Former Owner of Medical Equipment Supply Company Sentenced for $3.5 Million Medicare and Medi-Cal Fraud Scheme

The former owner of Ezcor Medical Supply was sentenced today to serve 97 months in prison for her role in a fraud scheme that resulted in $3.5 million in fraudulent claims to Medicare and Medi-Cal.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Eileen M. Deckerof the Central District of California, Special Agent in Charge Glenn R. Ferry of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General’s (HHS-OIG) Los Angeles Region, Assistant Director in Charge David Bowdich of the FBI’s Los Angeles Division and Special Agent in Charge Joseph Fendrick of the California Department of Justice’s Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud and Elder Abuse made the announcement.

Sylvia Walter-Eze, 48, of Stevenson Ranch, California, was found guilty by a federal jury on March 20, 2015, of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, four counts of health care fraud, and one count of conspiracy to pay illegal health care kickbacks.  In addition to imposing the term of imprisonment, U.S District Judge R. Gary Klausner ordered Walter-Eze to pay restitution in the amounts of $1,866,260 to Medicare and $73,268 to Medi-Cal.

The evidence presented at trial showed that Walter-Eze, the former owner of Ezcor, a durable medical equipment (DME) supply company located in Valencia, California, fraudulently billed more than $3.5 million to Medicare and Medi-Cal for DME that was not medically necessary.  The trial evidence also demonstrated that Walter-Eze paid illegal kickbacks to patient recruiters in exchange for patient referrals.  The evidence further showed that Walter-Eze paid kickbacks to physicians for fraudulent prescriptions for medically unnecessary, and expensive, power wheelchairs, which prescriptions Walter-Eze then used to support her fraudulent claims to Medicare and Medi-Cal.  The evidence showed that, between 2007 and 2012, Walter-Eze submitted $3,521,786 in fraudulent claims to Medicare and Medi-Cal, and that she received $1,939,529 in reimbursement for those claims.

The case was investigated by the FBI, HHS-OIG’s Los Angeles Regional Office and the California Department of Justice, and was brought as part of the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, supervised by the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Central District of California.  The case was prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Blanca Quintero and Alexander F. Porter of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.

Since its inception in March 2007, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, now operating in nine cities across the country, has charged over 2,300 defendants who collectively have billed the Medicare program for over $7 billion.  In addition, the HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the HHS-OIG, are taking steps to increase accountability and decrease the presence of fraudulent providers.

To learn more about the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Team, go to: www.stopmedicarefraud.gov.

Current and Former Executives of an Automotive Parts Manufacturer Indicted for Roles in Conspiracy to Fix Prices – Investigation Has Resulted in Charges Against 90 Individuals and Corporations

A Detroit federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against two executives of a Japanese automotive parts manufacturer for their participation in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids of automotive parts, the Department of Justice announced today.

The indictment, filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, charges Norio Teranishi, formerly of NGK Spark Plug Co. Ltd., and Hisashi Nakanishi of NGK Spark Plug, with conspiring to fix the prices of spark plugs, standard oxygen sensors, and air fuel ratio sensors, sold to DaimlerChrysler AG, Ford Motor Company, Fuji Heavy Industries (Subaru), General Motors Company, Honda Motor Company Ltd., Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., Toyota Motor Corporation, and certain of their U.S. subsidiaries.

Teranishi is the former General Manager of Sales and Vice-Head of the Automotive Component Group at NGK Spark Plug.  During the alleged conspiracy, Nakanishi served as the Managing Director of NGK Spark Plug Europe.

The indictment alleges, among other things, that beginning at least as early as January 2000 and continuing until at least July 2011, Teranishi and Nakanishi, and their co-conspirators participated in, and directed, authorized or consented to the participation of subordinate employees in, meetings with co-conspirators and reached collusive agreements to rig bids, allocate the supply, and fix the price of spark plugs, standard oxygen sensors, and air fuel ratio sensors sold to certain automobile manufacturers, in the United States and elsewhere.

“As a result of Antitrust Division’s automotive parts investigation, more than 50 individuals have been held accountable for corrupting the competitive process in this important global market,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program.  “The Antitrust Division will continue to vigorously prosecute those individuals who engaged in criminal antitrust violations in this vital market.”

“The criminal manipulation of the global automotive parts market through price fixing and bid rigging is a serious offense,” stated Special Agent in Charge Paul M. Abbate of the FBI’s Detroit Field Office.  “The FBI, together with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, will continue to aggressively pursue those who seek to commit criminal antitrust violations in order to gain a competitive advantage through corruption of the global marketplace.”

NGK Spark Plug is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan with its principal place of business in Nagoya, Japan.  On Oct. 8, 2014, NGK Spark Plug pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a $52.1 million criminal fine for its role in the conspiracy.

Including Teranishi and Nakanishi, 55 individuals have been charged in the government’s ongoing investigation into market allocation, price fixing and bid rigging in the automotive parts industry.  Additionally, 35 companies have pleaded guilty or agreed to plead guilty and have agreed to pay a total of more than $2.5 billion in criminal fines.

Teranishi and Nakanishi are charged with price fixing and bid rigging in violation of the Sherman Act, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million criminal fine for individuals.  The maximum fine for an individual may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.

Today’s indictment is the result of an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into price fixing, bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the automotive parts industry, which is being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement sections and the FBI.  Today’s charge was brought by the Antitrust Division’s Washington Criminal I Section and the FBI’s Detroit Field Office, with the assistance of the FBI headquarters’ International Corruption Unit.  Anyone with information on price fixing, bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct related to other products in the automotive parts industry should contact the Antitrust Division’s Citizen Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, visitwww.justice.gov/atr/contact/newcase.html or call the FBI’s Detroit Field Office at 313-965-2323.

3C’s: Thomas Farmer Acquitted in Puerto Rico Shipping Price Fixing Trial

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After a three-week trial, Thomas Farmer, a former Crowley Liner Services Vice-President was acquitted of price-fixing and bid rigging charges by a jury in Puerto Rico. The trial was before Federal District Court Judge Daniel Dominguez. The jury was composed of six men and six women. They deliberated for three hours before returning their verdict. Framer had been indicted on March 21, 2013 on a charge of conspiracy to fix and rig Puerto Rico freight surcharges with counterparts from Horizon Lines and Sea Star Line in the U.S. mainland-Puerto Rico trade.

The acquittal marks the end of the Antitrust Division’s otherwise successful investigation into price-fixing on ocean shipping route between Puerto Rico and the United States. Farmer was the second executive to go to trial. Frank Peake, the former President of Sea Star, was convicted in 2013 on a similar charge (here). Peake’s case was noteworthy in that he was sentenced to five years in prison, a record sentence for a Sherman Act conviction (here). The Peake trial came after subordinates of his and co-conspirators from other companies had pled guilty and cooperated with the government. Peak’s direct subordinate at Sea Star, Peter Baci, was sentenced to 48 months in prison and fined $20,000. Peake’s counterpart at Horizon, Gabriel Serra, was sentenced to 34 months in prison. Other executives at Sea Star and Horizon had pled guilty, and received prison terms ranging from seven months to 29 months. Three companies have paid more than $46 million in fines for their involvement in a conspiracy that included setting rates, bid rigging and other practices.

Farmer faced a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Farmer was represented by Joseph C. Laws, Melanie Matos Gilroy Cardona and Terrance Reed.  Farmer was facing a maximum of ten years in prison if convicted and his legal team deserves great credit for the best outcome Farmer could have hoped for.  But, there are great difficulties that the Antitrust Division faces in a “last man standing trial.”  I am not familiar with the specifics of the Farmer trial but some of these inherent difficulties are:

  • Staleness:  Farmer was indicted in March 2013.  The indictment charged a conspiracy: “From at least as early as mid-2005, to in or about April 2008.”  So, Farmer was indicted just before the five-year statute of limitations expired.  His trial did not begin until more than two years after indictment.  Farmer was tried in 2015 for conduct that ended in early 2008.  Antitrust violations do not “shock the conscience” the way a crime of violence might, and the long delay between conduct and trial can diminish whatever “jury appeal” a price-fixing case might have had.
  • Witness Fatigue:  When a witness signs a cooperation agreement with the Antitrust Division, he usually doesn’t realize that his cooperation may last longer than many marriages.  It can be difficult to work with a witness who has long since (hoped) he had put this chapter of his life behind him.  Witness prep so many years after the alleged conduct occured can involve an increasing frequency of “I’m not sure.  That was a really long time ago.”  And, in this case it was.
  • Prior Statements:  As I said, I have not read the record in the Farmer case so I do not know who the witnesses were.  But, there is a good chance some of the witnesses previously testified in the Peake trial.  So besides witness fatigue and faded recollections, defense attorneys have prior statements to work with on cross-examination.
  • The Weak Cases Are The Ones That Go To Trial:  It used to be fair to say that the Antitrust Division got plea agreements from those who they had the strongest cases against, but often found itself trying weaker cases, sometimes against senior managers that had insulated themselves from most of the illegal conduct.  But, my opinion is that today cases go to trial because the sentencing guidelines are so severe (based on volume of commerce) that the “last man standing,” who can’t get a 5K cooperation agreement/downward departure, has little to lose by going to trial.  Mr. Farmer went to trial because he declared he was innocent and a jury did in fact acquit him.  But, even a guilty party might go to trial because: (a) he has at least a chance at acquittal; (b) even if convicted at trial, he will likely be sentenced to less time than he could have negotiated with the Antitrust Division pursuant to a recommended guidelines plea agreement; and (c) in any event he can appeal and hope to get a conviction reversed on appeal.  In essence, the trial is an extended sentencing hearing, with a chance of acquittal, and even if convicted, a hope the conviction can be overturned.  I co-authored an article “A Peek Behind the Record Peake Sentence” (here) that explored some of these ideas.

Congratulations to Farmer’s defense team and also to the Antitrust Division for an otherwise very successful investigation.

Thanks for reading.

Thomas Farmer Acquitted Puerto Rico Shipping Price Fixing Trial

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After a three-week trial, Thomas Farmer, a former Crowley Liner Services Vice-President was acquitted of price-fixing and bid rigging charges by a jury in Puerto Rico. The trial was before Federal District Court Judge Daniel Dominguez. The jury was composed of six men and six women. They deliberated for three hours before returning their verdict. Framer had been indicted on March 21, 2013 on a charge of conspiracy to fix and rig Puerto Rico freight surcharges with counterparts from Horizon Lines and Sea Star Line in the U.S. mainland-Puerto Rico trade.

The acquittal marks the end of the Antitrust Division’s otherwise successful investigation into price-fixing on ocean shipping route between Puerto Rico and the United States. Farmer was the second executive to go to trial. Frank Peake, the former President of Sea Star, was convicted in 2013 on a similar charge (here). Peake’s case was noteworthy in that he was sentenced to five years in prison, a record sentence for a Sherman Act conviction (here). The Peake trial came after subordinates of his and co-conspirators from other companies had pled guilty and cooperated with the government. Peak’s direct subordinate at Sea Star, Peter Baci, was sentenced to 48 months in prison and fined $20,000. Peake’s counterpart at Horizon, Gabriel Serra, was sentenced to 34 months in prison. Other executives at Sea Star and Horizon had pled guilty, and received prison terms ranging from seven months to 29 months. Three companies have paid more than $46 million in fines for their involvement in a conspiracy that included setting rates, bid rigging and other practices.

Farmer faced a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Farmer was represented by Joseph C. Laws, Melanie Matos Gilroy Cardona and Terrance Reed.  Farmer was facing a maximum of ten years in prison if convicted and his legal team deserves great credit for the best outcome Farmer could have hoped for.  But, there are great difficulties that the Antitrust Division faces in a “last man standing trial.”  I am not familiar with the specifics of the Farmer trial but some of these inherent difficulties are:

  • Staleness:  Farmer was indicted in March 2013.  The indictment charged a conspiracy: “From at least as early as mid-2005, to in or about April 2008.”  So, Farmer was indicted just before the five-year statute of limitations expired.  His trial did not begin until more than two years after indictment.  Farmer was tried in 2015 for conduct that ended in early 2008.  Antitrust violations do not “shock the conscience” the way a crime of violence might, and the long delay between conduct and trial can diminish whatever “jury appeal” a price-fixing case might have had.
  • Witness Fatigue:  When a witness signs a cooperation agreement with the Antitrust Division, he usually doesn’t realize that his cooperation may last longer than many marriages.  It can be difficult to work with a witness who has long since (hoped) he had put this chapter of his life behind him.  Witness prep so many years after the alleged conduct occured can involve an increasing frequency of “I’m not sure.  That was a really long time ago.”  And, in this case it was.
  • Prior Statements:  As I said, I have not read the record in the Farmer case so I do not know who the witnesses were.  But, there is a good chance some of the witnesses previously testified in the Peake trial.  So besides witness fatigue and faded recollections, defense attorneys have prior statements to work with on cross-examination.
  • The Weak Cases Are The Ones That Go To Trial:  It used to be fair to say that the Antitrust Division got plea agreements from those who they had the strongest cases against, but often found itself trying weaker cases, sometimes against senior managers that had insulated themselves from most of the illegal conduct.  But, my opinion is that today cases go to trial because the sentencing guidelines are so severe (based on volume of commerce) that the “last man standing,” who can’t get a 5K cooperation agreement/downward departure, has little to lose by going to trial.  Mr. Farmer went to trial because he declared he was innocent and a jury did in fact acquit him.  But, even a guilty party might go to trial because: (a) he has at least a chance at acquittal; (b) even if convicted at trial, he will likely be sentenced to less time than he could have negotiated with the Antitrust Division pursuant to a recommended guidelines plea agreement; and (c) in any event he can appeal and hope to get a conviction reversed on appeal.  In essence, the trial is an extended sentencing hearing, with a chance of acquittal, and even if convicted, a hope the conviction can be overturned.  I co-authored an article “A Peek Behind the Record Peake Sentence” (here) that explored some of these ideas.

Congratulations to Farmer’s defense team and also to the Antitrust Division for an otherwise very successful investigation.

Thanks for reading.

ANTITRUST GUIDANCE IN BRAZIL

ANTITRUST GUIDANCE IN BRAZIL

Today we have an update from Brazil by Mauro Grinberg, a former Commissioner of CADE, a former Attorney of the National Treasury and senior partner of Grinberg Cordovil.

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A Resolution issued by Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), dated March 11, 2015, made a comeback of the procedure for antitrust guidance to be requested to CADE. This request for guidance can be used in all competition cases, including cartels.

The first article of such Resolution says that any interested party can forward a request for guidance to CADE, related to specific situations, which may be real or potential. Interested parties can also be trade associations which have, as their goals, representation of the involved sector and can demonstrate that at least one of the represented companies is legitimately interested in such guidance.

There are some requirements for such request for guidance and, although it is pointless, for the purpose of this note, to go through all of them, it is interesting to mention that the party must declare all CADE´s precedents related to the object. So, no request for guidance can be asked before a thorough research through CADE´s jurisprudence. However, any research may have its problems and it is not clear what will happen if a certain research does not present a decision that CADE may understand as fundamental.

Another point that must be reported says that the request for guidance cannot refer to a purely hypothetical issue. This may be a somewhat tricky question because CADE may understand that a question that is not under practice is hypothetical (which, in a way, it may be). It is not clear what can happen if, e.g., a party asks whether it is legitimate to have certain contacts with competitors and, if the conduct is approved by CADE and the party does not perform it due to a further strategic and/or commercial decision, could the party can be punished for having submitted a request for guidance that CADE may consider hypothetical?.

The answer to the request for guidance is binding for CADE and the parties for five years, although the Resolution states that CADE can reconsider its decision, if based on new facts. So, in practice, the Resolution is really binding only for the parties submitting the request for guidance.

A last problematic article states that, if CADE understands that an already existing conduct, which is the object of the request for guidance, has the possibility of being illegal, an administrative file will be opened in order to prosecute the interested party. If the conduct is a possible cartel, a criminal file may also be opened. So, it is fundamental that, in case a party wants to make such request related to a conduct that is under way, it is advisable to stop such conduct before requesting the guidance.

Consequently, a request for guidance, in order to be in the safe side, must be related to conducts that are not being performed but are to be performed and depend on the guidance, with the additional task of demonstrating to the authorities that the request for guidance is not hypothetical.

Mauro Grinberg is a former Commissioner of CADE, a former Attorney of the National Treasury and senior partner of Grinberg Cordovil.

3C’s: Global Glimpses of Cartel Capers

Global Glimpses of Cartel Capers

There have been a number of developments around the globe relating to cartel enforcement that I think might be of interest:

Australia

I wrote about this in an earlier post, but a billionaire businessman in Australia invited an investigation, which has now been dropped, with his comments at a business dinner griping about low prices in the market.  He got himself in hot water, which never reached a boiling point, by stating he was ready to reduce output of iron ore if his competitors would do likewise. (here)

Cambodia

People are people and as Adam Smith noted, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”

In Cambodia, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry said that they were investigating a possible secret agreement between middlemen or traders in the supply chain to manipulate the price of agriculture commodities, leaving farmers with no option but to sell their products at a lower price. A spokesperson at the Ministry said traders had divided regions into zones, giving farmers no choice but to sell to that trader and at the trader’s asking price. In this case, if true, the conspiracy was to reduce the prices paid to farmers.  (full story here)

Canada

On April 27th, after a seven-month trial and six days of deliberation, a jury in Ottawa found nine defendants not guilty on all 60 charges of bid rigging and conspiracy to rig bids. “Six years earlier federal prosecutors had charged 14 individuals and seven computer services firms with rigging bids in connection with more than $60 million worth of contracts at three federal departments. Now in the courtroom were six individuals and three of their firms — they had elected to be tried by a jury, the first time anyone had done so in the 39-year history of the Competition Act.” (full story here)

Also in Canada here is a helpful article on the shift in on corporate criminal liability. Corporate criminal liability can now be based on the conduct not only of senior corporate officers such as board members, but also middle managers in some circumstances.

EU Grapples with Extraterritoriality of Competition Law

Like the United States, the EU is working to define the scope of the extraterritorial application if its competition laws. The Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, Melchior Wathelet, urged the court to rescind the Court’s decision that based part of a fine against Innolux based on LCD panels sold by the manufacturers to other companies and eventually shipped to the EU as components in other devices. Wathelet wrote in an opinion that: “It seems to me that, unless further evidence can be furnished that the cartel creates qualified effects in the [European Economic Area], the commission goes too far if it fines cartels relating to products manufactured and sold outside the EEA for the sole reason that those products are subsequently ‘transformed’ or incorporated into other products which (either wholly or in part) arrive in the EEA.”  The opinion agreed that EU law could be applied extraterritorially to component price-fixing if the Commission had met a “qualified effects” test. Innolux’s fine stand to be cut almost in half if the Court reduces its fine in accord with the Advocate General’s opinion.

United States

  • Civil Settlement News

Civil settlements have now exceeded $270 million in federal litigation stemming from the ongoing U.S. criminal antitrust investigation into automotive supplier price-fixing (here). These settlements, however pale in comparison to the civil settlements reached in the follow-on civil suits to the air cargo price-fixing cartel. These settlements now top $1 billion (here).  In fairness, the auto parts civil litigation is far from over.  These figures relate only to civil settlements in the U.S.  Civil damage actions, including class action suits (collective redress), are quickly spreading thoughout the globe.

  • Senate Committee Launches Investigation of Dish and affiliates

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has begun an investigation of possible bid rigging between Dish and several of its smaller affiliates on a recent $3 billion spectrum auction. The investigation follows a complaint filed by Verizon with the Federal Communication Commission alleging that Dish colluded with its affiliates to violate the bidding rules as well as antitrust laws. (full story here)

Thanks for reading.

PS.  Guest posts, especially about cartel/compliance related developments outside of the United States, are most welcome.

CEO’s Say the Darndest Things (and salespeople too)

CEO’s Say the Darndest Things (and salespeople too)  

Since I spent over 30 years with the Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, people sometimes ask me how investigations get started. This blog post addresses one way: “loose lips sink ships” or put another way “CEO’s Say the Darndest Thing (and salespeople too).”

This is a story from down under. The Chairman of Australia’s Fortescue Metals, Andrew Forrest, was at a business dinner on March 24th when he expressed his frustration that his main rivals, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto were driving down the prices of iron ore with excess production. Mr. Forrest declared:

“I’m absolutely happy to cap my production right now. All of us should cap our production now and we’ll find the iron ore price will go straight back up to $70, $80, $90 and the tax revenues which that will generate will build more schools, more hospitals, more roads, more of everything which Australia needs — universities etc. I’m happy to put that challenge out there: let’s cap our production right here and start acting like grown-ups.”(full story here)

OOPS. The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (which has the great shorthand name: A-Triple C) started an investigation. The ACCC just announced it would no take action against Mr. Forrest because of the “context and circumstances” of his remarks.  The ACCC Chairman Rod Sims warned: “However, it is important that the business community understands that public statements calling for competitors to agree to limit production or to raise prices may constitute a serious cartel ­offence.”  (full statement here).

In the United States an offer to fix prices, even if not accepted, can and has been, prosecuted by the Antitrust Division as mail and/or wire fraud.  And the Federal Trade Commission has charged price-fixing/bid rigging solicitations as violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. That is not to say that either agency would have charged Mr. Forrest for the remarks he made, but with different circumstances, prosecutions have been brought for what are called “invitations to collude.” (A Sherman Act prosecution requires an actual agreement between the competitors, so unless an offer to collude is accepted, it can be prosecuted, but not under the Sherman Act.)  Mr. Forrest’s statement was also problematic because if competitors did raise prices, even if they had already been planning to do so, suspicion of collusion would be high.  And civil law suits may well have followed.

I am going to be making a presentation on this very subject with my friend Barbara Sicalides at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE’s) annual Compliance & Ethics Institute (October 4-7th) in Las Vegas. This is the SCCE’s primary education and networking event for professionals working in the Compliance and Ethics profession across all industries around the world. Sessions at the 2015 conference will offer the latest compliance information on hot topics and current events.   Our session is titled:  CEO’s (and salespeople too) Say The Darndest Things: How an Ill-Advised Statement or Email Can Start an Antitrust Investigation or Lawsuit – Robert E. Connolly, Partner, GeyerGorey LLP; Barbara T. Sicalides, Partner, Pepper Hamilton LLP.  We will have numerous examples, sometimes funny, sometimes not so funny and very expensive, of how companies and individuals have found themselves under investigation and/or charged with antitrust violations for things that simply never should have been said/written.  It should be a good session on how to counsel the unsuspecting of the potential perils of off the cuff remarks.

Hope to see you there.

Thanks for reading.

3C’s: Anti-Cartel Day in Canada

Anti-Cartel Day in Canada

The Canadian Competition Bureau is celebrating “Anti-cartel Day: Helping businesses detect and prevent price-fixing and bid-rigging.” The press release is available here.

Below are some experts where the Commission provides many useful links:

 “The Bureau has developed resources to assist businesses and trade associations in recognizing and preventing cartel activity. The videos were made available on the Bureau’s Facebook page, YouTube channel and its website earlier this week, and include:

 

The press release has this quote from John Pecman, Commissioner of Competition:  “Cartels are corrosive to a healthy marketplace. Anti-cartel Day is a way for us to raise awareness as to the devastating effects of anti-competitive conduct but also to highlight the benefits of compliance for companies and the individuals managing them.”

The following helpful links are also in the press release:

Kudos to Commissioner Pecman and the Canadian Competition Bureau for their efforts in publicizing broadly the benefits of competition/compliance and providing resources to support the effort.

Happy Anti-Cartel Day!

3C’s: Recommended Article on the Auto Parts Cartel

Recommended Article on the Auto Parts Cartel

I am passing on this feature article by Dan Gearino of the Columbus Dispatch published on Sunday, March 22, 2015: Massive Price-Fixing Among Auto-Parts Manufacturers Hurt U.S. Car Buyers.  The article goes beyond the numbers of the record-breaking prosecutions and looks at some of the reasons the cartel flourished for so long and what the executives were (or weren’t) thinking.  First some familiar stats cited in the article:

  • So far, 33 companies have pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $2.4 billion in fines, and the investigation is ongoing.
  • In addition to company sanctions, 28 executives pleaded guilty to individual charges and most of them went to federal prison.  An additional 26 executives have been indicted but have not surrendered to authorities.

The following quotes are all excerpts from the article:

  • The prison sentences were a surprise, he said, because many executives considered this conduct to be merely an “administrative offense.”
  • “Some of the people who (received leniency) were some of the evil, evil people in this thing,” said a midlevel manager for one of the companies that pleaded guilty, a U.S. citizen, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment.
  • He described a culture in which decisions were made by Japanese executives, often working with Japanese executives at other companies, and in which competitors were used to working together.
  • Meanwhile, the many American employees of the companies, even high-level employees, felt shut out from big decisions. In the price-fixing cases, this turned out to be a good thing. All but one of the 54 people charged are Japanese.
  • “Certainly one of the options we will consider will be extraditing them [indicted foreign defendants] from the country where they are located,” said [Marvin] Price, criminal director of the department’s antitrust division.

There are many lessons to be learned from the auto parts cartel capers.  I’ll be writing on some of my thoughts in the future, as I’m sure many others will.

3C’s: Recommended Article on the Auto Parts Cartel

Recommended Article on the Auto Parts Cartel

I am passing on this feature article by Dan Gearino of the Columbus Dispatch published on Sunday, March 22, 2015: Massive Price-Fixing Among Auto-Parts Manufacturers Hurt U.S. Car Buyers.  The article goes beyond the numbers of the record-breaking prosecutions and looks at some of the reasons the cartel flourished for so long and what the executives were (or weren’t) thinking.  First some familiar stats cited in the article:

  • So far, 33 companies have pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $2.4 billion in fines, and the investigation is ongoing.
  • In addition to company sanctions, 28 executives pleaded guilty to individual charges and most of them went to federal prison.  An additional 26 executives have been indicted but have not surrendered to authorities.

The following quotes are all excerpts from the article:

  • The prison sentences were a surprise, he said, because many executives considered this conduct to be merely an “administrative offense.”
  • “Some of the people who (received leniency) were some of the evil, evil people in this thing,” said a midlevel manager for one of the companies that pleaded guilty, a U.S. citizen, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment.
  • He described a culture in which decisions were made by Japanese executives, often working with Japanese executives at other companies, and in which competitors were used to working together.
  • Meanwhile, the many American employees of the companies, even high-level employees, felt shut out from big decisions. In the price-fixing cases, this turned out to be a good thing. All but one of the 54 people charged are Japanese.
  • “Certainly one of the options we will consider will be extraditing them [indicted foreign defendants] from the country where they are located,” said [Marvin] Price, criminal director of the department’s antitrust division.

There are many lessons to be learned from the auto parts cartel capers.  I’ll be writing on some of my thoughts in the future, as I’m sure many others will.

Thanks for reading.