month Yen LIBOR, Rabobank  submitted a 1-month Yen LIBOR rate of 0.90, which was 7 basis points higher  than the previous day and 5 basis points above where Robson said that “bookies”  predicted it, and which moved Rabobank’s submission from the middle to the  highest of the panel.

According  to court documents, the defendants were also aware that they were making false  or fraudulent Yen LIBOR submissions.  For  example, on May 10, 2006, Robson admitted in an email that “it must be pretty  embarrasing to set such a low libor.  I  was very embarrased to set my 6 mth – but wanted to help thomo [Thompson].  tomorrow it will be more like 33 from  me.”  At times, Robson referred to the  submissions that he submitted on behalf of his co-defendants as “ridiculously  high” and “obscenely high,” and acknowledged that his submissions would be so  out of line with the other Yen LIBOR panel banks that he might receive a phone  call about them from the BBA or Thomson Reuters.

A criminal complaint is a formal  accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence.   A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until convicted.

The investigation is being  conducted by special agents, forensic accountants, and intelligence analysts in  the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  The  prosecution is being handled by Trial Attorneys Carol L. Sipperly, Brian Young  and Alexander H. Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and Trial  Attorneys Ludovic C. Ghesquiere and Michael T. Koenig of the Antitrust  Division.  Former Deputy Chief Glenn Leon  and Senior Counsel Rebecca Rohr of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, along  with Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and  Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division, have also provided valuable  assistance.  The Criminal Division’s  Office of International Affairs has provided assistance in this matter as well.

The broader investigation  relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates has required, and has greatly  benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various  enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and  expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the Commodity Futures Trading  Commission’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department  and, along with the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, has played a major role  in the LIBOR investigation.  The department  has worked closely with the Dutch Public Prosecution Service and the Dutch  Central Bank in the investigation of Rabobank.   Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also  participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to  LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their  cooperation and assistance.  In  particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission has played a significant  role in the LIBOR series of investigations, and the department expresses its  appreciation to the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office for its assistance  and ongoing cooperation.

This prosecution is  part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud  Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency  Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and  proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task  force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies,  regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement  who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil  enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts  across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to  investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and  effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat  discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for  victims of financial crimes.  For more  information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.

RBS Securities Japan Ltd Sentenced for Manipulation of Yen Libor

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RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) that engages in investment banking operations with its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan, was sentenced today for its role in manipulating the Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement.
RBS Securities Japan was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Michael P. Shea in the District of Connecticut.    RBS Securities Japan pleaded guilty on April 12, 2013, to one count of wire fraud for its role in manipulating Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rates.    RBS Securities Japan signed a plea agreement with the government in which it admitted its criminal conduct and agreed to pay a $50 million fine, which the court accepted in imposing sentence.    In addition, RBS plc, the Edinburgh, Scotland-based parent company of RBS Securities Japan, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the government requiring RBS plc to pay an additional $100 million penalty, to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as set forth in an extensive statement of facts and to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation.    The DPA reflects RBS plc’s cooperation in disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution and recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by new management to enhance internal controls.
Together with approximately $462 million in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $325 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action and approximately $137 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution with RBS and RBS Securities Japan to approximately $612 million.
“Today’s sentencing of RBS is an important reminder of the significant consequences facing banks that deliberately manipulate financial benchmark rates, and it represents one of the numerous enforcement actions taken by the Justice Department in our ongoing LIBOR investigation” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman. “As a result of the department’s investigation, we have charged five individuals and secured admissions of criminal wrongdoing by four major financial institutions.  Our enforcement actions have had a lasting impact on the global banking system, and we intend to continue to vigorously investigate and prosecute the manipulation of this cornerstone benchmark rate.”
“By colluding to manipulate the Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rate, RBS Securities Japan reaped higher profits for itself at the expense of unknowing counterparties, and in the process undermined the integrity of a major benchmark rate used in financial transactions throughout the world,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Snyder.  “Today’s sentence, in conjunction with the department’s agreement with parent company RBS, demonstrates the Antitrust Division’s commitment to prosecuting these types of far-reaching and sophisticated conspiracies.”
“The manipulation of LIBOR impacts financial products the world over, and erodes the integrity of the financial markets,” said Assistant Director in Charge Parlave.    “Without a level playing field in our financial marketplace, banks and investors do not have a threshold to which they can measure their hard work.    I commend the Special Agents, forensic accountants and analysts, as well as the prosecutors, for the significant time and resources they committed to investigating this case.”
According to court documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.    LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.    The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.
LIBOR is published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London.    At the time relevant to the conduct in the criminal information, LIBOR was calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.    The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA.
According to the plea agreement, at various times from at least 2006 through 2010, certain RBS Securities Japan Yen derivatives traders engaged in efforts to move LIBOR in a direction favorable to their trading positions, defrauding RBS counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation affecting financial products referencing Yen LIBOR.    The scheme included efforts to manipulate more than one hundred Yen LIBOR submissions in a manner favorable to RBS Securities Japan’s trading positions.    Certain RBS Securities Japan Yen derivatives traders, including a manager, engaged in this conduct in order to benefit their trading positions and thereby increase their profits and decrease their losses.
The prosecution of RBS Securities Japan is being handled by Deputy Chief Patrick Stokes and Trial Attorney Gary Winters of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and New York Office Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division.    Deputy Chiefs Daniel Braun and William Stellmach and Trial Attorney Alex Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Daniel Tracer and Kristina Srica of the Antitrust Division, Jeremy Verlinda of the Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut, and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.    The investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.
The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.    The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.    In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FCA, has played a major role in the investigation.    Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.   In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission has played a significant role in the LIBOR investigation, and the department expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office for its assistance and ongoing cooperation.
This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.    President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.    The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.    The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.   For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov .

ICAP Brokers Face Felony Charges for Alleged Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Interest Rates

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Two former derivatives brokers and a former cash broker employed by London-based brokerage firm ICAP were charged as part of the ongoing criminal investigation into the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the Justice Department announced today.

Darrell Read, who resides in New Zealand, and Daniel Wilkinson and Colin Goodman, both of England, were charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud in a criminal complaint unsealed in Manhattan federal court earlier today.  They each face a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison for each count upon conviction.

“By allegedly participating in a scheme to manipulate benchmark interest rates for financial gain, these defendants undermined the integrity of the global markets,” said Attorney General Eric Holder. “They were supposed to be honest brokers, but instead, they put their own financial interests ahead of that larger responsibility.  And as a result, transactions and financial products around the world were compromised, because they were tied to a rate that was distorted due to the brokers’ dishonesty.  These charges underscore the Justice Department’s determination to hold accountable all those whose conduct threatens the integrity of our financial markets.”

“These three men are accused of repeatedly and deliberately spreading false information to banks and investors around the world in order to fraudulently move the market and help their client fleece his counterparties,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.  “Our criminal investigation of the manipulation of LIBOR by some of the largest banks in the world has led us from New York to London, to Tokyo, and other financial hubs around the globe.  These important charges are just the latest law-enforcement action in the Criminal Division and Antitrust Division’s global LIBOR investigation, and reflect the Department’s continued dedication to detecting, and prosecuting, financial fraudsters who affect U.S. markets, whether they work at a bank, or a brokerage, and whether they carry out their fraud from a desk in the United States, or abroad.”

“The complaint unsealed today charges Colin Goodman, Daniel Wilkinson and Darrell Read for conspiring to manipulate benchmark interest rates that determined the profitability of their client’s trades,” said Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program.  “In exchange for bigger bonus checks, the three defendants undermined financial markets around the world by compromising the integrity of globally used interest rate benchmarks.  The Department continues to demonstrate its commitment to protecting the interest of American citizens in free and fair financial markets.”

“Corporate and securities fraud involving the manipulation of these rates causes a worldwide impact on trading positions and erodes the integrity of the market and confidence in Wall Street,” said Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  “Unraveling such complex financial schemes is difficult and time consuming.  Today’s charges are the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents and forensic accountants who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

According to the criminal complaint, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based on submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR is published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London.  At the time relevant to the criminal complaint, LIBOR was calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The published LIBOR “fix” for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the contributor panel) selected by the BBA.

LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were estimated at approximately $450 trillion.

According to allegations in the criminal complaint filed in this case, between July 2006 and September 2010, Wilkinson was a desk director employed in the London office of ICAP, where he supervised a group of derivatives brokers – including Read – specializing in Yen-based financial products.  Generally, the desk’s clients were derivatives traders at large financial institutions, and the transactions brokered by Wilkinson, Read and others on the desk essentially consisted of bets between traders on the direction in which Yen LIBOR would move.  Between July 2006 and September 2009, the desk’s largest client was a senior trader at UBS (UBS Trader) in Tokyo, to whom Read spoke almost daily.  Because of the large size of the client’s trading positions, even slight moves of a fraction of a percent in Yen LIBOR could generate large profits.  For example, UBS Trader once told Read that a 0.01 percent – or one basis point – movement in the final Yen LIBOR fixing on a specific date could result in $3 million profit for his trading positions.  A significant part of both Read’s and Wilkinson’s compensation was tied to the brokerage fees generated by UBS Trader and paid to ICAP.

Goodman was a cash broker at ICAP’s London office during the relevant time period.  In addition to brokering cash transactions, Goodman distributed a daily email to individuals outside of ICAP, including derivatives traders at several large banks as well as those responsible for providing the BBA with LIBOR submissions at certain banks.  Goodman’s email contained what was termed his “SUGGESTED LIBORS,” purported predictions of where Yen LIBOR ultimately would fix each day across eight specified borrowing periods.  Read and Wilkinson, along with Goodman himself, often referred to Goodman as “lord libor.”

The complaint alleges that Read, Wilkinson and Goodman, together with UBS Trader, executed a sustained and systematic scheme to move Yen LIBOR in a direction favorable to UBS Trader’s trading positions.

According to the criminal complaint, the primary strategy employed by Read, Wilkinson and Goodman to execute the scheme was to use Goodman’s “SUGGESTED LIBORS” email to disseminate misinformation to Yen LIBOR panel banks in hopes that the banks would rely on the misinformation when making their own respective Yen LIBOR submissions to the BBA for inclusion in the published fix.  Rather than providing good faith predictions as to where Yen LIBOR would fix, Goodman instead often used his daily email to set forth predictions which benefitted UBS Trader’s trading positions.

Beginning in or about June 2007, Goodman was paid a bonus through the desk Wilkinson supervised, allegedly intended, at least in part, to reward Goodman for his role in their effort to influence and manipulate the published Yen LIBOR fix.

As a second strategy, Read and Wilkinson allegedly further agreed to contact interest rate derivatives traders and submitters employed at Yen LIBOR panel banks in an effort to cause them to make false and misleading submissions to the BBA at UBS Trader’s behest.

As alleged in the charging document, Read, Wilkinson, Goodman, UBS Trader, and other co-conspirators often executed their scheme through electronic chats and email exchanges.  For example, on June 28, 2007, in an email message, Read told Wilkinson: “DAN THIS IS GETTING SERIOUS [UBS TRADER] IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE WAY THINGS ARE PROGRESSING . . . CAN YOU PLEASE GET HOLD OF COLIN AND GET HIM TO SEND OUT 6 MOS LIBOR AT 0.865 AND TO GET HIS BANKS SETTING IT HIGH. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT BECA– — USE [UBS TRADER] IS QUESTIONING MY (AND OUR) WORTH.”

The complaint alleges that the defendants were aware of the effects that Goodman’s false and fraudulent “SUGGESTED LIBORS” had on submissions by Yen LIBOR panel banks.  For example, on Nov. 20, 2008, Read asked UBS Trader, “you have a really big fix tonight I believe? if Colin sends out 6m at a more realistic level than 1.10 [%] i reckon [the two panel banks] will parrot him, it might mean 6m coming down a bit.” On the following day, Nov. 21, 2008, Goodman moved his suggestion for 6-month Yen LIBOR down by nine basis points.  The two other banks mirrored Goodman’s suggestion, moving their 6-month Yen LIBOR submissions down by nine basis points.

According to allegations in the complaint, Read counseled UBS Trader how to most effectively manipulate Yen LIBOR.  For example, UBS Trader told Read in a July 22, 2009, electronic chat that “11th aug is the big date…i still have lots of 6m fixings till the 10th.”   Read responded to UBS Trader, “if you drop [UBS’s] 6m dramatically on the 11th mate, it will look v fishy… .  I’d be v careful how you play it, there might be cause for a drop as you cross into a new month but a couple of weeks in might get people questioning you.”  UBS Trader replied, “don’t worry will stagger the drops…ie 5bp then 5bp,” and Read told UBS Trader, “ok mate, don’t want you getting into [expletive].”  UBS Trader again assured Read that UBS and two additional panel banks would stagger their drops in coordination, and Read concluded, “great the plan is hatched and sounds sensible.”

A criminal complaint is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence.  A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until convicted.

The investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants, and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  The prosecution is being handled by Deputy Chief William Stellmach and Trial Attorney Sandra L. Moser of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and Kristina Srica of the Antitrust Division.  Trial Attorneys Alexander Berlin and Thomas B.W. Hall, Law Clerk Andrew Tyler, and Paralegal Specialist Kevin Sitarski of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, along with Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorney Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division, and former Trial Attorney Luke Marsh have also provided valuable assistance.  The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs has provided assistance in this matter as well.

The broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the Department and, along with the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, has played a major role in the investigation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has also provided valuable assistance for which the Department is grateful.  The Department also expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office for its assistance and ongoing cooperation.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation, and the Department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance as well.

Finally, the Department acknowledges ICAP’s continuing cooperation in the Department’s ongoing investigation.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark Interest Rates

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Second Financial Institution to Plead Guilty to Libor Fraud and Pay Substantial Criminal Penalties; RBS Parent Company Also Admits Fault in Deferred Prosecution Agreement

RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS), has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud and admit its role in manipulating the Japanese Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. Hammond of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Special Agent in Charge Timothy A. Gallagher of the FBI’s Washington Field Office Criminal Division announced today.

A criminal information, being filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, charges RBS Securities Japan with one count of wire fraud for engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rates.  RBS Securities Japan has signed a plea agreement with the government admitting its criminal conduct, and has agreed to pay a $50 million fine.

In addition, the government is filing a criminal information in the District of Connecticut which charges parent company RBS as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).  The information charges RBS with wire fraud for its role in manipulating LIBOR benchmark interest rates, and with participation in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act by rigging the Yen LIBOR benchmark interest rate with other banks.  The DPA requires the bank to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as described in an extensive statement of facts, to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation and to pay a $100 million penalty beyond the fine imposed upon RBS Securities Japan.

Together with approximately $462 million in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $325 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action and approximately $137 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution with RBS and RBS Securities Japan to approximately $612 million.

“As we have done with Barclays and UBS, we are today holding RBS accountable for a stunning abuse of trust,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer.  “The bank has admitted to manipulating one of the cornerstone benchmark interest rates in our global financial system, and its Japanese subsidiary has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud.  The department’s ongoing investigation has now yielded two guilty pleas by significant financial institutions.  These are extraordinary results, and our investigation is far from finished.  Our message is clear:  no financial institution is above the law.”

“RBS secretly rigged the benchmark interest rates upon which many transactions and consumer financial products are based,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hammond. “RBS’ conduct not only harmed its unsuspecting counterparties, it undermined the integrity and the competitiveness of financial markets everywhere.”

“The manipulation of LIBOR by RBS and its subsidiary directly affected the rates referenced by financial products held by and on behalf of American companies and investors. The FBI works to uncover wrongdoing such as this in order to protect American consumers and the integrity of financial markets,” said Special Agent in Charge Gallagher.  “Today’s announcement is the result of the hard work of the FBI special agents, financial analysts, and forensic accountants as well as the prosecutors who dedicated significant time and resources to investigating this case.”

According to court documents, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based upon submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were valued at approximately $450 trillion.

LIBOR, published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London, is calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks for that currency (the Contributor Panel) selected by the BBA.  From at least 2006 through 2010, RBS has been a member of the Contributor Panel for a number of currencies, including Yen LIBOR and Swiss Franc LIBOR, which are the focus of the plea agreement and DPA.

According to the filed charging documents, at various times from at least 2006 through 2010, certain RBS Yen and Swiss Franc derivatives traders – whose compensation was directly connected to their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR – engaged in efforts to move LIBOR in a direction favorable to their trading positions.  Through these schemes, RBS allegedly defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the manipulation affecting financial products referencing Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR.  The alleged schemes included hundreds of instances in which RBS employees sought to influence LIBOR submissions in a manner favorable to their trading positions in two principal ways: internally at RBS through requests by derivatives traders for Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR submissions, and externally through an agreement with a separately charged derivatives trader to request Yen LIBOR submissions.  The trader, Tom Alexander William Hayes, was formerly employed by a Japanese subsidiary of another Contributor Panel bank, UBS AG (UBS).

According to court documents, RBS employees engaged in this conduct through electronic communications, which included both emails and electronic chats.  For example, in an electronic chat on March 16, 2009, an RBS Swiss Franc derivatives trader, (Trader-7), sought to benefit his trading book by asking the RBS LIBOR submitter (Submitter-1), “can we pls get a very very very low 3m [3 month] and 6m [6 month] fix today [please]” because “we have rather large fixings!”  Submitter-1 responded, “perfect, if that’s what u want.”  After thanking Submitter-1, Trader-7 informed Submitter-1 that “from tomorrow . . .  we need them thru the roof!!!!!”

In another electronic chat on May 20, 2009, involving an RBS Yen derivatives trader, (“Trader-2”), Submitter-1, and others, the following exchange occurred:

Trader-2: high 3s and low 6s pls [Submitter-1]

Submitter-1: no problems

Trader-2: grazias amigo . . . where will you lower 6s to?

Submitter-1: 70

That day, RBS’s 6-month Yen LIBOR submission dropped two basis points from .72 to .70, before reverting to .72 the following two days.

RBS employees also allegedly furthered their collusive scheme with Hayes to fix the price of derivative instruments tied to Yen LIBOR through electronic communications.  For instance, in an electronic chat on April 20, 2007, Hayes requested that an RBS derivatives trader, (“Trader-3”), ask Submitter-1 for a low 3 month Yen LIBOR submission:

Hayes: . . . if you could ask your guys to keep 3m low wd be massive help as long as it doesn’t interfere with your stuff . . . tx in adavance.

Approximately 30 minutes later, Hayes and Trader-3 had the following exchange:

Hayes:   mate did you manage to spk to your cash boys?

Trader-3:  yes u owe me they are going 65 and 71

Hayes:  thx mate yes i do . . . in fact i owe you big time

Approximately 45 minutes later, Hayes sent the following message to Trader-3:

Hayes:  mater they set 64! . . . thats beyond the call of duty!

* * * *
Trader-3: no worries

By entering into a DPA with RBS, the Justice Department credits RBS’ cooperation in disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution, recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by RBS’ management to enhance internal controls, and acknowledges the additional reporting, disclosure and cooperation requirements undertaken by the bank.  The DPA does not prevent the Justice Department from prosecuting individuals for related conduct.

The pending charges against Hayes are merely accusations and he is considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The prosecution of RBS is being handled by Deputy Chief Patrick Stokes and Trial Attorney Gary Winters of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and New York Field Office Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorneys Eric Schleef and Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division.  Deputy Chiefs Daniel Braun and William Stellmach, Assistant Chief Rebecca Rohr and Trial Attorney Alex Berlin of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Daniel Tracer and Kristina Srica of the Antitrust Division, Jeremy Verlinda of the Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs have also provided valuable assistance in this matter.  The investigation is being conducted by special agents, forensic accountants and intelligence analysts of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the department and, along with the FSA, has played a major role in the investigation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of investigations.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.

UBS Securities Japan to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud For Long Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark Interest Rates

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Two Former Senior UBS Traders Face Felony Charges Unsealed Today

UBS AG to Pay Substantial Penalty in Agreement Reflecting
Substantial Cooperation, Significant Changes

WASHINGTON — UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. (UBS Japan), an investment bank, financial advisory securities firm and wholly-owned subsidiary of UBS AG, has agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud and admit its role in manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a leading benchmark used in financial products and transactions around the world, Attorney General Eric Holder announced today.  The criminal information, filed today in U.S. District Court in the District of Connecticut, charges UBS Japan with one count of engaging in a scheme to defraud counterparties to interest rate derivatives trades by secretly manipulating LIBOR benchmark interest rates.

As part of the ongoing criminal investigation by the Criminal and Antitrust Divisions of the Justice Department and the FBI into LIBOR manipulation, two former senior UBS traders also are charged.  Tom Alexander William Hayes, 33, of England, and Roger Darin, 41, of Switzerland, were both charged with conspiracy in a criminal complaint unsealed in Manhattan federal court earlier today.  Hayes is also charged with wire fraud, based on the same scheme, and a price fixing violation arising from his collusive activity with another bank to manipulate LIBOR benchmark rates.

UBS Japan has signed a plea agreement with the government admitting its criminal conduct, and has agreed to pay a $100 million fine.  In addition, UBS AG, the parent company of UBS Japan headquartered in Zurich, has entered into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the government requiring UBS AG to pay an additional $400 million penalty, to admit and accept responsibility for its misconduct as set forth in an extensive statement of facts and to continue cooperating with the Justice Department in its ongoing investigation.  The NPA reflects UBS AG’s substantial cooperation in discovering and disclosing LIBOR misconduct within the financial institution and recognizes the significant remedial measures undertaken by new management to enhance internal controls.

Together with approximately $1 billion in regulatory penalties and disgorgement – $700 million as a result of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) action; $259.2 million as a result of the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) action; and $64.3 million as a result of the Swiss Financial Markets Authority (FINMA) action – the Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of the resolution to more than $1.5 billion.

“By causing UBS and other financial institutions to spread false and misleading information about LIBOR, the alleged conspirators we’ve charged – along with others at UBS – manipulated the benchmark interest rate upon which many transactions and consumer financial products are based.  They defrauded the company’s counterparties of millions of dollars.  And they did so primarily to reap increased profits, and secure bigger bonuses, for themselves,” said Attorney General Holder. “Today’s announcement – and $1.5 billion global resolution – underscores the Justice Department’s firm commitment to investigating and prosecuting such conduct, and to holding the perpetrators of these crimes accountable for their actions.”

“UBS manipulated one of the cornerstone interest rates in our global financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.  “The scheme alleged is epic in scale, involving people who have walked the halls of some of the most powerful banks in the world.  Today’s agreement by UBS Japan to plead guilty, the charges against individual alleged perpetrators of these crimes, and our agreement recognizing the steps being taken by UBS AG to right itself demonstrate the Justice Department’s determination to hold accountable those in the financial marketplace who break the law.  We cannot, and we will not, tolerate misconduct on Wall Street of the kind admitted to by UBS today, and by Barclays last June.  We will continue to follow the facts and the law wherever they lead us in this matter, as we do in every case.”

“The criminal complaint charges two senior UBS traders with colluding to manipulate Yen LIBOR interest rates for the purpose of improving trading positions held by Hayes and UBS,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. Hammond of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.  “Coordinating the movement of interest rates even by a very small margin meant higher profits and bigger bonuses for the conspirators at the expense of those that relied on LIBOR as a reference rate.”

“The manipulation of LIBOR affects financial products including mortgages, credit cards, student loans and many other interest rate products,” said FBI Associate Deputy Director Kevin L. Perkins.  “This practice further erodes Main Street’s confidence in Wall Street.  The public expects our financial institutions to maintain proper oversight of their businesses and to ensure the public is not harmed by criminal activity within these institutions.  In this case, UBS acknowledged its failures and cooperated with our investigation.  The FBI would like to thank its federal partners in this investigation – the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Antitrust Division, Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Enforcement and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement whose joint efforts brought a successful resolution to this matter.”
 
According to documents filed in these cases, LIBOR is an average interest rate, calculated based on submissions from leading banks around the world, reflecting the rates those banks believe they would be charged if borrowing from other banks.  LIBOR serves as the primary benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as a reference rate for many interest rate contracts, mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other consumer lending products.  The Bank of International Settlements estimated that as of the second half of 2009, outstanding interest rate contracts were estimated at approximately $450 trillion.

LIBOR, published by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade association based in London, is calculated for 10 currencies at 15 borrowing periods, known as maturities, ranging from overnight to one year.  The LIBOR for a given currency at a specific maturity is the result of a calculation based upon submissions from a panel of banks.

Between July 2006 and September 2009, Hayes was a senior trader employed in the Tokyo office of UBS Japan, which then operated under the name UBS Securities Japan Ltd.  Among other financial products, Hayes traded in interest rate derivatives that essentially consisted of bets against other traders on the direction in which Yen LIBOR would move.  UBS was a member of the Yen LIBOR panel, and Darin was, at certain times relevant to the criminal complaint, a trader responsible for making and supervising LIBOR submissions to the BBA on behalf of the bank.  In a statement of facts attached to the NPA and plea agreement, Hayes is referred to as “Trader-1” and Darin is referred to as “Submitter-1.”

Beginning in September 2006, UBS Japan and Hayes orchestrated a sustained, wide-ranging and systematic scheme to move Yen LIBOR in a direction favorable to Hayes’ trading positions, defrauding UBS’ counterparties and harming others with financial products referencing Yen LIBOR who were unaware of the manipulation.  Between November 2006 and August 2009, Hayes or one of his colleagues endeavored to manipulate Yen LIBOR on at least 335 of the 738 trading days in that period, and during some periods on almost a daily basis.  Because of the large size of Hayes’ trading positions, even slight moves of a fraction of a percent in Yen LIBOR could generate large profits.  For example, Hayes once estimated that a 0.01 percent movement in the final Yen LIBOR fixing on a specific date could result in a $2 million profit for UBS.

According to the charging documents, UBS Japan and Hayes employed three strategies to execute the scheme: from November 2006 through September 2009, Hayes conspired with Darin and others within UBS to cause the bank to make false and misleading Yen LIBOR submissions to the BBA; also, Hayes caused cash brokerage firms, which purported to provide market information regarding LIBOR to panel banks, to disseminate false and misleading information about short-term interest rates for Yen, which those banks could and did rely upon in formulating their own LIBOR submissions to the BBA; and Hayes communicated with interest rate derivatives traders employed at three other Yen LIBOR panel banks in an effort to cause them to make false and misleading Yen LIBOR submissions to the BBA.

As alleged in the charging documents, Hayes, Darin and other co-conspirators often executed their scheme through electronic chats.  On Nov. 20, 2006, for example, Hayes asked a UBS Yen LIBOR submitter who was substituting for Darin, “hi . . .  [Darin] and I generally coordinate ie sometimes trade if ity [sic] suits, otherwise skew the libors a bit.”  Hayes went on to request, “really need high 6m [6-month] fixes till Thursday.”  The submitter responded, “yep we on the case there . . . will def[initely] be on the high side.”  The day before this request, UBS’s 6-month Yen LIBOR submission had been tied with the lowest submissions included in the calculation of the LIBOR fix.  Immediately after this request for high submissions, however, UBS’s 6-monthYen LIBOR submissions rose to the highest submission of any bank in the contributor panel and remained tied for the highest, precisely as Hayes had requested.

Another example of such an alleged accommodation occurred on March 29, 2007, when Hayes asked Darin, “can we go low 3[month] and 6[month] pls?  . . .  3[month] esp.” Darin responded “ok”, and the two had the following exchange:

Hayes:

 what are we going to set?

Darin:

 too early to say yet . . .  prob[ably]  .69 would be our unbiased contribution

Hayes:

 ok wd really help if we cld keep 3m low pls
Darin: as i said before – i [don’t] mind helping on your fixings, but i’m not setting libor 7bp away from the truth. . .  i’ll get ubs banned if i do that, no interest in that.
Hayes: ok obviousl;y [sic] no int[erest] in that happening either . . . not asking for it to be 7bp from reality anyway any help appreciated[.]

Hayes received the help he requested.

In addition, the criminal complaint charges Hayes with colluding with a trader employed at another LIBOR panel bank in May 2009, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Hayes allegedly engaged in the collusive scheme to fix the price of derivative instruments whose price was based on Yen LIBOR.  In electronic chats, Hayes asked the trader to move 6-month Yen LIBOR up due to a “gigantic” position Hayes had taken.  For the trade in question, UBS trading records confirmed that each 0.01 percent movement in LIBOR would generate profits of approximately $459,000 for Hayes’ book.  The trader at the other bank responded that he would comply, and his bank’s submission moved by 0.06 percent compared to its submission the previous day, for which Hayes thanked him.

In entering into the NPA with UBS AG, the Justice Department considered information from UBS, and from regulatory agencies in Switzerland and Japan, demonstrating that in the last two years UBS has made important and positive changes in its management, compliance and training to ensure adherence to the law.  The department received favorable reports from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the Japan Financial Services Authority (JFSA) describing, respectively, progress that UBS has made in its approach to compliance and enforcement and UBS Japan’s effective implementation of the remedial measures the JFSA imposed based on findings relating to the attempted manipulation of Yen benchmarks.

The investigation is being handled by Deputy Chiefs William Stellmach and Daniel Braun and Trial Attorney Luke Marsh of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, and Assistant Chief Elizabeth Prewitt and Trial Attorney Richard Powers of the Antitrust Division, New York Field Office.  Assistant Chief Rebecca Rohr and Trial Attorneys Alexander Berlin and Thomas Hall of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorneys Portia Brown and Wendy Norman of the Antitrust Division, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Glover and Liam Brennan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut have also provided valuable assistance.  The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs also provided assistance in this matter.  The investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

The investigation leading to these cases has required, and has greatly benefited from, a diligent and wide-ranging cooperative effort among various enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad.  The Justice Department acknowledges and expresses its deep appreciation for this assistance.  In particular, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Enforcement referred this matter to the Department and, along with the FSA, has played a major role in the investigation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has also played a significant role in the LIBOR series of investigations and, among other efforts, has made an invaluable contribution to the investigation relating to UBS.  The Department of Justice also wishes to acknowledge and thank FINMA, the Japanese Ministry of Justice, and the JFSA.  Various agencies and enforcement authorities from other nations are also participating in different aspects of the broader investigation relating to LIBOR and other benchmark rates, and the Department is grateful for their cooperation and assistance.

This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information about the task force visit: www.stopfraud.gov.

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