3C’s: Do Not Remove—Under Penalty of Law!

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When I was a boy, I was always puzzled but fearful of labels that I saw on pillows that read in bold print “Do Not Remove—Under Penalty of Law.” I was pretty sure that the cops wouldn’t know if I removed a label, but what if my parents ratted me out? And, as a Catholic School lad, I had to worry about the sin implications. If it was against the law, was it also a sin? A venial sin? (six to twelve months in purgatory). Or, a mortal sin? (eternal damnation—which seemed a little harsh just for removing a label). In any event, being fairly cautious, I never did remove a pillow label, though I may have committed a few more serious offenses in my youth.

These thoughts crossed my mind the other day I when I read about an ongoing case in the Second Circuit, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., Case number 14-2985. Microsoft is challenging a district court order that it produce documents located overseas that were sought by a validly executed search warrant. Microsoft claims the documents are out of the reach of the government while settled law seems to be that, at least as it relates to subpoenas, the documents are producible. The magistrate and district court judge ordered that the documents be produced and Microsoft is currently pressing its appeal in the Second Circuit.

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3C’s: Invitations to Collude Invite Big Trouble

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On Thursday February 26th I enjoyed a day long Symposium on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act hosted by BakerHostetler and organized and moderated by my friend and former colleague Carl Hittinger. The conference focused on the history of Section 5, its current scope and where it may be headed. There was particular discussion about whether the FTC should have guidelines to explain and limit the application of Section 5.

While I found the entire conference interesting, of particular interest to me was the discussion of “invitation to collude” cases, which is a way of saying to a competitor “Would you like to form a cartel with me?” Section 5 broadly prohibits “[un]fair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” One way Section 5 has been used by the FTC has been to charge invitations to collude cases.

An invitation to collude case can arise when one competitor (or a group of competitors) reaches out to another competitor to invite the competitor to agree to fix prices.  An invitation to collude investigation/case arises usually when there is some specificity in the offer—much like contract analysis. General grousing about prices in an industry, while extremely foolish and may draw an investigation, is not likely to result in a formal charge. And, in US v. Foley, 598 F. 2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1979)  a realtor hosted a dinner for seven other realtors and announced he didn’t care what others did, he was raising his commission. Some discussion ensued from which a jury concluded that an agreement has been reached.  The realtors were indicted and convicted.

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3C’s: India–CCI Imposes Maximum Penalty on Trade Association

In this India Update 2015 Volume 4, Avinash Amarnath reports on a recent decision of the CCI and the thin evidence that still led to imposition of a maximum fine.

CCI fines All India Motor Transport Congress for calling for price hike

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) imposed the maximum penalty of 10% of the average turnover on the All India Motor Transport Congress (AIMTC) the apex trade association for road transport service providers (both cargo and passenger) in India.

The CCI found that AIMTC had called for a hike of 15% in freight charges following an announcement of increase in diesel prices by state run oil marketing companies. AIMTC tried to argue that there was no evidence such as written circulars, directions or minutes of such a decision except for news reports which could not be considered as credible evidence without other corroborative evidence. Further, AIMTC argued that in any event, the members had, in fact not acted upon such a call.

The CCI, while observing that evidence was generally bound to be sparse in cartel investigations and an agreement could be inferred even in the absence of written circulars or directions found that:

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3C’s: Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards–Please Vote

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[Robert Connolly writes:] [s]everal months ago wrote a Cartel Capers blog entry (here) discussing a suggested approach for the Seventh Circuit to follow in deciding Motorola Mobility when the Court reheard the case.  I also wrote a longer article (here) published in the Competition Policy International’s FTAIA issue. To my surprise and delight, Judge Posner in Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics, 775 F. 3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015), cited both Cartel Capers and the CPI article. The article was quoted at length in the opinion.  This article has now been nominated for a Concurrences writing award.

The aim of the Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards is to promote competition scholarship and to contribute to competition advocacy. The 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards Jury contributes to this achievement by selecting the best writings published in 2014. The articles are selected by the Jury and by Readers. The Jury consists of a Board, an Academic and a Business Steering Committees composed of the leading academics and counsels. Readers of Concurrences Journal and its sister publication e-Competitions contribute to the selection process by voting for articles. Click here to see the Jury.  You can check out all of the nominated articles on various subjects here.

Unlike many elections where one reluctantly votes for the lesser of two evils, every article nominated is terrific. I am honored to be included in this group. I would appreciate it if you would click on this link and vote for my article.

Thanks for reading…. and voting.

3C’s: Bid Rigging Prosecution In Canada Hits Another Setback

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Here’s a quick post from Robert Connolly’s Cartel Capers by James Musgrove and Joshua Chad about an interesting case in Canada.

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Bid Rigging Prosecution Hits Another Setback

The trial judge in a high profile bid rigging case with respect to federal government procurement has directed that a verdict of not guilty be entered for one of the individual accused, ruling that there was no reasonable possibility of a conviction. The trial continues against a number of other accused. This is not the first setback for the Crown in the case. In a pre-trial motion the same judge, Judge Warkentin, ruled that the Competition Act’s provisions allowing the admission of documentary evidence to prove the truth of the matters set out in the documents was unconstitutional in a criminal case. Please see the full news report here.

3C’s: Why Motorola Mobility was a Good Decision for Global Cartel Enforcement

Why Motorola Mobility was a Good Decision for Global Cartel Enforcement

Back in September I wrote an article for Competition Policy International (CPI) on the FTAIA and the now vacated Motorola Mobility I decision.  That article can be read here.  I was honored to have that article quoted at length by Judge Posner in the subsequent decision:Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp, 2015 WL 137907 (7th Cir., decided Nov 26, 2015, amended January 12, 2015). In this decision, the Seventh Circuit held that purchases made by Motorola Mobility’s foreign subsidiaries of LCD panels, which the subsidiary then incorporated into products sold to the parent for sale in the U.S., did not give rise to a damage claim under the FTAIA. The Court found that the cartel victims were Motorola Mobility’s foreign subsidiaries. The key fact was Motorola Mobility’s claim that it purchased more than $5 billion worth of LCD panels from cartel members. The Court responded: “That’s a critical misstatement. All but 1 percent of the purchases were made by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.”

Since there is little doubt that the defendants did fix prices, the dismissal of 99% of Motorola’s claims seemed like a windfall for the cartelists, and a decision that could lead to under deterrence of global cartel enforcement. Motorola Mobility has expressed its intent to seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Because of the ambiguity of the FTAIA and the myriad fact patterns that can arise, policy consideration will play a large role in ultimately deciding the scope of the FTAIA. I thought Motorola Mobility was rightly decided and that the decision is actually pro-cartel enforcement. I explained why I thought that was so in a recent article CPI published as part of an “Motorola Mobility Redux” issue. My paper is titled: “Why the Motorola Mobility Decision Was Good For Cartel Enforcement and Deterrence” can be found here without charge.  (There are other excellent articles in the CPI issue but they require a subscription to view.). Below are excerpts of my thoughts on why I thought theMotorola Mobility decision was good for cartel enforcement.

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3C’s: CCI fines Port Owner’s Association and Individuals for Price Fixing

CCI fines Port Owner’s Association and Individuals for Price Fixing

Today’s guest post is from Avinash Amarnath.

India Update 2015 Vol. 2

Trade associations continue to be the flavor of the day in the cartel space in India.

On 21 January 2015, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) imposed a penalty on the Dumper Owner’s Association (DOA), a trade association of dumper and hywa [unloading] machinery providers for intra-port transportation of cargo at Paradip Port and its individual officers for controlling the supply of dumpers and hywas at Paradip Port and fixing supply prices. The trade association was fined 8% of its average turnover (for the last 3 years) while the individual officers were fined 5% of their average income (for the last 3 years).

The complaint was brought by Swastik Stevedores Private Limited (the Informant), a company engaged in the business of stevedoring and intra-port transportation of cargo alleging that the DOA, in connivance with the Paradip Port Trust (PPT), the government authority managing Paradip Port had been refusing to provide dumpers and hywas to it.

In particular, the CCI found that:

  1. The DOA had been entrusted with the authority to issue gate passes for dumpers and hywas at Paradip Port by the PPT which gave it a unique advantage in controlling supply at the port as no machinery could enter the port without a gate pass. Further, the members of the DOA owned a substantial number of the dumpers used at Paradip Port. The DOA used this control over the supply of dumpers and hywas to refuse supply to the Informant thereby limiting output through collective action in violation of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act); and
  2. The DOA collectively fixed the rates to be charged for provision of dumpers and hywas. The members       were forced to abide by such rates and were not allowed to individually negotiate rates. This resulted in determination of sale prices through collective action in violation of the Competition Act.

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3C’s: CCI fines Port Owner’s Association and Individuals for Price Fixing

CCI fines Port Owner’s Association and Individuals for Price Fixing

Today’s guest post is from Avinash Amarnath.

India Update 2015 Vol. 2

Trade associations continue to be the flavor of the day in the cartel space in India.

On 21 January 2015, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) imposed a penalty on the Dumper Owner’s Association (DOA), a trade association of dumper and hywa [unloading] machinery providers for intra-port transportation of cargo at Paradip Port and its individual officers for controlling the supply of dumpers and hywas at Paradip Port and fixing supply prices. The trade association was fined 8% of its average turnover (for the last 3 years) while the individual officers were fined 5% of their average income (for the last 3 years).

The complaint was brought by Swastik Stevedores Private Limited (the Informant), a company engaged in the business of stevedoring and intra-port transportation of cargo alleging that the DOA, in connivance with the Paradip Port Trust (PPT), the government authority managing Paradip Port had been refusing to provide dumpers and hywas to it.

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A Report Card: “Obama Administration Antitrust Policy:

Brief Summary of “Obama Administration Antitrust Policy: A Report Card” Program

On January 29, 2015 I attended a program hosted by the Heritage Foundation: Obama Administration Antitrust Policy: A Report Card. The program was free and held in the Allison Auditorium. The program had three panels that focused on 1) the FTC; 2) the DOJ, and 3) Antitrust Abroad.   The panels were outstanding and included speakers who were either current or former senior members of the FTC or the Antitrust Division.

The consensus of the speakers was that it is too early to give an overall Antitrust grade to the Obama administration. It can take years to conduct a proper retrospective of how decisions and priorities have played out. Overall, however, there were a number of “high marks” or “good job” given by each of the panels. The DOJ, however was given one failing grade for (my words) “Plays Well With Others.”  Typically when a new administration takes over, new management speaks well of their predecessors, even though they may have a different approach in some areas. This happened with the Bush to Obama transition at the FTC. It did not at the DOJ. Several panelists noted Obama administration DOJ officials were uncharacteristically critical of their immediate predecessors with remarks such as the “antitrust is open for business”[1] and comments made when, in May 2009, the new administration withdrew the September 2008 Section 2 report on monopolization.

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3C’s: LIBOR Guest Post from Richard Wolfram, Esq.

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I came across a very informative post by Richard Wolfram, Esq. about antitrust standing the LIBOR civil damages litigation.  I thought it would be of interest to Cartel Capers readers, in case you haven’t seen it elsewhere.  Mr. Wolfram kindly agreed to let me repost this.

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In re LIBOR: ‘More Light, Please!’—Questions and Observations As the Decision Dismissing Antitrust Claims for Lack of Antitrust Injury Now Faces Appellate Review
Posted: 28 Jan 2015 10:01 AM PST
by Richard Wolfram, Esq.

(An in-depth article on In re LIBOR and antitrust injury is available here under this title. The following is a preview of my article).

(N.B.: In a coincidence of timing, on Jan. 28, 2015, the date of this posting and publication of the linked article, Judge Lorna Schofield of the federal district court for the Southern District of New York, in a case alleging a conspiracy to manipulate the benchmark rates in the $5.3 trillion/day foreign exchange market, denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and expressly rejected the test used by the court in In re LIBOR for determining antitrust injury, discussed below. In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 1/28/15).)

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