3C’s: EU Competition Policy Brief–The Damages Directive

EU Competition Policy Brief–The Damages Directive

Last week Cartel Capers featured a post from James Musgrove and Joshua Chad, What Fresh Hell Is This: The Canadian Cartel Class Action System.  I wanted to follow up that post with an update on collective redress in Europe. On November 26, 2104 the European Parliament adopted certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringement of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. The “Damages Directive” was published on December 5, 2014 and EU countries need to implement it by December 27, 2016. The aim of the Directive is more efficient enforcement of the EU competition rules by making it easier for victims of antitrust violations to claim compensation. While larger companies already often obtain redress for price-fixing overcharges in Europe, the Directive aims to make recovery a realistic options for smaller companies and consumers.

For more information see the EU Competition Policy Brief—The Damages Directive, January 2015.

Thanks for reading.

3C’s: What Fresh Hell is This? The Canadian Cartel Class Action System

What Fresh Hell is This? The Canadian Cartel Class Action System

In Canadian Cartel News Volume 6, James Musgrove and Joshua Chad of McMillan LLP discuss the Canadian class action system.

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The answer to Miss Parker’s question, for those in the midst of a cartel investigation, is, almost certainly, a follow-on class action claim. In this volume of Cartel Capers we aim to give a rough and ready overview of the class action system for cartel cases in Canada. A book could be written on this subject – some have been – so these are merely the highest of lights.

The first point to note is that what used to be called follow-on class actions (that is, follow-on after a criminal conviction) is now a misnomer. Like in the US, these are now parallel or even precursor class actions. The merest hint of a cartel investigation results in the filing of class action applications.

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3C’s: Banks Found Not to Have Colluded

Banks Found Not to Have Colluded

I have really enjoyed publishing this blog.  One of the downsides is the embarrassment of an occasional typo, a problem with margins or other technical issues, or like yesterday, when I forgot to include a headline.  But, the  headline above is not a typo.  Banks have been found not to have colluded.

In India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) dismissed allegations that banks had colluded had to control and determine prices in the gold loan business (here).  It is welcome to see the reasoning of the CCI:  “It may be observed that parallel behaviour needs to be substantiated with the additional evidence or the plus factors to bring it into the ambit of prohibited anti-competitive agreements.”

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3C’s- Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA–Update

Motorola Mobility’s Petition for En Banc Review

This news is a bit dated, but on December 17, 2014 Motorola Mobility petitioned the Seventh Circuit for an en banc hearing of its price-fixing damages case against AU Optronics and other liquid-crystal-display panel makers. On November 26, 2014 a three-judge panel affirmed, on different grounds, its vacated opinion dismissing Motorola Mobility’s suit. In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the panel held that purchases by made overseas by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries of panels that were incorporated into products subsequently shipped into the United States did not meet the second prong of the FTAIA requirements, that the effect of anticompetitive conduct give rise to an antitrust cause of action. 15 U.S.C. Section 6(a)(2). “Whether or not Motorola was harmed indirectly, the immediate victims of the price-fixing were its foreign subsidiaries.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2014 WL 6678622 (7th Cir. 2014). In its petition for rehearing en banc, Motorola claims:

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The 3C’s: An Overview of Japanese Cartel Regulation

Today’s guest blog post is by Masayuki Atsumi of the Japanese law firm Mori Hamada & Matsumoto.  Mr. Atsumi was an attorney with the JFTC before private practice.

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Japan is one of the most important jurisdictions in Asia in relation to cartel enforcement, but not many written materials articulate the details of Japanese cartel regulation.  As my first contribution to this blog, I would like to briefly provide an overview of Japanese cartel regulation, with a focus mainly on procedural and practical aspects.

  1. Prohibition on cartel activities

The Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act (“AMA”) prohibits, among other things, “unreasonable restraint of trade” which includes collusive activities such as cartels or bid-rigging. A cartel violation is not per se illegal in Japan because the AMA requires that the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”), the Japanese antitrust enforcement body, must prove a “substantive restraint on competition in the relevant market” in order to find a violation.

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3C’s: A Small Bite at the Apple

A Small Bite at the Apple

On December 15th, Apple and the United States continued their heavyweight battle with a round of oral argument in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It’s been a while since this feud started so I’ll briefly recap the claims of the combatants.  The DOJ wrote in its Second Circuit brief, “In late 2009 and early 2010, Apple orchestrated and participated in a conspiracy with five major book publishers to take control of retail pricing for electronic books (e-books) and to raise prices to agreed-upon levels. The conspiracy was successful: retail e-book prices for the vast majority of the Publisher-Defendants’ new releases and bestsellers rose from $9.99 to $12.99 or $14.99. Consumers paid almost 20% more, on average, for all of the Publisher-Defendants’ e-books.”  Apple offered a “no good deed goes unpunished” defense, contending that it did not join any conspiracy and, in fact, offered a pro-competitive, innovative alternate to the monopolistic stranglehold that Amazon.com had on the e-book market.

The DOJ prevailed in the trial court with Judge Denise Cote finding that Apple had helped orchestrate a horizontal, per se Sherman Act price-fixing violation by book publishers to raise prices. The district court found that “with Apple’s active encouragement and assistance, the Publisher Defendants agreed to work together to eliminate retail price competition and raise e-book prices, and again with Apple’s knowing and active participation, they brought their scheme to fruition.”

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2014 Sherman Act Twombly Recap

A Recap of Sherman Act Twombly Decisions in 2014

My parter, Joan Marshall, and I wrote an article just published by Law 360 titled:  “In 2014 Plaintiffs Gained Some Ground Lost After Twombly.”  The article reviewed some key antitrust cases at the motion to dismiss stage and examined how the courts applied the “plausible” pleading standards announced in Twombly to various elements of the alleged offense.   (It is important to note that while Twombly involved and antitrust complaint, the Supreme Court announced a pleading standard that applied to all complaints.  The vast majority of post-Twombly cases do not involve antitrust pleadings).

Twombly motions and decisions are of course fact specific so its a bit of a stretch to say there is a trend.  The party who tells the best story consistent with Twombly and the underlying policy considerations will win.  But, after several appeals courts reminded lower courts that the standard at the motion to dismiss stage was “plausbility,” it seems plaintiffs chances have improved.   Reminders such as this certainly have helped plaintiffs:

First, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff is not required to allege facts showing that an unlawful agreement is more likely than lawful parallel conduct. * * *Second, in order to state a Section One claim, a plaintiff need not allege a fact pattern that “tends to exclude the possibility” of lawful, independent conduct.  Erie County, Ohio v. Morton Salt, 702 F.3d 860, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2012).

Law 360 is a subscription based service. If you don’t have access to Law 360 and would like to read our full article, please send me a note and I’d be happy to send it along.  [email protected]

Thanks for reading.

3C’s: “Nobody likes to see a competitor get in trouble, but . . .”

Last week I spent a few days at a Consero Corporate and Ethics Forum in San Jose, California. It was a very informative conference that brought together senior compliance executives in an intimate format to discuss many aspects of compliance such as “Internal Investigations: Soup to Nuts.” This was the third major compliance program I have attended since I retired from the Antitrust Division.  Earlier this year I was a speaker at the annual conferences for the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) and Ethics Compliance Officer Association. These conferences have their own personality and I enjoyed each. I have learned an enormous amount about the far-ranging responsibilities compliance attorneys and officers shoulder, often with limited resources. And, having been on the side of the prosecutor (regulator) for so long, I think I have been able to add some ideas to the discussion. Thus, the title of this post “Nobody like to see a competitor in trouble, but….”

The “but” is that when a competitor is in trouble it may be the best time to focus compliance resources on a particular area. Being able to go to management and say, “Company X is embroiled in this investigation and I think it may be something we need to focus on” can be a more persuasive than saying, “We need more resources.” One example may be if a competitor has an issue with a third-party vendor in an emerging market. That would be an ideal time to move any compliance efforts in that location to the top of the heap. In the antitrust area it is very common for investigations to start fairly localized and then spread.  A prime and recent example is the record-breaking auto parts cartel investigation. What started as an investigation in the United States of one auto part has spread to prosecutions involving virtually every auto part except the air freshener hanging from the front view mirror. This quote is from the most recent press release from the DOJ relating to another guilty plea in the auto parts investigation:  “Including today’s charges, 48 individuals have been charged in the department’s ongoing investigation into price-fixing and bid rigging in the auto parts industry.  Additionally, 32 companies have pledged guilty or agreed to plead guilty and have agreed to pay more than $2.4 billion in fines.” (here)  The auto parts investigation not only spread from one product to another, but also from the United States to competition authorities around the world including the EU, China, Japan, and Korea.   The auto parts investigation is an unusually large investigation, but industry “way of life” cartels are fairly common.

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CCC: Seventh Circuit Rules (Again) in Motorola Mobility

December 1, 2014 by Leave a Comment

The Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Motorola Mobility on November 26.   Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 14-8003. In the opinion, written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit panel ruled that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, (FTAIA) barred Motorola’s lawsuit because the harm was incurred by its foreign subsidiaries and not the parent company itself. The most critical fact in the case was this: “Motorola says that it “purchased over $5 billion worth of LCD panels from cartel members [i.e., the defendants] for use in its mobile devices.” That’s a critical misstatement. All but 1 percent of the purchases were made by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.” This key fact led to Motorola’s downfall:

What trips up Motorola’s suit is the statutory requirement that the effect of anticompetitive conduct on domestic U.S. commerce give rise to an antitrust cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2). The conduct increased the cost to Motorola of the cellphones that it bought from its foreign subsidiaries, but the cartel-engendered price increase in the components and in the price of cellphones that incorporated them occurred entirely in foreign commerce.

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CCC: “Congratulations to Nezida Davis on Her Retirement”

Congratulations to Nezida S. Davis who retired from the Antitrust Division last week. Nezida was the former Chief of the Atlanta office until it got whacked in early 2013 (along with Cleveland, Dallas and Philadelphia). Nezida had a long and distinguished career in public service with the Division. She joined the Division in 1984 as a trial attorney after serving a clerkship with U.S. District Court Judge Horace T. Ward. Nezida, a graduate of Columbia Law School, was named Assistant Chief of the Atlanta office in 1995 and Chief in 2002.

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