Category Archives: Whistleblower

CCC’s: The Bid Rigging Whistleblower –Part 2

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Should the Antitrust Division Have a Whistleblower Czar?

Well, no.  Without legislation to create a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute, the Czar might have little to do.  But, the Antitrust Division should make some effort, short of Czardom, to encourage bid rigging whistleblowers.  As I noted in Part I (here), there is already a mechanism for a whistleblower to claim a reward for prosecuting collusion among contractors/vendors on government contracts.  The bid rigging whistleblower can file a False Claims Act (qui tam) case on behalf of the government alleging that the government was ripped off by illegal collusion among the bidders.  If the government recovers damages, the person who brought the suit (the Relator) can receive a percentage (10-25%) of the recovery.

As I mentioned in Part I, the Antitrust Division has brought both criminal and civil suits as a result of filed whistleblower cases. This is a pretty well-kept secret because as far as I know, the Division has never encouraged anyone to come forward as a bid rigging whistleblower or done anything to publicize the fact that whistleblowers of collusion on government contracts can and have recovered a portion of the government’s damages.  The government should make some effort to attract bid rigging whistleblowers.  Doing so would benefit the Antitrust Division in obvious and non-obvious ways.  Below are a few ideas I think are worth discussing.

  1. Welcoming Bid Rigging False Claims Act cases
  • Special Counsel for False Claims Act Cases

Over the years there has been a proliferation of counselors to the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division.  One counsel, with a criminal and civil background, could be designated as the Special Counsel for False Claims Act cases.  This would at least be a message to the bar that the Antitrust Division does have an interest in promoting whistleblowing on collusion on federal government contracts.  This special counsel could also oversee whatever efforts the Antitrust Division does take to encourage bid rigging whistleblowing.

  • Create a False Claims Act web page

The Antitrust Division has a page on its website for the Leniency Program.  The Antitrust Division promotes the heck out of leniency.  This page is an excellent source of information about everything one would need to know about the Corporate and Individual Leniency Programs.   There is also a Report Violations page on the Antitrust Division’s website. A False Claims Act page would signal the Division’s interest in possible False Claims cases as well as provide information a potential whistleblower might need to begin.

  • Better Coordination with Civil Division and United States Attorney’s Offices

 When a False Claim Act case is filed, notice of the case and the evidence supporting it must be filed with the Attorney General of the United States.  From there, the case will be assigned according to the subject matter of the alleged fraud: (i.e. health care, defense, antitrust).  Perhaps this is already being done, but the Antitrust Division might be more aggressive in claiming its seat at the table for bid rigging on government contracts.  A whistleblower will not file a Sherman Act case if she has information about collusion on a government contract—because there is no provision for antitrust whistleblowers.  The case will be filed as a Conspiracy to Defraud the United States with the bid rigging constituting the fraud.  A review of cases False Claims Act Cases on the Department of Justice website indicates that there have been a variety of False Claims Act matters that involved bid rigging yet were handled by local United States Attorney’s offices and the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, instead of the Antitrust Division.[1]

It would be good public policy to have all potential government bid rigging cases be referred to the Antitrust Division. Pardon the institutional pride (I worked there for 34 years), but nobody can spot, investigate and prosecute a viable criminal antitrust violation (i.e. bid rigging) better than an experienced Antitrust Division Attorney.  What may look like a bid rig too small for government intervention, may be spotted as the tip of the iceberg by an Antitrust Division prosecutor.  Likewise, a case that may appear weak to someone else, may look quite viable to a Division prosecutor that has experience investigating cartels—and tools like the leniency program.  A special counselor for False Claims Act cases would raise the profile within the Antitrust Division, the Department of Justice (and the outside bar) and may spur additional viable False Claim Act cases being referred to the Antitrust Division for a decision on whether the government should intervene and take over the prosecution.

     2.      The Benefits to the Antitrust Division of a Higher Profile for False Claims                                      Act Cases

The Antitrust Division could benefit in both obvious and non-obvious ways from a higher profile on False Claim Act cases.

  • The Obvious

Filing a False Claims Act case is a risky proposition for any potential whistleblower.  The blowback from being a whistleblower will likely be severe and the chances for success, especially if the government does not intervene, are far from certain.  Modest changes like these suggestions are not going to lead to an avalanche of new cases.  (Thus, the need for an SEC like criminal antitrust whistleblower statute as I argue in this article (here)).  But, it is certainly worth a try.  Nothing suggested above, and others may have additional/better suggestions, costs the government a nickel and the return on the investment may be substantial, even if just one additional cartel is uncovered.  Also, while a different subject, many believe that the value of leniency has been decreasing and the number of viable leniency applications is down. While this may be coincidence, not causation, the Antitrust Division’s statistics for cases and jail sentences and fines are way down.  It may be an opportune time to launch a new, if modest, initiative.

  • Good Cases

One benefit of publicizing the potential benefits of being a bid rigging whistleblower is that even if only one new case emerges, these are great cases for staff to work on.  Here I speak from personal experience and my views may not be universally held, but I’m pretty sure they are held by most trial attorneys in the Antitrust Division. Government bid rigging cases are great cases to work on.  They are much lower profile than say a Forex or Libor or other international cartel matters.  These “big” cases have their own allure, but the front office, the Criminal Division, SEC, CFTC, foreign agencies, Batman and Robin and others all have a hand in these investigations.  While it is exhilarating to work on a matter that makes the front page of the Wall Street Journal, a staff member is a small cog in the big wheel. On a government contract matter, generally speaking, the staff has more responsibility and more ownership of the matter, including possible trial experience on manageable cases. It’s a great way to learn how to investigate, take chances and take ownership.  These cases also involve working with agents across the federal spectrum.  These relationships can last a career and produce results over a long period of time.

  • Deterrent Effect

Finally, one of the most important reasons for robust antitrust prosecutions is deterrence. If the Antitrust Division starts whistleblowers and prosecuting bid rigging cases, it should have a deterrent effect on all the bid riggers out there that are not currently being detected. Whistleblower awards on bid rigging matters should be well-publicized. There is great satisfaction in seeing taxpayer money restored (with appropriate penalties) if a successful case is brought.  In a cartel case like capacitors the price of an input is raised but the impact on the final cost to consumers is small.  The cumulative harm is great (and should be prosecuted), but it is very diffused.  With bid rigging on government contracts the harm is focused and the recovery can be significant with both criminal and civil penalties.  Also, many government bid rigging investigations can lead to finding more bid rigging and what often looks like a small matter can proliferate into a major investigation.  Road construction, school milk, Defense Department contracts are just a few of the government contract cases that led to uncovering “way of life” collusion in certain industries.

Part III

 Special Issues with A Big Rigging Whistleblower

 Thanks for reading. Please come back for Part III.

Bob Connolly

CCC’s: The Bid Rigging Whistleblower–Part 1

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I have been writing, along with my co-author Kimberly Justice, about the desirability of a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute.  Besides many blog posts, we have written a few articles such as It’s a Crime There Isn’t an Antitrust Whistleblower Statute, Wolters Kluwer, Antitrust Law Daily, April 8, 2018.

A principle objection to an antitrust whistleblower statute is that it would undermine the credibility of a witness if she received compensation for exposing a cartel.  Superficially that sounds right but doesn’t hold up when you consider the success of the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Program. Simply change “leniency applicant” to “whistleblower” and one can see that the Antitrust Division already has a form of whistleblowing; the Corporate Leniency Program which bestows rich rewards on the whistleblower.  As the Antitrust Division has stated repeatedly, the value of leniency is the tens of millions of dollars it can save a company.   Leniency/whistleblowing saves not only the leniency company money, but it can save multiple culpable executives from jail time in return for their cooperation: “When Calculating The Costs And Benefits Of Applying For Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put A Price Tag On An Individual’s Freedom?” So, the government is rightfully not skittish about paying for information. It’s a necessary evil to breaking up secret cartels and hopefully deter their inception.

The reward of leniency does, of course, undermine the credibility of witnesses just as a whistleblower reward will ding the credibility of any whistleblower who testifies.  If the government has only the cooperation of a leniency applicant, it is likely to: a) not bring a case; or b) lose the case it brings.  But, that flaw in leniency that does not outweigh the benefits!  Leniency whistleblowing almost always leads to cooperation from other subjects of the investigation.  The value of leniency whistleblowing is that it starts the dominos falling of companies/individuals coming in to cooperate for the next best deal available. You don’t see many criminal antitrust trials based on a grant of leniency, because the grant of leniency to one company leads to many guilty pleas and an overwhelming case against whomever is left.[1] A criminal antitrust whistleblower statute for individuals will work the same way.

Pardon the advertisement for a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute because this post is not about that.  In writing about the need for a whistleblower statute, I may have given the impression that it is not currently possible to be a whistleblower on cartel cases.  This is not true.  An individual whistleblower already has a way to help the government recover damages from bidding collusion, while at the same time getting some reward for the great expense and risk in doing this.  If there is bid rigging or price-fixing and the federal government is a victim of the collusion, a qui tam(whistleblower) suit can be brought seeking damages on behalf of the government.  A whistleblower can file a False Claims Act case alleging that a defendant (or group of defendants as in a cartel) obtained a federal contract by means of making a material false statement.  If a bid was rigged, the false statement would likely be the non-collusion affidavit filed with a vendor’s bid package.  This is typically referred to as a Certificate of Independent Price Determination, or something similar.  But, even without such a certification, in the context of a competitive bidding situation, there would be an implied certification that each vendor submitted his bid independently and without collusion with the other bidders, or even non-bidders if the scheme involved payoffs to a potential competitor to not bid).

A couple of things to note. To get a reward for this type of whistleblowing, it is not sufficient to simply go into the prosecutor’s office and lay out the evidence you have.[2]  Under the False Claims Act, the “Relator” [as the whistleblower is called] must file a qui tamsuit on behalf of the government alleging the government suffered damages as a result of the fraud.[3]  If damages are awarded as a result of the qui tamsuit, the Relator is entitled to between 15-25% of the amount the government recovers as a result of the bid rigging.  As an example, if a Relator files a qui tamaction alleging bid rigging on a $50 million contract and the contractor repays the government $10 million in overcharges, the whistleblower should recover between $1.5 million and $2.5 million.[4]

Once a qui tam suit is filed, the Relator’s attorneys must present the evidence they have to the government.  The government will decide whether they want to intervene and take over prosecution of the fraud.  If the government declines to intervene, (and the reason for declination can range from the government thinks your case is weak, or your case is fine, but they are just too busy with other matters).  Even if the government declines to intervene, the Relator can still prosecute the case, and some do, but it is obviously more difficult without the government’s assistance.  And in some fairly rare instances, the government can seek to have the Relator’s case dismissed if they believe it is without evidentiary merit or based on a legal theory the government doesn’t agree with.

The Antitrust Division has actually had successful criminal prosecutions that began based on evidence provided by a whistleblower who had filed a False Claims Act suit. The Antitrust Division neither publicizes the fact that whistleblowing rewards are available for exposing bid rigging on government contracts (and most states have similar False Claims Act statutes) and does not publicize when a whistleblower has successfully recovered damages for the government or himself.  When I was Chief of the Philadelphia Office of the Antitrust Division we prosecuted several cases where the investigation began as a result of a whistleblower False Claims Act case.  A publicly documented example of this was in 2012 when the Antitrust Division settled a civil bid rigging case where two companies were charged with rigging contracts for Bureau of Land Management gas leases.[5]  Because of the collusion, SG Interests and Gunnison Energy Corp. overcharged the government for leases by bidding less than they would have if they bid competitively. Each company paid a settlement of $550,000 in a civil case brought by the Antitrust Division.  The government’s case was based on a qui tamcase filed in 2009 by a former vice president of one of the companies.[6]  See, Justice Department Settlement Requires Gunnison Energy and SG Interests to Pay the United States a Total of $550,000 for Antitrust and False Claims Act Violations.

Also, there was a False Claim Act case filed in the Puerto Rican ocean shipping cartel matter.  That investigation resulted in the longest jail sentence ever received by an individual convicted of a Sherman Act violation–5 years[7].  Again, the fact that a whistleblower case was filed is not well known, but the following is an excerpt from an Antitrust Division appellate brief as Mr. Peake appealed his conviction:

Stallings, a former Sea Star executive, was the government’s first cooperator in its investigation into the shipping conspiracy, although he did not testify at Peake’s trial. Stallings’s [whistleblower] lawsuit sought damages for “injuries to the United States Government resulting from Defendants’ fraudulent course of conduct and conspiracy to allocate customers, rig bids, fix rates, surcharges and other fees for Puerto Rican Cabotage which resulted in the submission of false or fraudulent claims to the Government. [8]

The Antitrust Division noted in its brief:

The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act permit whistleblowers (known as “relators”) to bring certain fraud claims on behalf of the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). These actions “are filed under seal and remain that way for at least 60 days” to give “the government an opportunity to assess the relator’s complaint and decide whether to intervene and assume primary responsibility for prosecuting the case.” United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (b)(4), (c)(1)). Regardless of whether the government intervenes, a relator is entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the lawsuit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).

Coming Next in Part II:  Should There Be an Antitrust Division “Whistleblower Czar?”

Thanks for reading.  Please come back.  Bob Connolly  

[1]  To be honest, another reason there are so few criminal antitrust trials is the prohibitive cost and the draconian “trial penalty” a convicted defendant is likely to face for demanding his day in court.

[2]     It would be far more efficient if a whistleblower could simply provide the information he has to the government and cooperate in the investigation.  This is among the reasons Ms. Justice and I are advocating an SEC style whistleblower statute.

[3]     It is unquestioned that a scheme to rig bids not only violation the Sherman Act, but is a conspiracy to defraud the government where the government’s money is at stake.

[4]     31 U.S. Code § 3730 (d)Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff. — (1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government  Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.

[5]     https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/510616/download.

[6]     https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settlement-requires-gunnison-energy-and-sg-interests-pay-united-states.

[7].   https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-sea-star-line-president-sentenced-serve-five-years-prison-role-price-fixing-conspiracy.

[8]      US v. Frank Peake, Antitrust Division brief available at,https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/936611/download.

CCC’s: DOJ Announces “Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties” Policy

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On May 9, 2018 Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein delivered remarks to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute. He announced a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.  The full prepared remarks are here.  Below is an excerpt:

Today, we are announcing a new Department policy that encourages coordination among Department components and other enforcement agencies when imposing multiple penalties for the same conduct.

The aim is to enhance relationships with our law enforcement partners in the United States and abroad, while avoiding unfair duplicative penalties.

It is important for us to be aggressive in pursuing wrongdoers. But we should discourage disproportionate enforcement of laws by multiple authorities. In football, the term “piling on” refers to a player jumping on a pile of other players after the opponent is already tackled.

Our new policy discourages “piling on” by instructing Department components to appropriately coordinate with one another and with other enforcement agencies in imposing multiple penalties on a company in relation to investigations of the same misconduct.

In highly regulated industries, a company may be accountable to multiple regulatory bodies. That creates a risk of repeated punishments that may exceed what is necessary to rectify the harm and deter future violations.

Sometimes government authorities coordinate well.  They are force multipliers in their respective efforts to punish and deter fraud. They achieve efficiencies and limit unnecessary regulatory burdens.

Other times, joint or parallel investigations by multiple agencies sound less like singing in harmony, and more like competing attempts to sing a solo.

Modern business operations regularly span jurisdictions and borders. Whistleblowers routinely report allegations to multiple enforcement authorities, which may investigate the claims jointly or through their own separate and independent proceedings.

By working with other agencies, including the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OFAC, and others, our Department is better able to detect sophisticated financial fraud schemes and deploy adequate penalties and remedies to ensure market integrity.

But we have heard concerns about “piling on” from our own Department personnel. Our prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys prize the Department’s reputation for fairness.

They understand the importance of protecting our brand. They asked for support in coordinating internally and with other agencies to achieve reasonable and proportionate outcomes in major corporate investigations.

And I know many federal, state, local and foreign authorities that work with us are interested in joining our efforts to show leadership in this area.

“Piling on” can deprive a company of the benefits of certainty and finality ordinarily available through a full and final settlement. We need to consider the impact on innocent employees, customers, and investors who seek to resolve problems and move on. We need to think about whether devoting resources to additional enforcement against an old scheme is more valuable than fighting a new one.

Our new policy provides no private right of action and is not enforceable in court, but it will be incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, and it will guide the Department’s decisions.

This is another step towards greater transparency and consistency in corporate enforcement. To reduce white collar crime, we need to encourage companies to report suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement and to resolve liability expeditiously.

There are four key features of the new policy.

First, the policy affirms that the federal government’s criminal enforcement authority should not be used against a company for purposes unrelated to the investigation and prosecution of a possible crime. We should not employ the threat of criminal prosecution solely to persuade a company to pay a larger settlement in a civil case.

That is not a policy change. It is a reminder of and commitment to principles of fairness and the rule of law.

Second, the policy addresses situations in which Department attorneys in different components and offices may be seeking to resolve a corporate case based on the same misconduct.

The new policy directs Department components to coordinate with one another, and achieve an overall equitable result. The coordination may include crediting and apportionment of financial penalties, fines, and forfeitures, and other means of avoiding disproportionate punishment.

Third, the policy encourages Department attorneys, when possible, to coordinate with other federal, state, local, and foreign enforcement authorities seeking to resolve a case with a company for the same misconduct.

Finally, the new policy sets forth some factors that Department attorneys may evaluate in determining whether multiple penalties serve the interests of justice in a particular case.

Sometimes, penalties that may appear duplicative really are essential to achieve justice and protect the public. In those cases, we will not hesitate to pursue complete remedies, and to assist our law enforcement partners in doing the same.

Factors identified in the policy that may guide this determination include the egregiousness of the wrongdoing; statutory mandates regarding penalties; the risk of delay in finalizing a resolution; and the adequacy and timeliness of a company’s disclosures and cooperation with the Department.

Cooperating with a different agency or a foreign government is not a substitute for cooperating with the Department of Justice. And we will not look kindly on companies that come to the Department of Justice only after making inadequate disclosures to secure lenient penalties with other agencies or foreign governments. In those instances, the Department will act without hesitation to fully vindicate the interests of the United States.

The Department’s ability to coordinate outcomes in joint and parallel proceedings is also constrained by more practical concerns.  The timing of other agency actions, limits on information sharing across borders, and diplomatic relations between countries are some of the challenges we confront that do not always lend themselves to easy solutions.

The idea of coordination is not new. The Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and many of our U.S. Attorney’s Offices routinely coordinate with the SEC, CFTC, Federal Reserve, and other financial regulators, as well as a wide variety of foreign partners. The FCPA Unit announced its first coordinated resolution with the country of Singapore this past December.

The Antitrust Division has cooperated with 21 international agencies through 58 different merger investigations during the past four years.

Here is a link to the policy on Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties.

As the Deputy Attorney General stated, coordination is not new.  The Antitrust Division routinely coordinates with other federal and state agencies on most investigations.  And some coordination always occurs on international investigations.  In the recent financial crimes investigations such as Libor and FOREX the amount of coordination was extensive among federal agencies such as the Antitrust Division, Criminal Division, FBI, SEC, CFTC, state AG office, as well as with many foreign jurisdictions.  It is rumored that meetings were held in the Great Hall at the Department of Justice since no conference room could hold the throngs of participating enforcers.

Coordination by the Antitrust Division with enforcers from other federal, state and international enforcers is not new, but there is a continual debate about whether such coordination prevents “piling on.”  Of course, what a defense attorney may call piling on, the prosecutors may deem to be a hard but fair hit.  There is no referee or instant replay.  The question of piling on or double counting is a subject of continuing debate in antitrust circles.  It’s a tough question as foreign jurisdictions are injured by international cartels and they have stakeholders that want a significant penalty.  Sorting out proportional penalties among sovereign nations is a particularly tough ongoing challenge. This new policy document is not going to end that debate but a written policy document (while creating no new rights) could enhance defendants’ power of persuasion with the Department of Justice if they have some credible numbers to back up a “piling on” argument.

Thanks for reading.

PS.  Several publications have reported that Richard Powers will become the next Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division.  The Antitrust Division has made no announcement yet.  One of the many qualifications Mr. Powers will bring to the position, if he is named as the Criminal Deputy, is his experience in multi-agency, international prosecutions. He worked on both Libor and Forex while a member of the Antitrust Division’s New York Field Office.

CCC’s: Farewell Remarks by John Pecman, Commissioner of Competition (Canada)

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Yesterday John Pecman gave his last public talk as Commissioner of Competition for the Canadian Competition Bureau.  The remarks were made at the Canadian Bar Association’s Spring Conference in Toronto.  Mr. Pecman became acting Commissioner in 2012 and was subsequently named Commissioner.  In his final remarks (here), Mr. Pecman discussed the four goals he had as Commissioner and the successes the agency achieved in realizing those goals:

“Looking at this job, I saw four must-do things to make the transition work:

  • Adopt a shared compliance approach;
  • Increase our guidance;
  • Enhance our domestic and international partnerships; and
  • Restructure the organization through an internal realignment.”

As always, Mr. Pecman was candid in describing areas where improvement was needed.  For example:

“Simply put, the Bureau’s current cartel model is inefficient.

It ties up Bureau resources and leads to poor outcomes. It needs to be examined and repaired, in keeping with the approach adopted by a number of our international counterparts, like the ACCC, who have employed “dual track” approaches to proceeding against hard-core cartels.”

Lastly, I was happy to see that Mr. Pecman and I share a strong support of “whistleblower” programs to prevent, destabilize and prosecute cartels.  Mr. Pecman stated:

Finally, I firmly support establishing a stand-alone “whistleblower” program, similar to the model employed by the Ontario Securities Commission and some of our international counterparts, which would provide financial rewards to whistleblowers who provide information and meet certain eligibility requirements. This would be an extremely effective enforcement tool for addressing the most egregious and most challenging anti-competitive behaviour to detect.

The full text of Mr. Pecman’s remarks is here.

I have written numerous posts on Cartel Capers in support of whistleblower legislation (here) (here).  They are summarized in an article I coauthored with a former Antitrust Division colleague, Kimberly Justice.  The article, “It’s a Crime There Isn’t A Criminal Antitrust Whistleblower Statute” can be found here.

Thanks for reading.  And many thanks to John Pecman for his long service on behalf of consumers and competition law enforcement.  Congratulations John on your successful stewardship!

CCC’s: European Commission Sets EU-wide Whistleblower Protection Rules

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The European Union just announced proposed rules designed to guarantee protection to whistleblowers who report infringements of EU law.  The proposal requires approval from EU countries and the European Parliament before it can become law. Currently only 10 EU countries offer full protection to whistleblowers.

From the EU Press Release

Brussels, 23 April 2018

Recent scandals such as Dieselgate, Luxleaks, the Panama Papers or the ongoing Cambridge Analytica revelations show that whistleblowers can play an important role in uncovering unlawful activities that damage the public interest and the welfare of our citizens and society.

Today’s proposal will guarantee a high level of protection for whistleblowers who report breaches of EU law by setting new, EU-wide standards. The new law will establish safe channels for reporting both within an organisation and to public authorities. It will also protect whistleblowers against dismissal, demotion and other forms of retaliation and require national authorities to inform citizens and provide training for public authorities on how to deal with whistleblowers.

First Vice-President Frans Timmermans said: “Many recent scandals may never have come to light if insiders hadn’t had the courage to speak out. But those who did took enormous risks. So, if we better protect whistleblowers, we can better detect and prevent harm to the public interest such as fraud, corruption, corporate tax avoidance or damage to people’s health and the environment. There should be no punishment for doing the right thing. In addition, today’s proposals also protect those who act as sources for investigative journalists, helping to ensure that freedom of expression and freedom of the media are defended in Europe.”

Věra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality added: “The new whistleblowers’ protection rules will be a game changer. In the globalised world where the temptation to maximise profit sometimes at the expense of the law is real we need to support people who are ready to take the risk to uncover serious violations of EU law. We owe it to the honest people of Europe.

The European Commission also issued a press release on Whistleblower Protection: Frequently Asked Questions

My former Antitrust Division colleague, Kimberly Justice and I have been advocating strongly for a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute; one that would not only give retaliation protection to whistleblowers but would provide a financial incentive for information that leads to exposure and prosecution of a cartel.  See It’s a Crime There Isn’t an Criminal Antitrust Whistleblower Statute.

One objection I’ve heard to a criminal antitrust whistleblower statute is that a whistleblower statute would undermine the Corporate Leniency program.  I think the truth would be quite the opposite.  Once a whistleblower helps initiate a cartel investigation, the race would be on to be the first company to qualify for leniency.  Also, the fact that a whistleblower could come forward may also increase Type A Corporate Leniency—leniency for a company that self-reports before there is even an investigation. And, in the ideal world (except for those of us who make a living from cartel investigations), the threat of a whistleblower would prevent a cartel from forming in the first place.  This notion was expressed in a Reuters article about the proposed EU legislation (here):

The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) said increasing whistleblower protection will help businesses.

“Companies have to see speak-up as something that would help them manage risks and avoid more serious issues such as violation of law, inappropriate conduct, crime or any type of harms,” ACCA head of corporate governance Jo Iwasaki said.

Thanks for reading.  Bob Connolly

CCC’s: It’s A Crime There Isn’t a Criminal Antitrust Whistleblower Statute

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Kimberly Justice and I are continuing to write about what we believe is a very important issue in cartel fighting–the passing of criminal antitrust whistleblower legislation.  Below are the opening paragraphs of our latest article on the subject.  The full article, kindly posted by Wolters Kluwer in their Antitrust Law Daily, can be found here.

“The SEC’s wildly successful whistleblower program has returned hundreds of millions of dollars to investors as a result of actionable whistleblower information over the past six years.  The IRS paid one whistleblower more than $100 million for information that helped the government uncover a massive tax evasion scheme and led to a $780 million settlement.  The CFTC predicts that the results of its whistleblower program this year will be “huge.”  The Antitrust Division has paid $0 to whistleblowers and received $0 from cartels exposed by whistleblowers.  Or, as Charlie Brown would say, the Antitrust Division “got a rock.”

There is no cartel whistleblower program and this should change now.  Price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies are felonies costing American consumers millions of dollars in the form of artificially high prices.  These fraudulent schemes are particularly suited to exposure by whistleblowers because senior corporate executives frequently use lower level employees (and potential whistleblowers) to carry out the illegal scheme.  The time is right for serious antitrust whistleblower legislation.”

 

Full article here

Thanks for reading.  If you have any reaction/comment you’d like to share please use the comment section or through LinkedIn (here).

Japanese Fiber Manufacturer to Pay $66 Million for Alleged False Claims Related to Defective Bullet Proof Vests

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Thursday, March 15, 2018

Toyobo Co. Ltd. of Japan and its American subsidiary, Toyobo U.S.A. Inc., f/k/a Toyobo America Inc. (collectively, Toyobo), have agreed to pay $66 million to resolve claims under the False Claims Act that they sold defective Zylon fiber used in bullet proof vests that the United States purchased for federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies, the Justice Department announced today.

The settlement resolves allegations that between at least 2001 and 2005, Toyobo, the sole manufacturer of Zylon fiber, knew that Zylon degraded quickly in normal heat and humidity, and that this degradation rendered bullet proof vests containing Zylon unfit for use.  The United States further alleged that Toyobo nonetheless actively marketed Zylon fiber for bullet proof vests, published misleading degradation data that understated the degradation problem, and when Second Chance Body Armor recalled some of its Zylon-containing vests in late 2003, started a public relations campaign designed to influence other body armor manufacturers to keep selling Zylon-containing vests.  According to the United States, Toyobo’s actions delayed by several years the government’s efforts to determine the true extent of Zylon degradation.  Finally, in August 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) completed a study of Zylon-containing vests and found that more than 50 percent of used vests could not stop bullets that they had been certified to stop.  Thereafter, the NIJ decertified all Zylon-containing vests.

“Bulletproof vests are sometimes what stands between a police officer and death,” said Attorney General Jeff Sessions.  “Selling material for these vests that one knows to be defective is dishonest, and risks the lives of the men and women who serve to protect us. The Department of Justice is committed to the protection of our law enforcement officers, and today’s resolution sends another clear message that we will not tolerate those who put our first responders in harm’s way.”

“This settlement sends a strong message to suppliers of products to the federal government that they must be truthful in their claims, particularly with regard to health and safety,” said Carol Fortine Ochoa, Inspector General of the General Services Administration.

This settlement is part of a larger investigation undertaken by the Civil Division of the body armor industry’s use of Zylon in body armor.  The Civil Division previously recovered more than $66 million from 16 entities involved in the manufacture, distribution or sale of Zylon vests, including body armor manufacturers, weavers, international trading companies, and five individuals.  The settlement announced today brings the Division’s overall recoveries to over $132 million.  The United States still has lawsuits pending against Richard Davis, the former chief executive of Second Chance, and Honeywell International Inc.

The settlement announced today resolves allegations filed in two lawsuits, one brought by the United States and the other filed by Aaron Westrick, Ph.D., a law enforcement officer formerly employed by Second Chance who is now a Criminal Justice professor at Lake Superior University.  Dr. Westrick’s lawsuit was filed under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private individuals to sue on behalf of the government for false claims and to share in any recovery.  The Act also allows the government to intervene and take over the action, as it did in 2005 in Dr. Westrick’s case.  Dr. Westrick will receive $5,775,000.

This case was handled by the Justice Department’s Civil Division, along with the General Services Administration, Office of the Inspector General; the Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service; the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command; the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General for Tax Administration; the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; the Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General; and the Defense Contracting Audit Agency.

The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only; there has been no determination of liability.  The lawsuits resolved by the settlement are captioned United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, et al., No. 04-0280 (PLF) (D.D.C.) and United States v. Toyobo Co. Ltd., et al., No. 07-1144 (PLF) (D.D.C.).

 

Beam Bros. Trucking Inc. and Its Principals Agree to Settle Civil False Claims Act Allegations

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Monday, March 12, 2018

Beam Bros. Trucking Inc. (BBT), and its principals Gerald Beam and Garland Beam, have agreed to pay $1,025,000 to resolve allegations under the False Claims Act that BBT overcharged the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) on contracts to transport mail.  BBT is a trucking company located in Mt. Crawford, Virginia.

“The Department of Justice takes seriously its role in protecting the federal procurement process from false claims,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A. Readler of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “This settlement demonstrates that we will hold accountable federal contractors engaging in fraud, and will ensure that federal funds are protected from overcharges and abuse.”

“We are gratified to have contributed to this investigation and applaud the exceptional work by the investigative team for both protecting the contracting process and overall program costs,” said Special Agent in Charge Scott Pierce of the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General.  “Along with our law enforcement partners, the USPS OIG will continue to aggressively investigate those who engage in activities designed to defraud the Postal Service.”

“Contractors working for the federal government are held to the same high ethical standards as full-time employees,” U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey Craig Carpenito said. “This settlement will return more than $1 million to the USPS.”

USPS contracts with trucking companies, including BBT, to transport mail throughout the United States.  On some contracts, USPS had provided trucking contractors with credit cards, known as Voyager Cards, to pay for fuel.  This settlement resolves allegations that BBT misused Voyager Cards to purchase fuel on contracts that did not allow for their use, resulting in inflated charges in violation of the False Claims Act.

The settlement resolves allegations made in lawsuit filed under the whistleblower provision of the False Claims Act by Bobby Blizzard, a former BBT employee.  The False Claims Act permits private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and obtain a portion of the government’s recovery.  Mr. Blizzard’s share of the recovery has yet to be determined.

The settlement was the result of a coordinated effort between the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, and the USPS, Office of the Inspector General.

The lawsuit, which was filed in the District of New Jersey, is captioned United States ex rel. Doe v. Beam Bros. Trucking, Inc., Civil Action No. 10-657 (D.N.J.).  The claims resolved by this settlement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

Pennsylvania Hospital and Cardiology Group Agree to Pay $20.75 Million to Settle Allegations of Kickbacks and Improper Financial Relationships

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Wednesday, March 7, 2018

UPMC Hamot (Hamot), a hospital based in Erie, Pennsylvania – and now affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) – and Medicor Associates Inc. (Medicor), a regional physician cardiology practice, have agreed to pay the government $20,750,000 to settle a False Claims Act lawsuit alleging that they knowingly submitted claims to the Medicare and Medicaid programs that violated the Anti‑Kickback Statute and the Physician Self‑Referral Law, the Justice Department announced today.  Hamot became affiliated with UPMC after the conduct resolved by the settlement occurred.

The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce referrals of items or services covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other federally funded programs.  The Physician Self-Referral Law, commonly known as the Stark Law, prohibits a hospital from billing Medicare for certain services referred by physicians with whom the hospital has an improper compensation arrangement.  Both the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law are intended to ensure that a physician’s medical judgment is not compromised by improper financial incentives and is instead based on the best interests of the patient.

The settlement resolves allegations brought in a whistleblower action filed under the False Claims Act alleging that, from 1999 to 2010, Hamot paid Medicor up to $2 million per year under twelve physician and administrative services arrangements which were created to secure Medicor patient referrals.  Hamot allegedly had no legitimate need for the services contracted for, and in some instances the services either were duplicative or were not performed.

“Financial arrangements that improperly compensate physicians for referrals encourage physicians to make decisions based on financial gain rather than patient needs,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A. Readler, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “The Department of Justice is committed to preventing illegal financial relationships that undermine the integrity of our public health programs.”

The lawsuit was filed by Dr. Tullio Emanuele, who worked for Medicor from 2001 to 2005, under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act.  The Act permits private parties to sue on behalf of the government when they believe that defendants submitted false claims for government funds and to share in any recovery.  The Act also allows the government to take over the case or, as in this case, the whistleblower to pursue it.  In a March 15, 2017 ruling, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that two of Hamot’s arrangements with Medicor violated the Stark Law.  The case was set for trial when the United States helped to facilitate the settlement.  Dr. Emanuele will receive $6,017,500.

“Federal law prohibits physicians from entering into financial relationships that may affect their medical judgment and drive up health care costs,” said U.S. Attorney Scott W. Brady.  “Today’s settlement demonstrates our commitment to ensuring that health care decisions are made based exclusively on the needs of the patient, rather than the financial interests of health care providers.”

This matter was handled on behalf of the government by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Justice Department’s Civil Division, and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General.

The case is captioned United States ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Associates, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 10-cv-00245-JFC (W.D. Pa.).  The False Claims Act claims resolved by this settlement are allegations only and there has been no determination of liability.

United States Files False Claims Act Complaint Against Compounding Pharmacy, Private Equity Firm, and Two Pharmacy Executives Alleging Payment of Kickbacks

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Friday, February 23, 2018

The United States has filed a complaint in intervention against Diabetic Care Rx LLC d/b/a Patient Care America (PCA), a compounding pharmacy located in Pompano Beach, Florida, alleging that the pharmacy paid illegal kickbacks to induce prescriptions for compounded drugs reimbursed by TRICARE, the Department of Justice announced today.  The government has also brought claims against Patrick Smith and Matthew Smith, two pharmacy executives, and Riordan, Lewis & Haden Inc. (RLH), a private equity firm based in Los Angeles, California, which manages both the pharmacy and the private equity fund that owns the pharmacy, for their involvement in the alleged kickback scheme.

TRICARE is a federally-funded health care program for military personnel and their families.  The government alleges that the Defendants paid kickbacks to marketing companies to target TRICARE beneficiaries for prescriptions for compounded pain creams, scar creams, and vitamins, without regard to the patients’ medical needs.  According to the complaint, the compound formulas were manipulated by the Defendants and the marketers to ensure the highest possible reimbursement from TRICARE.  The Defendants and marketers allegedly paid telemedicine doctors to prescribe the creams and vitamins without seeing the patients, and sometimes paid the patients themselves to accept the prescriptions.  The scheme generated tens of millions of dollars in reimbursements from TRICARE in a matter of months, according to the complaint, which alleges that the Defendants and marketers split the profits from the scheme.

“The Department of Justice is determined to hold accountable health care providers that improperly use taxpayer funded health care programs to enrich themselves,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Division Chad A. Readler.  “Kickback schemes corrupt the health care system and damage the public trust.”

“Providers and marketers that engage in kickback schemes drive up the cost of health care because they focus on their own bottom line instead of what is in the best interest of patients,” said Executive Assistant Randy Hummel of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.  “We will hold pharmacies, and those companies that manage them, responsible for using kickbacks to line their pockets at the expense of taxpayers and federal health care beneficiaries.”

“The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) is committed to protecting the integrity of TRICARE, the military health care program that provides critical medical care and services to Department of Defense beneficiaries,” said Special Agent in Charge John F. Khin, of the Southeast Field Office.  “In partnership with DOJ and other law enforcement agencies, DCIS continues to aggressively investigate fraud and corruption to preserve and recover precious taxpayer dollars to best serve the needs of our warfighters, their family members, and military retirees.”

The lawsuit, United States ex rel. Medrano and Lopez v. Diabetic Care Rx, LLC dba Patient Care America, et al., No. 15-CV-62617 (S.D. Fla.), was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida by Marisela Medrano and Ada Lopez, two former employees of PCA.  The lawsuit was filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit private parties to sue for false claims against of the United States and to receive a share of any recovery.  The Act permits the United States to intervene in such lawsuits, as the United States has done in this case.

This matter was investigated by the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Criminal Investigations, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s Major Procurement Fraud Unit.

The claims asserted against the defendants are allegations only; there has been no determination of liability.