Category Archives: Competition

The 3C’s: Antitrust Division to Hold Roundtable on Criminal Antitrust Compliance

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From the Press Release (here):

On April 9, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division will hold a public roundtable discussion to explore the issue of corporate antitrust compliance and its implications for criminal antitrust enforcement policy.

The roundtable will provide a forum for the Antitrust Division to engage with inside and outside corporate counsel, foreign antitrust enforcers, international organization representatives, and other interested parties on the topic of antitrust compliance.  Participants will discuss the role that antitrust compliance programs play in preventing and detecting antitrust violations, and ways to further promote corporate antitrust compliance.  The format of the program will be a series of panel discussions with featured speakers.  Audience participation in the discussions will be encouraged.

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Seventh Company Agrees to Plead Guilty for Fixing Prices of Electrolytic Capacitors

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Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Nichicon Has Agreed to Pay $42 Million Criminal Fine

Nichicon Corporation will plead guilty for its role in a conspiracy to fix prices for electrolytic capacitors sold to customers in the United States and elsewhere, the Department of Justice announced today.

According to the one-count felony charge filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Nichicon conspired with others to suppress and eliminate competition for electrolytic capacitors from as early as November 2001 until December 2011. In addition to pleading guilty, Nichicon has agreed to pay a $42 million criminal fine and cooperate with the Antitrust Division’s ongoing investigation. The plea agreement is subject to court approval.

“Including today’s charge, the Antitrust Division has now charged seven companies and ten individuals for participating in a long-running conspiracy to fix the price of a critical component in electronic devices used by millions of American consumers,” said Director of Criminal Enforcement Marvin Price of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “But our investigation is not over. We are continuing to pursue the companies and executives who conspired to undermine competition in this vital industry.”

Electrolytic capacitors store and regulate electrical current in a variety of electronic products, including computers, televisions, car engines and airbag systems, home appliances and office equipment.

Today’s charge results from ongoing federal antitrust investigations being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Office and the FBI’s San Francisco Field Office into price fixing, bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the capacitor industry. Anyone with information related to the focus of this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Citizen Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, visit https://www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations, or call the FBI tip line at 415-553-7400.

CCC: Some Comments from Brent Snyder, former Antitrust Division Criminal Deputy, as he Heads to the Hong Kong Competition Commission

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Some Comments from Brent Snyder, former Antitrust Division Criminal Deputy, as he Heads to the Hong Kong Competition Commission

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If you ever wanted to sell a student on pursuing a career in antitrust because of the interesting possibilities, Brent Snyder’s career (which is far from over) would be a good case in point.  Mr. Snyder graduated with Honors from the University of Texas School of Law, where he was an Associate Editor of the Texas Law Review. After completing a federal judicial clerkship, he began practicing as a private commercial litigator and in 2001 became a partner at Perkins Coie, a large Seattle law firm.  Mr. Snyder joined the Antitrust Division United States Department of Justice in 2003.   In June 2017 Mr. Snyder stepped down from the Antitrust Division and will be heading to Hong Kong.  On June 19, 2017, the Hong Kong Competition Commission announced the appointment of Mr. Snyder as its next Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for a term of three years commencing 4 September 2017 (here).

Mr. Snyder had a remarkably successful career with Antitrust Division.  He started in 2003 as a trial attorney.  He was involved, both as a trial attorney and as a supervisor, in many successful cartel investigations and prosecutions.  He was part of the team that conducted the TFT-LCD international cartel investigation, which culminated in a conviction and a $500 million fine against AU Optronics.  Several AUO executives were also convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.  From 2013 until his departure, Mr. Snyder served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement overseeing all of the Division’s criminal investigations, prosecutions, leniency and other policy work.

Mr. Snyder is known to his friends as someone whose career has always focused on positions that would be interesting, provide new challenges and allow him to make a meaningful contribution.  On these scores, his going to Hong Kong is not surprising.  Hong Kong has a relatively new but robust competition enforcement regime. Full enforcement of the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance began only a little over 18 months ago and the Competition Commission has had positive results already.  Some of these results are outlined in the Commission’s March 2017 newsletter, “Competition Matters.”  The Competition Commission also has a very helpful website.

The Hong Kong Competition Commission has been very innovative during its short history.  The Commission created an educational video on “Fighting Bid Rigging Cartels,” which can be viewed here on You Tube.  The Commission’s “Fighting Bid-rigging Cartels” Campaign was named a winner in the category “Engaging through results: Successful experience in planning, implementing and monitoring advocacy strategies” in the Competition Advocacy Contest organised by the International Competition Network (ICN) and the World Bank Group (here).

Mr. Snyder will bring a great deal of valuable experience and perspective to the Hong Kong Competition Commission. Before heading off to Hong Kong, Mr. Snyder kindly agreed to answer a few questions about his experiences to date.

Q.     Can you talk about an experience you had in the Antitrust Division that might be your fondest memory?

First, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to Cartel Capers!  Your blog has been a great and influential addition to the antitrust landscape and facilitates discussion and thinking on important topics in our field. I appreciate your interest and am happy to answer your questions.

I suppose I should have an easy answer to this question, but it is hard to pick from so many great experiences over the years.  Anyone who has worked in the Division understands what a special place it is and the exciting things its attorneys get to do.

Running through the Honolulu airport to serve a grand jury subpoena on someone trying to hightail it out of the country, the excitement of trial wins, a karaoke celebration party with the AUO team, kayaking on a bio-luminescent bay in Puerto Rico with the Peake trial team, any number of memorable drop-in interviews, planning a successful undercover operation, and, most recently, a surprise farewell party complete with a hula dancer, ukulele player and Aloha-attired Division friends (people seem to think I have a thing for Aloha shirts for some reason ?) all come to mind.

They all have one thing in common — that I was fortunate to be part of great teams. I can’t separate any memory from the fantastic people with whom I shared the experiences and accomplishments. Experiencing those things with people I like and respect are my fondest memories. I was just so fortunate to work for and with talented, hardworking, dedicated public servants who also are fun and have a great sense of humor (and/or high tolerance for mine). Anyone who knows me knows that I value that last part especially highly!

Q.     You’ve had several different positions in the Division, starting out as a trial attorney, rising to Criminal Deputy and even being Acting Assistant Attorney General for a time.  For the trial staff, what do you think are the biggest challenges they face today in cartel enforcement?

It is a great time to be a Trial Attorney because the Division has a number of really exciting investigations and plenty of cases going to trial.  But, as always, there are challenges.  I think some of the significant ones are:

  • Keeping up with the work, especially while the Division has so many cases in litigation, which pulls resources away from investigations;
  • The complexity of several of the schemes and industries under investigation, such as LIBOR and the foreign exchange spot market;
  • Coordinating and harmonizing investigations with an increasingly greater number and variety of enforcement and regulatory agencies, especially non-competition enforcement agencies; and
  • Keeping up with ever evolving technologies that cartelists are using to communicate and that are difficult to detect and penetrate.

I have been proud to see the Division’s attorneys overcome every challenge with determination and dedication and fully expect them to have a continued track record of great success in the future.

Q.     Overall, what do you think is the biggest challenge facing the Antitrust Division in its primary mission of cartel enforcement?

You raise one of them below — keeping the incentive strong to seek  leniency.

Another challenge is that the Division has lost many of its most experienced attorneys through retirements, office closures, and other attrition over the past several years.  Although the Division was able to hire a large number of exceptionally talented attorneys, the lost experience cannot immediately be replicated. The good news is that this challenge should be short term in nature. Recent trials and investigations have provided opportunities for the new attorneys to get tremendous experience, and the Division is on its way to having a really deep pool of accomplished prosecutors to go along with a skilled group of managers.

Finally, as I mentioned above, there is a much more crowded enforcement landscape today than there was even a few years ago. I am referring less to the emergence of new competition enforcers than to investigations involving a greater number and variety of other domestic and foreign enforcement agencies and regulators.  This results in greater harmonization challenges, and these investigations no doubt complicate the leniency calculus for companies that may face non-antitrust exposure from those regulators and enforcers for the same or related conduct.

Q.     Is there any one area of international enforcement harmonization or cooperation you’d hope to see improvement in among the world’s cartel enforcement agencies?

I think the quality and quantity of international cooperation is better than it has ever been. The Antitrust Division now routinely communicates and coordinates with enforcement agencies that it had little or no interaction with just a few years ago. I think this is testament to the rate at which agencies around the world are maturing and becoming involved in international investigations.

If there is one area that I would like to see improved, it would be in the area of witness interviews. As I have said at other times, I think enforcers can do a better and more efficient job of coordinating the timing of and approach to witness interviews among enforcement agencies. This would not only benefit our investigations but also be more cost effective and efficient for the witnesses and cooperating companies.

Q.     Do you think “leniency” has lost some of its appeal to potential cooperators? If so, can/should anything be done about that?

I don’t think leniency has lost its appeal. For a company confronted with exposure to a cartel offense and the resulting large fines, civil liability, and incarceration for executives, it is still a great opportunity.  And, I believe that companies and their counsel still see it as one.

But, as I mentioned above, the decision to seek leniency is undoubtedly more complicated than it has ever been as a result not only of the proliferation of competition enforcement agencies but also the more frequent involvement of other types of enforcement agencies and regulators in parallel investigations of the same conduct.  The proliferation of enforcement agencies increases the potential cost and burden of seeking leniency, and the involvement of other enforcement agencies and regulators increases the risk of liability not covered by leniency.

I think the expense and burden of multi-jurisdictional cartel investigations can be addressed through greater coordination and efficiency enhancements among competition enforcement agencies. I think that harmonizing leniency with non-competition enforcement agencies and regulators presents greater challenges, but I believe it will become easier as they have more experience with leniency and see its results.  I saw improvements in this area during my years as DAAG.

Finally, the best way to make leniency attractive is to prove you can and will detect and prosecute cartels even without a leniency applicant. The Antitrust Division has an excellent track record of doing so, and cartelists who choose not to seek leniency face a real risk of detection and prosecution.

Q.     As mentioned above with “Fighting Bid Rigging Cartels” video the Hong Kong Competition Commission has been innovative and active in public outreach.  Do you think that kind of outreach can be duplicated in the United States?

I have been really impressed by innovative public outreach efforts in other jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, and have often wondered if they can be replicated here. Unfortunately, I am doubtful that they can be replicated here because the U.S. is so large and the channels for communicating to the general population are diffuse or prohibitively expensive.

Nonetheless, the Antitrust Division has prioritized making public outreach more systematic and diverse than in the past. I don’t think we’ll see any national ad campaigns or public service announcements from the Division, but I do think it will be finding ways to get in front of a greater number of groups and constituents than in the past.

I think this outreach is very important not only from the perspective of developing investigative leads but also to educate the public regarding the illegality of cartel offenses.  In 2015, Prof. Andreas Stephan of the University of East Anglia published an interesting survey of public attitudes to price fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy, and the U.S. which showed that the U.S. lags behind the other jurisdictions in knowledge that cartel conduct is illegal.  Outreach can certainly help with this.

Q.     You no doubt had many possible very lucrative opportunities upon leaving the Department of Justice.  Why did you chose to go to work with the Hong Kong Competition Commission? 

I thought it was an incredible and interesting opportunity to go from one of the most established and experienced agencies in the world to one of the newest. You’ve already noted that the Hong Kong Competition Commission has shown itself to be innovative and thoughtful during its relatively short existence. I am excited to get to contribute to what Stanley Wong, Rose Webb, and others have already begun to build there and hope to make good use of my experience at the Antitrust Division.

It should come as no surprise that I think the Antitrust Division is the finest competition enforcement agency in the world, but I jokingly told Acting Assistant Attorney General Andrew Finch that we’re going to try to knock them back to second best. ?

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Thanks Brent.  Best of luck in the new position in Hong Kong!

3C’s Recommended Amicus Brief on Section One Summary Judgment Standard

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Here is a link to a brief filed by a number of professors asking the Supreme Court to clarify the standard to be applied by districts courts to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a Section One antitrust case,  evergreen – petition for certiorari – amicus brief – filed copy – 4.21.17 – evergreen partnering group v. pactiv corp.  The petition notes:

“[C]ircuit courts are mired in an abiding difference of opinion concerning the appropriate interpretation of the summary judgment paradigm in cases brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as applied to circumstantial evidence.”

The professors are going to bat for plaintiff Evergreen, which had its group boycott claimed dismissed on summary judgment. The amicus brief argues that the First Circuit incorrectly applied the Matsushita standard that requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility of independent conduct.” The brief goes on to argue say this strict standard should only be applied where the defendants’ conduct is arguably pro-competitive (like the price cutting in Matsushita). In this case, the brief argues, the correct standard, is found in Eastman Kodak Industry Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc.,: whether the plaintiff has produced evidence that the defendants’ conduct is unreasonable.

From the brief:

The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits “have narrowed the application of Matsushita’s “tends to exclude the possibility of independent conduct” test to situations where the plaintiff ’s theory: (1) is implausible; and (2) challenges pro-competitive conduct….The First, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, do not interpret Kodak as a limitation on Matsushita’s “tends to exclude” test. These courts universally apply the test to all motions seeking entry of summary judgment on a conspiracy claim under Section 1, regardless of whether plaintiff’s theory makes economic sense or there is little or no risk of chilling pro-competitive behavior.”

The brief notes that Judge Posner has been critical of the Matsushita “tends to exclude the possibility of independent conduct” standard for requiring the plaintiffs to disprove the defendants’ case with a “sweeping negative.” Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, 100 (2d ed. 2001).  The brief also quotes a Judge Posner opinion:

“That would imply that the plaintiff in an antitrust case must prove a violation of the antitrust laws not by a preponderance of the evidence, not even by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (as indeed is required in criminal antitrust cases), but to a 100 percent certainty, since any lesser degree of certitude would leave a possibility that the defendant was innocent.”

In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.).

The brief concludes:

“In sum, the decision below illustrates and intensifies confusion among the lower courts about the Matsushita standard for Section 1 antitrust claims at summary judgment. The question is critical; private enforcement is essential to maintaining the correct balance between under and over deterrence to foster healthy competition. But when it comes to Matsushita, inconsistency in its application is now the rule, rather than the exception. For these reasons, the Court should clarify the standard, resolve the circuit split, and emphasize that the correct interplay between Matsushita and Kodak properly limits the “tends to exclude” summary judgment standard to cases where the alleged conspiracy is economically irrational and the conduct is pro-competitive.”

Whichever side of the “v.” you are on [plaintiff or defendant] the brief is a useful read for the discussion of the differences among the circuits on the proper standard for summary judgment.

Evergreen is represented by Richard Wolfram  who earlier had filed a petition for certiorari with Supreme Court. A copy of the petition can be found here.

Thanks for reading.

FTC Charges Qualcomm With Monopolizing Key Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones

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Company’s sales and licensing practices hamper Qualcomm’s competitors and threaten innovation in mobile communications, according to FTC

The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint in federal district court charging Qualcomm Inc. with using anticompetitive tactics to maintain its monopoly in the supply of a key semiconductor device used in cell phones and other consumer products.

Qualcomm is the world’s dominant supplier of baseband processors – devices that manage cellular communications in mobile products. The FTC alleges that Qualcomm has used its dominant position as a supplier of certain baseband processors to impose onerous and anticompetitive supply and licensing terms on cell phone manufacturers and to weaken competitors.

Qualcomm also holds patents that it has declared essential to industry standards that enable cellular connectivity. These standards were adopted by standard-setting organizations for the telecommunications industry, which include Qualcomm and many of its competitors. In exchange for having their patented technologies included in the standards, participants typically commit to license their patents on what are known as fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, or “FRAND,” terms.

When a patent holder that has made a FRAND commitment negotiates a license, ordinarily it is constrained by the fact that if the parties are unable to reach agreement, the patent holder may have to establish reasonable royalties in court.

According to the complaint, by threatening to disrupt cell phone manufacturers’ supply of baseband processors, Qualcomm obtains elevated royalties and other license terms for its standard-essential patents that manufacturers would otherwise reject. These royalties amount to a tax on the manufacturers’ use of baseband processors manufactured by Qualcomm’s competitors, a tax that excludes these competitors and harms competition. Increased costs imposed by this tax are passed on to consumers, the complaint alleges.

By excluding competitors, Qualcomm impedes innovation that would offer significant consumer benefits, including those that foster the increased interconnectivity of consumer products, vehicles, buildings, and other items commonly referred to as the Internet of Things.

The FTC has charged Qualcomm with violating the FTC Act. The complaint alleges that Qualcomm:

  • Maintains a “no license, no chips” policy under which it will supply its baseband processors only on the condition that cell phone manufacturers agree to Qualcomm’s preferred license terms. The FTC alleges that this tactic forces cell phone manufacturers to pay elevated royalties to Qualcomm on products that use a competitor’s baseband processors. According to the Commission’s complaint, this is an anticompetitive tax on the use of rivals’ processors. “No license, no chips” is a condition that other suppliers of semiconductor devices do not impose. The risk of losing access to Qualcomm baseband processors is too great for a cell phone manufacturer to bear because it would preclude the manufacturer from selling phones for use on important cellular networks.
  • Refuses to license standard-essential patents to competitors. Despite its commitment to license standard-essential patents on FRAND terms, Qualcomm has consistently refused to license those patents to competing suppliers of baseband processors.
  • Extracted exclusivity from Apple in exchange for reduced patent royalties. Qualcomm precluded Apple from sourcing baseband processors from Qualcomm’s competitors from 2011 to 2016. Qualcomm recognized that any competitor that won Apple’s business would become stronger, and used exclusivity to prevent Apple from working with and improving the effectiveness of Qualcomm’s competitors.

The FTC is seeking a court order to undo and prevent Qualcomm’s unfair methods of competition in violation of the FTC Act. The FTC has asked the court to order Qualcomm to cease its anticompetitive conduct and take actions to restore competitive conditions.

The Commission vote to file the complaint was 2-1. Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen dissented and issued a statement. Both a public and sealed version of the complaint were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on January 17, 2017.

 

The 3C’s: Will President Trump Revive Section 2 of the Sherman Act?

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Below is a post by Brad Geyer, my partner at GeyerGorey LLP.  As you can tell from the title of the post, it is not the typical Cartel Capers fare, but you might find it interesting.

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By Bradford L. Geyer [1]

When I concluded by summer of 2015 that our next President would be Donald Trump, my closest friends and associates were skeptical. Having grown up in the New York media market and reading the “Art of the Deal” after college, I studied Donald Trump because he was interesting. You are free to see it differently, but I see in President-Elect Trump as a strategic and tactical thinker who comes off as being spontaneous and off the cuff, but is actually in the third decade of his strategic plan. To read his books and to watch old videos shows a consistency in public policy views that is startling.

Few took President-Elect Trump seriously over the years in his statements about Antitrust, but like the protagonists in a movie, the best ones like to tell the antagonists that it’s coming.   Any mystery about President-Elect Trump’s Antitrust enforcement priorities should have been eliminated when in his “Gettysburg address” outlining his plans for his first 100 days, he blasted the media and turned his ire toward the Comcast / NBC Universal merger stating that the merged company is “trying to poison the mind of the American voter,” and said that the deal should never have been approved in the first place, and that it’s bad for democracy (here). He took his complaints further, promising action to prevent AT&T from buying Time Warner, the parent company of CNN, which he argued would concentrate too much power in one company (here). “We’ll look at breaking that deal up and other deals like it,” he vowed. “They’re trying to poison the mind of the American voter.”

President-Elect Trump has already been equally clear in expressing his thoughts about Amazon [2]:

Amazon has “a huge antitrust problem,” and (Jeff) Bezos (owner of the Washington Post and founder of Amazon.com) “thinks I would go after him for antitrust.”

– from the Twitter account of @realDonaldTrump (May 14, 2016)(here)

President-Elect Trump may have the most sophisticated view of Antitrust Law of any U.S. President in history. That experience was recently referenced by Emre N. Ilter in the National Law Review:

Mr. Trump was involved in three significant antitrust proceedings in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, in 1988, Mr. Trump paid a $750,000 civil penalty to settle charges brought by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that he had violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) by acquiring stock in two companies without making timely HSR filings. Around the same time, Mr. Trump, as one of the owners of the New Jersey Generals US Football League team, was involved in a private antitrust suit against the National Football League (NFL)—a case that resulted in a jury verdict that the NFL had willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in a market consisting of major league professional football in the United States, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Damages of $1, trebled to $3, were awarded. US Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988). Finally, Mr. Trump, in connection with his Atlantic City casinos, was sued by Boardwalk Properties, Inc. on numerous grounds including allegations that he had attempted to monopolize casino gambling and had conspired to suppress competition. After a lengthy legal battle, Mr. Trump prevailed. (here).

Combine experience, competition sophistication and seething intensity [3] and recognize that in the early 1980’s there were 50 media companies in the United States. Now that number is 6[4]. I suspect he believes there is a significant conscious parallelism among these six companies and there seems to be tight coordination and collaboration –a common gestalt — among these organizations on a host of issues. Call it a “thought cartel”. I would suggest that recent Wikileaks disclosures are likely to have reinforced this view among him and his team of advisors who may suspect that media companies are inducing lax regulation through maximizing the benefits of close relationships of its media figures with the political apparatus.[5]  Further, is President-Elect Trump viewing AT&T, Time Warner, Amazon, Comcast and even Google [6] individually as “media and information trusts”, as he finalizes his enforcement initiatives? My hunch is that he is and that each of these companies is at risk of enhanced enforcement attention.

It is clear that President Elect-Trump understands the power of the bully pulpit and he knows that if he can get AT&T and Time Warner to abort merger discussions before “the sheriff even rides into town” that means: 1) less work for him; 2) emboldened career civil service enforcers who were gearing up to make the case for blocking it; and 3) an enhanced perception of the Antitrust Division’s power. This, before he takes the oath of office in January, means enhanced leverage on day one.

I believe that it is possible he will pick a high visibility company, possibly on the crest of the wave of an aborted AT&T deal, to break up. So what potential “trust” will it be? Amazon has attracted criticism and controversy for years. Many of the criticisms are tied to allegations of anti-competitive or monopolistic behavior.  Does President-Elect Trump agree with Paul Krugman who recently penned, “Amazon.com, the giant online retailer, has too much power, and it uses that power in ways that hurt America.”[7]  Could the Department of Justice under the leadership of an Attorney General appointed by President-Elect Trump quite credibly take the view that Amazon is the Standard Oil Company or the AT&T or the Microsoft of its day [8] and bring an action to break it up?

I am certain that President-Elect Trump will announce that enforcement of the nation’s Antitrust Laws needs to be reinvigorated and that allegations of predatory pricing and attempts to monopolize certain sectors of the economy will not be tolerated. Some might expect that a Republican administration would line up alongside lax Section 2 enforcement. It is clear, however, that whatever else might be expected in a Trump administration, based on his statements throughout the campaign, consistency with Republican orthodoxy is not that thing and affected companies would be well served to increase their outside counsel budget.

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1. Mr. Geyer is a partner in the Washington and Philadelphia-based law firm of GeyerGorey LLP. Prior to entering private practice he was a prosecutor in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for 21 years. From 2007 through 2012 he served as the Antitrust Division’s Special Counsel to the Criminal Division involving “war zone” cases and investigations involving procurement fraud and grand fraud.

2.  President-Elect Trump on Hannity May 12, 2016 at 15:59 through 17:20. “[Jeff Bezos is] using the Washington Post . . . he’s using that for political purposes to save Amazon in terms of taxes and in terms of antitrust.

3.  Any member of the Antitrust defense bar who would like to get a flavor of what I suspect will be reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement under a Trump administration would be well served to watch this video which shows Seth Rogan and President Obama roasting President Elect Trump in 2011. If you are like me, when you watch this video you see a ferocious Kodiak bear in a cage that is being poked with sticks. The Bear is not reacting, but you can tell he is going to bust out of the cage and tear the pokers to shreds … after he constructs an ingenious plan. There is something about his reaction that makes you feel uncomfortable from the first Rogan joke. You want to plead with the men with the sticks to “please just stop.”   You actually look in your hand to make sure you aren’t holding a stick and try to drop it anyway. That is called power and intensity and control. He has it and he knows how to use it.

4.  See, The Media Monopoly, 6th Edition, March 24, 2000, by Ben H. Bagdikian.

5.  For example, in an April 15, 2014 email released by WikiLeaks, Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, proposed that a $1.5 billion Clinton Campaign vehicle be formed that, among other things, to convert each voter to a single record that aggregates all that is known about them. Are enforcers entitled to wonder if voters across the country want to be converted into a record and whether this market share in this endeavor is aided by power in Google’s core businesses? Would Google’s relationship with the Clinton campaign team regenerate an interest in their potential antitrust issues as Europe has? (When enforcers read this email does it bring the movie, “the Clockwork Orange” to mind like it did for me?).

6.  See, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/technology/google-europe-antitrust.html

7.   See, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/paul-krugman-amazons-monopsony-is-not-ok.html?_r=0

8.   Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. , 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Microsoft Corp. , 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.Cir . 1995).

Two Executives Charged for Conspiring to Eliminate Competition to Supply Water Treatment Chemicals

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Two water treatment chemicals executives were indicted in Newark, New Jersey, for their roles in a conspiracy to eliminate competition among suppliers of liquid aluminum sulfate to municipalities and pulp and paper companies in the United States, the Department of Justice announced today.

Vincent J. Opalewski, former president, vice president and general manager of a water treatment chemicals manufacturer headquartered in Parsippany, New Jersey, and Brian C. Steppig, director of sales and marketing of a water treatment chemicals manufacturer headquartered in Lafayette, Indiana, are the second and third executives charged in connection with the conspiracy, which sought to eliminate competition for contracts to supply liquid aluminum sulfate.  Liquid aluminum sulfate is a coagulant used by municipalities to treat drinking and waste water and by pulp and paper companies in their manufacturing processes.

“Municipalities and pulp and paper companies deserve competitive prices for water treatment chemicals,” said Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.  “These charges reflect our ongoing efforts to hold accountable those who conspire to cheat their customers responsible for their crimes.”

“These charges send a message that anyone intent on corrupting the free market will be identified and brought to justice,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Andrew Campi of the FBI’s Newark Division.  “Our mission is to protect victims who don’t see these crimes occurring, but who always end up paying the price.”

The indictment, returned by a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleges that Opalewski, from 2005 to 2011, and Steppig, from 1998 until 2011, and their co-conspirators participated in the conspiracy by meeting to discuss each other’s liquid aluminum sulfate business, agreeing to stay away from each other’s historical customers, submitting intentionally losing bids to favor the intended winner of the business, withdrawing inadvertently winning bids and discussing with each other prices to be quoted to municipalities and pulp and paper companies.

The charges contained in the indictment are allegations and not evidence of guilt.  The defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

The investigation into collusion in the liquid aluminum sulfate industry is being conducted by the New York Office of the Antitrust Division and the FBI’s Newark Division.  Anyone with information regarding price fixing, bid rigging or customer allocation in the sale and marketing of liquid aluminum sulfate should contact the Antitrust Division’s New York Office at 212-335-8000, call the Antitrust Division’s Citizen Complaint Center at 1-888-647-3258, or visit www.justice.gov/atr/contact/newcase.htm.

CCC’s: I Know this Looks Bad, But…..

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When I was a kid, there were times when it looked like I was in big trouble, but was able to talk my way out of it.  “Mom, I know this looks bad, but ….”  (Probably I did do it, but it was good practice for being a lawyer.)  There are times when even the most ethical companies can “look” like they may have violated the antitrust laws.  And it may not be as simple as explaining to Mom why things aren’t the way they look.  That “splaining” may take years of costly litigation, even for a defendant that hasn’t done anything wrong.  That is why antitrust/competition law compliance training is important, even for companies that have the highest ethical standards.  Not only is it important to not violate the law, but it is import to know how to communicate the pro-competitive merits of actions in the marketplace and to document why decisions were made.

Let me give one example.  In a commodity market with few sellers, it is natural that prices are going to be similar, if not identical.  If a company’s pricing is above the market in a commodity, their sales will suffer.  But, there is a thin line between “conscious parallelism” and price fixing.  A communication to customers such as this may be the hook to suggest sellers have crossed the line:  “The X industry has not been profitable and as of March 1 our prices will increase 5%.  This is in line with the increases of the other producers in the industry who are also going up.”  The company may be trying to communicate that they are only doing what others are doing to “stay competitive.”  But, referring to “industry pricing” gives the hint of collusion–enough of a hint to possibly draw an antitrust suit.  Much better to simply write:  “We have experienced increases in the cost of several major inputs.  Regrettably, we find it necessary to increase our prices 5% as of March 1.”  And there should be a document in the file explaining the need for the price increase.

To be clear, the first email does not establish that price fixing has occurred.  But, it may be enough,along with other evidence,  to give potential plaintiffs enough to file a case and result in a settlement to avoid costly litigation.  And, while no policies can guarantee a company will never be sued, an educated sales force will greatly lessen that likelihood.

The above is just one example. On January 19, 2016 from 1:00 to 2:15 pm I will be giving a presentation for Clear Law Institute on “Avoiding the Creation of “Hot” Antitrust Documents.”  I will talk about risk assessment for antitrust lawsuits and how to avoid creating the appearance of anticompetitive conduct, while documenting the pro-competitive reasons for activity in the market place.  The announcement/registration for the program is here.   There is a 35% off discount code you can use if you’d like to register: connolly35

Please check it out and see if it might be useful to your organization.   There will be slides that you may want to later  distribute as part of an antitrust compliance program.

Thanks for reading.

3C’s: Thomas Farmer Acquitted in Puerto Rico Shipping Price Fixing Trial

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After a three-week trial, Thomas Farmer, a former Crowley Liner Services Vice-President was acquitted of price-fixing and bid rigging charges by a jury in Puerto Rico. The trial was before Federal District Court Judge Daniel Dominguez. The jury was composed of six men and six women. They deliberated for three hours before returning their verdict. Framer had been indicted on March 21, 2013 on a charge of conspiracy to fix and rig Puerto Rico freight surcharges with counterparts from Horizon Lines and Sea Star Line in the U.S. mainland-Puerto Rico trade.

The acquittal marks the end of the Antitrust Division’s otherwise successful investigation into price-fixing on ocean shipping route between Puerto Rico and the United States. Farmer was the second executive to go to trial. Frank Peake, the former President of Sea Star, was convicted in 2013 on a similar charge (here). Peake’s case was noteworthy in that he was sentenced to five years in prison, a record sentence for a Sherman Act conviction (here). The Peake trial came after subordinates of his and co-conspirators from other companies had pled guilty and cooperated with the government. Peak’s direct subordinate at Sea Star, Peter Baci, was sentenced to 48 months in prison and fined $20,000. Peake’s counterpart at Horizon, Gabriel Serra, was sentenced to 34 months in prison. Other executives at Sea Star and Horizon had pled guilty, and received prison terms ranging from seven months to 29 months. Three companies have paid more than $46 million in fines for their involvement in a conspiracy that included setting rates, bid rigging and other practices.

Farmer faced a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Farmer was represented by Joseph C. Laws, Melanie Matos Gilroy Cardona and Terrance Reed.  Farmer was facing a maximum of ten years in prison if convicted and his legal team deserves great credit for the best outcome Farmer could have hoped for.  But, there are great difficulties that the Antitrust Division faces in a “last man standing trial.”  I am not familiar with the specifics of the Farmer trial but some of these inherent difficulties are:

  • Staleness:  Farmer was indicted in March 2013.  The indictment charged a conspiracy: “From at least as early as mid-2005, to in or about April 2008.”  So, Farmer was indicted just before the five-year statute of limitations expired.  His trial did not begin until more than two years after indictment.  Farmer was tried in 2015 for conduct that ended in early 2008.  Antitrust violations do not “shock the conscience” the way a crime of violence might, and the long delay between conduct and trial can diminish whatever “jury appeal” a price-fixing case might have had.
  • Witness Fatigue:  When a witness signs a cooperation agreement with the Antitrust Division, he usually doesn’t realize that his cooperation may last longer than many marriages.  It can be difficult to work with a witness who has long since (hoped) he had put this chapter of his life behind him.  Witness prep so many years after the alleged conduct occured can involve an increasing frequency of “I’m not sure.  That was a really long time ago.”  And, in this case it was.
  • Prior Statements:  As I said, I have not read the record in the Farmer case so I do not know who the witnesses were.  But, there is a good chance some of the witnesses previously testified in the Peake trial.  So besides witness fatigue and faded recollections, defense attorneys have prior statements to work with on cross-examination.
  • The Weak Cases Are The Ones That Go To Trial:  It used to be fair to say that the Antitrust Division got plea agreements from those who they had the strongest cases against, but often found itself trying weaker cases, sometimes against senior managers that had insulated themselves from most of the illegal conduct.  But, my opinion is that today cases go to trial because the sentencing guidelines are so severe (based on volume of commerce) that the “last man standing,” who can’t get a 5K cooperation agreement/downward departure, has little to lose by going to trial.  Mr. Farmer went to trial because he declared he was innocent and a jury did in fact acquit him.  But, even a guilty party might go to trial because: (a) he has at least a chance at acquittal; (b) even if convicted at trial, he will likely be sentenced to less time than he could have negotiated with the Antitrust Division pursuant to a recommended guidelines plea agreement; and (c) in any event he can appeal and hope to get a conviction reversed on appeal.  In essence, the trial is an extended sentencing hearing, with a chance of acquittal, and even if convicted, a hope the conviction can be overturned.  I co-authored an article “A Peek Behind the Record Peake Sentence” (here) that explored some of these ideas.

Congratulations to Farmer’s defense team and also to the Antitrust Division for an otherwise very successful investigation.

Thanks for reading.

Thomas Farmer Acquitted Puerto Rico Shipping Price Fixing Trial

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After a three-week trial, Thomas Farmer, a former Crowley Liner Services Vice-President was acquitted of price-fixing and bid rigging charges by a jury in Puerto Rico. The trial was before Federal District Court Judge Daniel Dominguez. The jury was composed of six men and six women. They deliberated for three hours before returning their verdict. Framer had been indicted on March 21, 2013 on a charge of conspiracy to fix and rig Puerto Rico freight surcharges with counterparts from Horizon Lines and Sea Star Line in the U.S. mainland-Puerto Rico trade.

The acquittal marks the end of the Antitrust Division’s otherwise successful investigation into price-fixing on ocean shipping route between Puerto Rico and the United States. Farmer was the second executive to go to trial. Frank Peake, the former President of Sea Star, was convicted in 2013 on a similar charge (here). Peake’s case was noteworthy in that he was sentenced to five years in prison, a record sentence for a Sherman Act conviction (here). The Peake trial came after subordinates of his and co-conspirators from other companies had pled guilty and cooperated with the government. Peak’s direct subordinate at Sea Star, Peter Baci, was sentenced to 48 months in prison and fined $20,000. Peake’s counterpart at Horizon, Gabriel Serra, was sentenced to 34 months in prison. Other executives at Sea Star and Horizon had pled guilty, and received prison terms ranging from seven months to 29 months. Three companies have paid more than $46 million in fines for their involvement in a conspiracy that included setting rates, bid rigging and other practices.

Farmer faced a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Farmer was represented by Joseph C. Laws, Melanie Matos Gilroy Cardona and Terrance Reed.  Farmer was facing a maximum of ten years in prison if convicted and his legal team deserves great credit for the best outcome Farmer could have hoped for.  But, there are great difficulties that the Antitrust Division faces in a “last man standing trial.”  I am not familiar with the specifics of the Farmer trial but some of these inherent difficulties are:

  • Staleness:  Farmer was indicted in March 2013.  The indictment charged a conspiracy: “From at least as early as mid-2005, to in or about April 2008.”  So, Farmer was indicted just before the five-year statute of limitations expired.  His trial did not begin until more than two years after indictment.  Farmer was tried in 2015 for conduct that ended in early 2008.  Antitrust violations do not “shock the conscience” the way a crime of violence might, and the long delay between conduct and trial can diminish whatever “jury appeal” a price-fixing case might have had.
  • Witness Fatigue:  When a witness signs a cooperation agreement with the Antitrust Division, he usually doesn’t realize that his cooperation may last longer than many marriages.  It can be difficult to work with a witness who has long since (hoped) he had put this chapter of his life behind him.  Witness prep so many years after the alleged conduct occured can involve an increasing frequency of “I’m not sure.  That was a really long time ago.”  And, in this case it was.
  • Prior Statements:  As I said, I have not read the record in the Farmer case so I do not know who the witnesses were.  But, there is a good chance some of the witnesses previously testified in the Peake trial.  So besides witness fatigue and faded recollections, defense attorneys have prior statements to work with on cross-examination.
  • The Weak Cases Are The Ones That Go To Trial:  It used to be fair to say that the Antitrust Division got plea agreements from those who they had the strongest cases against, but often found itself trying weaker cases, sometimes against senior managers that had insulated themselves from most of the illegal conduct.  But, my opinion is that today cases go to trial because the sentencing guidelines are so severe (based on volume of commerce) that the “last man standing,” who can’t get a 5K cooperation agreement/downward departure, has little to lose by going to trial.  Mr. Farmer went to trial because he declared he was innocent and a jury did in fact acquit him.  But, even a guilty party might go to trial because: (a) he has at least a chance at acquittal; (b) even if convicted at trial, he will likely be sentenced to less time than he could have negotiated with the Antitrust Division pursuant to a recommended guidelines plea agreement; and (c) in any event he can appeal and hope to get a conviction reversed on appeal.  In essence, the trial is an extended sentencing hearing, with a chance of acquittal, and even if convicted, a hope the conviction can be overturned.  I co-authored an article “A Peek Behind the Record Peake Sentence” (here) that explored some of these ideas.

Congratulations to Farmer’s defense team and also to the Antitrust Division for an otherwise very successful investigation.

Thanks for reading.